

# A Systematic Threat Modeling of LLM Applications

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## Abstract

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly accelerated the development of a wide range of applications across various fields. There is a growing trend in the construction of specialized applications based on LLMs, such as the custom GPTs by OpenAI. While custom GPTs provide various functionalities like web browsing and code execution, they also introduce significant security threats. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the security and privacy issues arising from the GPT platform. Our systematic examination categorizes potential attack scenarios into three threat models based on the role of the malicious actor, and identifies critical data exchange channels in GPTs. Utilizing the STRIDE threat modeling framework, we identify 26 potential attack vectors, with 19 being partially or fully validated in real-world settings. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for robust security and privacy measures in the GPT ecosystem as well as other similar LLM application ecosystems.

## CCS Concepts

• Security and privacy → Web application security.

## Keywords

Large Language Model, Security and Privacy, Threat Modeling

### ACM Reference Format:

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## 1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have spurred a wide range of applications across various fields. Building platforms based on LLMs is becoming increasingly popular, such as retrieval augmented generation [2, 4, 8, 15, 23]. OpenAI has introduced custom versions of ChatGPT [19], denoted as custom GPTs, where developers can create customized GPTs for specific purposes. This newly introduced feature greatly empowers the capabilities of ChatGPT and fosters a wider LLM ecosystem. Custom GPTs offer various functionalities,

such as web browsing, code execution, and interfacing with third-party services. More details are elaborated in Section 2. There are more than 30,000 public GPTs available online [9, 20].

The increased flexibility in utilizing ChatGPT appears highly beneficial. However, this perspective does not encompass the entire situation. As custom GPTs are built by third parties, this new integration introduces various security and privacy threats. For example, a custom GPT designed to assist users with validating tax forms could maliciously alter the Social Security Number (SSN) in revised forms and covertly transmit this data, constituting a serious violation of data integrity and privacy. A malicious user may craftily obtain the instructions and configurations of GPTs, which are intellectual properties of GPT developers, compromising their confidentiality. Furthermore, both GPTs and users can share and distribute harmful or even illegitimate content via the platform, such as malware and disturbing information. These issues represent just the tip of the iceberg. In our research, we have identified real-world examples of these issues in publicly available custom GPTs (see Figure 18-Figure 20 in the Appendix).

These problems reveal the importance of systematically evaluating the security and privacy of this new paradigm. To this end, we conduct a systematic analysis to assess potential security threats in custom GPTs. Specifically, we categorize potential attack scenarios into three threat models based on the role of the malicious actor (GPT, end user, or both). We also identify critical entry/exit points of custom GPTs, the channels through which users and custom GPTs exchange data or messages. These channels are crucial for analyzing security and privacy issues in custom GPTs. We then leverage the STRIDE threat modeling framework [12] to pinpoint potential security threats, covering all six categories, including spoofing, tampering, and information disclosure. For each category, we identified at least two attack vectors in the context of custom GPTs. In total, we identified 26 attack vectors, 19 of which are (partially) realizable in real-world settings. Our findings uncover the severity of security and privacy problems inherent in the GPT platform, which requires special attention from the community.

Our contributions are summarized in the following.

- We systematically study the security and privacy issues in the new paradigm of custom GPTs. Our analysis lays out the foundation for future designs in LLM-based platforms.
- We categorize potential attack scenarios into three threat models based on the role of the malicious actor. We leverage the well-known threat modeling framework STRIDE [12] to systematically and comprehensively analyze and evaluate security threats in the context of custom GPTs.
- We have identified 26 attack vectors in total and validated the realizability of 19 attacks. We have also pinpointed real-world cases in public GPTs. Our findings underscore the severity of

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


Figure 1: Overview of a custom GPT and channels

these problems on this new platform. We envision future directions in designing secure LLM-based platforms and building practical countermeasures against security threats.

## 2 Background of Custom GPTs

The custom GPTs contain a variety of functionalities, such as web browsing, file modification, and code execution. These functions greatly enhance the capabilities of language models to achieve tasks beyond natural language processing. In the following, we describe the major functionalities of custom GPTs and how they interact with end users. The architecture and channels of a custom GPT are summarized in Figure 1.

