Three or four information time paradoxes revisited

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The paradox of the stalled watch

 This watch is stalled (swiss made but exhausted battery)



- It desperately indicates 5:33':30"

This watch is absolutely accurate

• Twice a day!

– It is useless I cannot tell when...

This watch is absolutely accurate

• But I can tell you when...



- Twice a day at 5:33':30''!

I can tell you when

- Two meanings: one paradox
 - -1. Information about time
 - -2. Time of information delivery

- On Friday afternoon
 - The judge sentences a man to be executed the next week



- « in a day you wouldn't be able to predict the day before »
- The man says « I will never be executed »

- The man:
 - I cannot be executed next Friday
 - Would be last day,
 - could predict on Thursday evening
 - Cannot on Thursday
 - Would be last day (since Friday out)
 - could predict on Wednesday evening
 - -... Cannot on Saturday
 - Would be never



• Execution day Recursion:

sat sun mon	tue	wed	thu	fri
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predicted predicted predicted predicted predicted predicted

- The man will transmit every evening

 « execution day is tomorrow »
- The man is like the stalled watch
 - Transmit always the same information
 - Will be right one day
 - In fact no information is transmitted (entropy zero)

- Disclaimer: this paradox has nothing to do with or against
 - Women...
 - Faith…
 - Iraq...

- Long time ago, the Caliph of baghdad issued the following order
 - Not all our women are faithful wives.
 - I order that any betrayed husband kills his wife the morning after he discovers his unfortune



• At this time, there were 2,009 unfaithful wives in Baghdad.



- Nothing happen during the 2,008 first mornings
- The 2,009th morning all the 2,009 unfaithful wives have been killed

- All the 2,009 unfaithful women killed on the 2,009th morning. How possible?
- Hypothesis:
 - Every husband knows the status of all other husbands in Baghdad
 - He does'nt know his own status. Nobody will tell him.
 - Information is very fast in Baghdad
 - Baghdadis are strict obedient to Caliph order
 - They are also very good mathematicians.
 - No polygamy

Resolution of the Baghdad paradox

- Assume only one unfaithful wife in Baghdad
 - All non betrayed husband sees one unfaithful women in Baghdad
 - The betrayed husband sees none
 - -- But the Caliph says that there is at least one
 - -- Thus the unfaithful wife is his own wife
 - -- He kills her the next morning

Resolution of the Baghdad paradox

- Let assume *n* unfaithful wives
 - Let D_n be the number of days to wait before their killing

$$D_n = n$$

- A betrayed husband sees only *n*-1.
- Since $D_{n-1} = n-1$, if his wife was faithful, then he should read about n-1 murders in the n-1 th day newspaper
- Since not: his wife is unfaithful and he kills her the next morning:

$$D_n = D_{n-1} + 1$$

Baghdad paradox and information theory

- There is a communication code:
 - Every husband that sees *n* unfaithful wives
 - Observes *n* silent days
 - Kills his wife the *n*+1 th morning
 - The murder appears in newspaper.

Variation on Baghdad paradox

- New Caliph statement:
 - More than 2,000 wives are unfaithful.
 - I order that any betrayed husband kills his wife the morning after he discovered his unfortune
- The 9th morning, all the 2,009 unfaithful wives are killed

Variation on Baghdad paradox

- If only 2,001 unfaithful wives, then
 - the betrayed husbands see only 2,000

But the Caliph said there are more

Thus his wife is the 2,001st unfaithful wife

He kills her the morning after

$$D_{2,000+n} = n$$

Variation on Baghdad paradox


- But there is no information in the statement:
 - More than 2,000 wives in Baghdad are unfaithful.
 - Betrayed husbands see 2,008, unbetrayed see 2,009, both more than 2,000.
 - How can it make a difference?


Prisonner paradox

- Most famous counterexample of Nash equilibrium
 - One robbery;
 - Two suspects, A and B, interrogated in separate prisons, cannot communicate
 - 20 years in jail to share
 - If A and B both betray each other, then 10 years each
 - If only is betrayed by the other:, then got full 20 years
 - If none betrays, zero year.

Prisonner paradox

 Collective objective would be no betrayal






State(A)=State(B)=betraying if robbery
State(A)=State(B)= not betraying otherwise

Prisonner paradox

- I(A,B)=H(robbery):
 - If P(robbery)=1/2, then I(A,B)>0
 - But there is no channel between A and B



Prisonner paradox

- If State(A) can be communicated to B before B decides
 - Collective wealth prevails
 - Always State(A)=State(B)=non betraying
 - I(A,B)=0 whatever P(robbery)
 - No information shared!