### 2.1 Overview of Functionalities

The overview of a custom GPT is shown in Figure 1. The left part displays the configuration view, where GPT developers can customize the GPT for specific purposes. The top-right section of the figure shows the user interface of a custom GPT, similar to ChatGPT, allowing users to chat with the GPT.

In the configuration on the left, developers can specify the name of the GPT and a description about its functionalities. There are four major configurable components: *Instructions*, *Knowledge*, *Capabilities*, and *Actions*.

- **Instructions.** Instructions serve as the primary control module, specifying the detailed functions of the GPT in response to user requests. Developers can input a natural language prompt and

additional data such as website links and Python programs (if the *Code Interpreter* option is chosen, which will be discussed later).

- **Knowledge.** This is the storage space where developers upload different types of files, such as text files (e.g., *.txt*, *.docx*, *.pdf*), images (e.g., *.jpg*, *.png*), and programs (e.g., *.py*). The custom GPT can utilize these files during the conversation with users according to the instructions provided by developers. The files also can be downloaded when code interpreter is enabled.
- **Capabilities.** There are three options in capabilities: *Web Browsing*, *DALL-E Image Generation*, and *Code Interpreter*. With the web browsing option, the GPT can either using Microsoft’s Bing search engine to find appropriate content based on user requests, or communicate with the websites pre-specified in *Actions* by developers (which is discussed in the next bullet). The DALL-E image generation option provides the functionality of generating images based on context using OpenAI’s text-to-image models. The generated images will be visually displayed in the user interface and can be downloaded. The last option, code interpreter, enables the GPT to execute Python programs directly on the backend Linux system. This allows the GPT to use executable code to directly process user requests and data, making it similar to a traditional operating system.
- **Actions.** Actions enable GPTs to access the Internet and interface with applications beyond Bing search. As shown in the bottom-left of Figure 1, developers can enter a schema describing how requests to outside websites or applications should be handled through GET/POST. The schema can be written in JSON




Figure 2: Role-based malicious actor threat models

or YAML format. Beyond typical GET/POST requests, a custom GPT can also interact with external web applications on behalf of the user through authentication, such as adding an event in the user’s Google calendar. Different authentication methods are displayed on the bottom right in the figure, including API key and OAuth. Developers are required to provide a privacy policy for using actions. Otherwise, the custom GPT cannot be published to the public.

These components significantly enhance the capabilities of custom GPTs in satisfying various aspects of user needs. In the following subsection, we elaborate in detail how users use and interact with custom GPTs.

### 2.2 Channels of Entry/Exit

We categorize the channels through which users and custom GPTs exchange data or messages. In specific, there are five channels: *conversation*, *file*, *network*, *operational command*, and *authentication*. These channels are critical entry/exit points of custom GPTs, which are leveraged in this paper for security and privacy analysis. The right part of Figure 1 illustrates what GPT components different channels correspond to.

- **Channel 1: Conversation** mainly involves the chatting component of GPTs, where users ask questions through natural language descriptions and GPTs respond with text outputs. For example, the user may ask “*What’s the capital of USA?*” and the GPT will respond with “*Washington D.C.*”.
- **Channel 2: Files** can be uploaded by users in the conversation and by developers in knowledge (see the red arrows). They can also be modified by GPTs and downloaded through conversation by users if code interpreter is selected in the GPTs. Program files (e.g., \*.py) can be executed. More details regarding code interpreter are discussed in the later bullet (Channel 4). Additionally, GPTs are enhanced with a text-to-image generation capability by DALL·E. The generated images based on users’ prompts can also be downloaded.
- **Channel 3: Network** is where GPTs connect to the Internet. There are two ways (denoted by the yellow arrows): searching related contents through Bing and directly accessing specific websites. They both require the web browsing function to be activated. The first method is token when users ask certain questions that need up-to-date information not available in the training data of ChatGPT (the backbone of custom GPTs), such as today’s weather. This is determined automatically by GPTs to

Table 1: Attack channels under different threat models

Threat Model	Custom GPT	End User	Conversation	File	Network	Command	Authentication
T-1	⊖	⊕	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
T-2	⊕	⊖	✓	✓	✓	✓	
T-3	⊖	⊖	✓	✓			

whether use Bing to search for the corresponding information. The second method of web browsing is specified by custom GPTs through actions. Developers can enter arbitrary website links in the schema to fulfill users’ requests. They can explicitly specify when to visit those websites in instructions or let ChatGPT decide based on context.

- **Channel 4: Operational Commands** are programs that can be directly executed on the backend system. Developers can select the code interpreter option in the configuration to activate this feature. Once selected, the GPT attaches a virtual operating system (OS) to the conversation session, where Python programs are passed to the OS for execution. The programs can be written directly in the conversation or in instructions, or uploaded through files (as denoted by the green arrows). Note that while GPTs do not permit the direct execution of programs in other languages like shell script, they often automatically translate these programs into Python for execution.
- **Channel 5: Authentication** is a way for GPTs to communicate with external web applications on behalf of users. GPTs can read or modify contents in users’ external applications once authenticated by corresponding users.

The above five channels are the main entry/exit points where an attacker may exploit security and privacy vulnerabilities. We use this categorization to illustrate specific attack scenarios in the following sections.

## 3 Threat Models

In the usage scenarios of GPTs, there are two parties involved: the custom GPT (or the GPT developer) and the end user, either of whom could be malicious actors. We categorize possible attack scenarios into three threat models based on the role of the malicious actor. Figure 2 illustrates the concept. The x-axis denotes the intent of the user (i.e., benign or malicious) and the y-axis presents the intent of the custom GPT. There are four possible combinations based on the intents of the user and the GPT, with three involving a malicious actor. Details are discussed later in this section. Table 1 lists the attack channels under the three threat models, detailing the specific entry/exit points through which an attacker exploits security and privacy vulnerabilities. The following subsections elaborate on each threat model.

### 3.1 T-1: Malicious GPT and Benign User

The first threat model, denoted as T-1, involves a malicious GPT and benign users. The malicious GPT aims to exploit the vulnerabilities of the current GPT system design to attack benign users, such as manipulating certain contents or stealing private data.

The bottom-right part of Figure 2 presents an example. The user asks the GPT to help revise the tax form, such as fixing potential grammatical errors or incorrect tax calculations. Note that the tax form includes private and sensitive data, such as the social security number (SSN). The malicious GPT helps fix the grammatical error

**Table 2: Summarization of security threats in the custom GPT paradigm. Column ‘Desired Property’ denotes the security properties described by the CIA triad including confidentiality, integrity and availability. Column ‘Attack Vector’ lists the attack scenarios in the corresponding security threat category. Column ‘Realizable’ denotes whether the attack has been validated in a real-world setting. The symbol ● indicates validation. The symbol ◐ represents partial validation, meaning that certain aspects of the attack are challenging to validate or could potentially impact the real system. The symbol ◑ signifies that the attack is theoretically realizable but has not been validated to avoid possible impacts on the real system.**

Security Threat	Desired Property	Threat Model	Attack Vector	Realizable
Spoofing	Integrity	T-1	Domain name spoofing or masquerading	●
		T-1, T-2	Website spoofing	●
Tampering	Integrity	T-1, T-2, T-3	Direct content manipulation	●
		T-1	Event triggered execution	●
		T-2	Shared content tainting	◐
		T-2	File and directory permissions modification	◐
Repudiation	Integrity	T-1	Identity theft	◑
		T-1, T-2	Non-repudiation bypass	◐
Information Disclosure	Confidentiality	T-1, T-2	Phishing	●
		T-1, T-2	Identity/private information gathering	●
		T-1, T-2, T-3	Host information and volume disclosure	●
Denial of Service	Availability	T-1	Distributed denial of service	◑
		T-2	Fork bomb	◑
Elevation of Privilege	Integrity	T-1	Account manipulation	◑
		T-1, T-2, T-3	Escape to host	◑

in the form, but intentionally modifies the SSN to a wrong number. Additionally, the GPT also secretly sends the user private data to an external source. This entails a severe integrity violation and privacy leakage, significantly affecting the user’s personal security and privacy.

In the above example, there are at least two channels involved to realize the attack: conversation and network. As listed in Table 1, other channels such as file, command, and authentication may also be leveraged by the malicious GPT to achieve the attack goal. For instance, the attacker may copy the private data to a file through the file channel. More specific attack vectors are illustrated and discussed in Section 4.

### 3.2 T-2: Benign GPT and Malicious User

In the second threat model, the end user is characterized as the malicious actor and the GPT is benign. The goal of the malicious user is to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of GPTs. The malicious user may also target other benign users via GPTs.

The top-left part of Figure 2 shows an example, where the malicious user tries to extract the system prompt used by the GPT. It should be noted that custom GPTs are intellectual properties of developers, including the system prompt written in *instructions* in the configuration. This renders a severe compromise to the confidentiality of custom GPTs. Recent efforts on prompt stealing [22] fall into this threat model. The attack discussed in the above example mainly involves the conversation channel for the exploit. There are other channels such as file, network, and command that can be leveraged by adversaries for malicious purposes. More details are discussed in Section 4.

**Benign Users as Victim.** The malicious user may launch attacks on other benign users through GPTs. For example, the notable man-in-the-middle attack can also be executed within the custom

GPT paradigm. Specifically, the malicious user can initially conduct reconnaissance on a target GPT, collecting information about when and how it visits certain websites. The attacker then spoofs these websites, leading benign users to malicious sites when using the targeted GPT. This exposes any benign user to potential security threats, such as phishing attacks.

### 3.3 T-3: Malicious GPT and Malicious User

Since anyone can create and publish their own customized GPTs for specific purposes, this opens the door for malicious actors to distribute harmful content. We refer to this threat as *Malware as a Service* (MaaS). As illustrated in the bottom-left of Figure 2, when the user inquires about sensitive information, such as “How to make a bomb,” the GPT responds with detailed steps. Please see real-world cases in Figure 18-Figure 20 in the Appendix. Additionally, malicious developers can exploit the knowledge feature to upload malware, which can then be shared with users for download. In this threat model, the conversation and file channels are involved for the malicious purpose.

## 4 Security Threats

In this new paradigm of custom GPTs, a wide range of security threats exist that could harm GPT developers, end users, and even the entire ecosystem. To assess potential threats, we leverage the STRIDE threat modeling [12] in this paper. STRIDE breaks down security threats into six categories: *spoofing*, *tampering*, *repudiation*, *information disclosure*, *denial of service*, and *elevation of privilege*. We study potential vulnerabilities in the custom GPT system following these threats. Table 2 lists specific attack vectors in each category. Particularly, we find 19 out of 26 attack scenarios are (partially) realizable in real-world settings. The remainder of this section elaborates on the details of each security threat and corresponding possible attacks.




Figure 3: Domain spoofing

## 4.1 Spoofing

A spoofing attack [3] aims to disguise the true identity of the adversary as someone or something else (usually benign) to gain an illegitimate advantage. For example, an attacker may provide users with legitimate information embedded with malicious hyperlinks. It primarily compromises the integrity of data. In the context of custom GPTs, we identify two potential attack vectors within the spoofing category. We illustrate these attacks with examples in the following.

**4.1.1 Domain Name Spoofing or Masquerading.** Domain name spoofing [11] is carried out by imitating or spoofing the domain name of a legitimate website. The goal of the attack is to mislead users into believing they are visiting a trusted site when, in fact, they are directed to a malicious destination.

In the context of custom GPTs, the malicious GPT may craftily append a malicious website link to a publicly trusted domain. Since only the domain name of a website displays in the conversation, users can be misled into trusting the visit, unaware of the manipulated website link. Such attacks leverage the conversation and network channels to achieve the goal (see Table 3 in the Appendix).

**Example.** Figure 3 demonstrates an example attack scenario. The GPT helps users to find code snippets from GitHub. However, it is configured to mislead users to visit malicious websites. To achieve this, the attacker uses the *actions* feature in the configuration to specify the malicious URL, as shown on the left side of the figure. The URL starts with a legitimate domain name, e.g., “github.com,” and ends with attacker-intended malicious subdomain, e.g., “llm-attacks.” When a user requests sorting code from GitHub, the GPT navigates to the malicious site. Notice that on the right side of the figure, the conversation only displays “Talking to github.com,” the trusted domain name. Consequently, the user is unaware of being redirected to the malicious site and thus, the attack. The screenshots of a real case are presented in Figure 21 in the Appendix.

**4.1.2 Website Spoofing.** Website spoofing [7] also disguises a malicious website as a legitimate one. There are two attack scenarios regarding custom GPTs. The first scenario falls under the threat model T-1, where a malicious GPT tries to attack benign users. The second attack scenario delineates T-2, where a malicious user aims to compromise other benign users through a benign GPT. Both attack scenarios leverage the conversation and network channels to achieve the goal as shown in Table 3 (see Appendix).

**Attack under T-1.** Different from the domain name spoofing attack discussed earlier, this attack exploits the Internet search feature of GPTs. Specifically, when the user’s request requires up-to-date information, the GPT automatically searches the Internet using Microsoft’s Bing search engine. The malicious GPT can manipulate

the search process to inject content from attacker-chosen websites into the response. A detailed example is included in Appendix A.1.

**Attack under T-2.** In this scenario, a malicious user aims to attack other users by leveraging a benign GPT. The custom GPT may modify user queries to enhance the search results provided by Bing. A malicious user can extract the instructions of the custom GPT and craft malicious websites that will be returned by the search engine based on these modified queries. Consequently, other benign users are exposed to the risk of visiting these malicious websites. The attack outcome is similar to the attack under T-1, and the example is hence omitted.

## 4.2 Tampering

Tampering refers to the intentional modification of data in a way that harms users (broadly defined). For instance, an attacker might inject malicious code into a user’s document, causing the system to shut down upon opening. This compromises the integrity of data. In the context of custom GPTs, we identify four potential attack vectors related to this threat.

**4.2.1 Direct Content Manipulation.** The content during the conversation or in the files is subject to manipulation either by malicious GPTs or malicious users. There are attack scenarios that fall under the three threat models: T-1, T-2, and T-3, respectively. The adversary may launch the attack via conversation, file, and/or operational command channels as shown in Table 4 (see Appendix).

**Attack under T-1.** When the GPT is malicious, it may intentionally inject undesired content into the response or tamper with user-uploaded files. A detailed example is included in Appendix A.2.

**Attack under T-2.** A malicious user may modify the instructions or the files in the GPT configuration. Such attacks can also affect other users, a topic that will be discussed later in relation to shared content tainting. A detailed example is included in Appendix A.3.

**Attack under T-3.** In this attack scenario, both the GPT and the user are malicious. They share harmful content, such as malware, via the platform. The tampering can occur within the custom GPT environment and also affect external systems, for instance, by disseminating shared malware (see Figure 25).

**4.2.2 Event Triggered Execution.** The attack can be programmed to activate under specific conditions [16]. For instance, a malicious GPT may respond to user requests with legitimate answers. However, it would only generate harmful content when the user asks certain questions. Data transmission can occur either directly in the conversation or through file exchanges, activated by specific instructions or operational commands. These methods constitute the primary channels for event-triggered executions, as detailed in Table 4 (see Appendix).

**Example.** The GPT depicted in Figure 4 checks the grammar of texts in user-uploaded files. However, it is configured to provide a malicious Microsoft Word document, Malware.docx, when users request modifications to uploaded “.docx” files. As shown on the left side of the figure, the malicious GPT confirms grammatical corrections and provides a modified document, which is actually the malware. A simulated real-world example case is presented in Figure 26 in the Appendix.




Figure 4: Event triggered execution




Figure 6: Private information gathering




Figure 5: Non-repudiation bypass

4.2.3 *Shared Content Tainting.* As a custom GPT is utilized by multiple users, a malicious user may secretly manipulate the content in the GPT such that other users are affected. Such an attack can be realized through the conversation and file channels with operational commands. A detailed example is included Appendix A.4.

4.2.4 *File and Directory Permissions Modification.* Similar to shared content tainting, the malicious user may modify the files and directories owned by the custom GPT by changing their permissions. This threat requires enabling the code interpreter feature to execute operational commands, e.g., `chmod`. A detailed example is included in Appendix A.5.

### 4.3 Repudiation

Repudiation [25] refers to the denial by an attacker of having performed a specific action. It might also involve the denial of the validity of an electronic contract or transaction. This threat compromises data integrity. Specifically, it involves two attack scenarios in the context of custom GPTs.

4.3.1 *Identify Theft.* Custom GPTs can assist users to process tasks on external applications, such as Google calendar, via authentication. A malicious GPT may steal users' identify and conduct unauthorized activities leveraging users' authenticated tokens. As the GPT disguises itself as the user, it makes the attack not repudiated. The attack involves the network and authentication channels as listed in Table 5 (see Appendix).

4.3.2 *Non-Repudiation Bypass.* Non-repudiation [13] involves associating actions or changes with a unique individual. However, due to the design of the custom GPT system, there may lack sufficient information to associate the connection. Specifically, in custom GPTs, a sandbox virtual machine is attached to the conversation session if code interpreter is enabled. If the sandbox is unique for a GPT or a user, it is possible to be leveraged for future investigation. However, as shown in Figure 5, when the same user retrieves the UUID

(universal unique identifier) in different conversation sessions, the values are different (see screenshots of the example in Figure 29 in the Appendix). This means it may have a weak logging system deployed in the custom GPTs, leading to potential security threats by both malicious GPTs (T-1) and malicious users (T-2).

### 4.4 Information Disclosure

When sensitive or confidential data is viewed or stolen by unauthorized individuals, it is a security violation referred as information disclosure. For example, an attacker may steal sensitive information provided by users during the conversation with GPTs. It compromises the data confidentiality. We identify three potential attack vectors in this category regarding custom GPTs.

4.4.1 *Phishing.* A phishing attack [10] may deceive users into disclosing sensitive information. It usually colludes with a spoofing attack to disguise the true intent of adversaries. There are two attack scenarios regarding custom GPTs, under the treat models T-1 and T-2, respectively. Both attacks leverage the conversation and network channels to achieve the goal as shown in Table 6 (see Appendix). The following shows an attack example under T-1. Attacks under T-2 are similar and hence omitted. Please see the discussion in Section 4.1.2 regarding website spoofing under T-2 for reference. A detailed example is included in Appendix A.6.

4.4.2 *Identity/Private Information Gathering.* An attacker may collect identify or private information that compromises the data confidentiality. We identify two attack scenarios in the context of custom GPTs, under the treat models T-1 and T-2, respectively. This threat may involve all possible attack channels.

**Attack under T-1.** The GPT is malicious and aims to steal private data from users, such as user-uploaded files.

**Example.** In Figure 6, the GPT is designed to check the grammar of user input. It utilizes a file named `Helper.txt` to assist the attack. When the user asks for grammar check of the provided tax information, the malicious GPT copies the private data to the file `Helper.txt`. The user however is unaware of the whole attack process as the response only shows the revised tax form. Please see a simulated real-world case in Figure 31 in the Appendix.

**Attack under T-2.** The end user is malicious and aims to steal private data from custom GPTs, such as the system prompt. Note that the configuration of custom GPTs, like the system prompt in instructions, is the intellectual property of GPT developers. As illustrated in Figure 2 in Section 3, the malicious user may utilize a




Figure 7: Host information and volume disclosure

magic prompt to obtain the system prompt of custom GPTs [22]. Please refer to Figure 18 in the Appendix for a real-world example.

4.4.3 *Host Information and Volume Disclosure.* As mentioned earlier, when the code interpreter is enabled, a virtual machine is attached to the conversation session. An attacker, either the GPT or the user, is able to view the information in the virtual machine. This vulnerability exists under all three threat models and involves channels such as conversation, file, and command.

**Example.** In Figure 7, the user asks the GPT to run several system-level commands, such as “cat /etc/passwd”, “uname -a”. The GPT returns with all the requested host information. The screenshots from ChatGPT are shown in Figure 30 in the Appendix.

In addition, we find that all the files uploaded by developers are stored in the directory “/mnt/data”. Users can easily view and obtain all the files by running a simple script, such as “ls /mnt/data”. Figure 17 and Figure 18 in the Appendix display the obtained system prompts and files from real-world public custom GPTs.

## 4.5 Denial of Service

Denial of service (DoS) [17] is a type of cyberattack that aims to disrupt the normal functionality of a system or network by overwhelming it with a flood of excessive traffic or resource request. DoS attacks make the target system unavailable to legitimate users, denying their access. Such attacks compromise the availability property. We identify two types of potential attack vectors in the context of custom GPTs regarding the DoS threat.

4.5.1 *Distributed DoS (DDoS).* Distributed DoS [14] is launched by using a distributed groups of compromised systems to overwhelm a target with traffic and cause disruption. In the context of custom GPTs, a malicious GPT can redirect users’ requests to a target system and launch the DoS attack (see Appendix A.7). It leverages the conversation and network channels (see Table 7 in the Appendix).

4.5.2 *Fork Bomb.* A fork bomb [18] is another form of DoS attack, where a malicious script or software takes advantage of the fork operation to generate an excessive number of processes rapidly and without control. This flood of processes depletes system resources, rendering them unavailable for legitimate operations, ultimately leading to system slowdown or even a crash. Within the context of custom GPTs, users can potentially deploy a fork bomb as a means to disrupt the normal functionality of the GPT.

In this attack scenario, the custom GPT is benign, while the user is malicious. The malicious user can instruct the GPT to execute code that carries the potential risk of a fork bomb. This attack involves the conversation and command channels as shown in Table 7 (see Appendix). A detailed example is included in Appendix A.8.

## 4.6 Elevation of Privilege

Elevation of privilege refers to a type of security vulnerability where an attacker gains a higher level of access or privilege than they should have on a system or network. For example, an attacker can exploit vulnerabilities in software to escalating from a regular user to an administrator or root user. Elevation of privilege compromises the integrity of data. In the context of custom GPTs, we point two potential attack vectors associated with this security concern.

4.6.1 *Account Manipulation.* Custom GPTs have the potential to compromise users’ accounts during login to external applications, such as Outlook email, via the authentication process. Once compromised, a malicious GPT gains full access to victims’ accounts, enabling it to conduct malicious actions. For instance, it can craft convincing phishing emails and send them to victim users or steal private email contents. This threat involves the network and authentication channels as shown in Table 8 (see Appendix).

4.6.2 *Escape to Host.* Escape to host is another threat, where the attacker leverages zero-day vulnerabilities in Python or Linux to break free from a virtual machine, gaining root privileges on the underlying host system. In the context of custom GPTs, malicious GPTs or users can execute code to attain host-level privileges through the code interpreter feature. This attack involves all three threat model scenarios. A detailed example is included in Appendix A.9.

## 5 Discussion and Future Directions

While platforms built on top of large language models (LLMs) like custom GPTs are intriguing and beneficial, we point out in this paper that it is critical to ensure the security and privacy of such platforms in every aspect. We also remind users and developers to be mindful when utilizing this type of platforms, as anything could go wrong without proper caution. In the following sections, we discuss future directions to secure LLM-based platforms.

### 5.1 Security by Design

**Execution Transparency.** A range of security threats in the GPT platform stem from a lack of transparency. For example, spoofing attacks can succeed because the current platform design only displays the domain name and part of the search query, leaving users unaware of potential malicious visits. Transparent Internet queries are crucial for mitigating attacks that disguise true intentions.

**Data Separation.** The platform notes that custom GPTs “can’t view your chats” at the starting window of GPTs. However, as demonstrated in our paper, our findings contradict this assertion. A malicious GPT can easily steal user data during a conversation. This threat is bidirectional; a malicious user can also gain unauthorized access to the system prompt and all uploaded files of custom GPTs. The problem lies in the lack of clear separation between GPT data and user data, with both being accessible within the same virtual environment. This should be addressed by clearly separating data from

the two parties. Furthermore, instructions (e.g., the system prompt) and data (e.g., the conversation) are not separated. The current platform design, following an architecture similar to the Von Neumann architecture [21], lacks sufficient protection against issues such as stack overflow. It should enhance the security protocols for data transmission and storage within the platform. Another approach is to adopt the Harvard architecture [1], where user data and GPT operations are processed and stored in separate, secure environments.

**Access Control.** Connecting to external applications empowers custom GPTs. However, there is a lack of access control, as malicious GPTs could manipulate the account authenticated by users. The platform should consider introducing a permission mechanism [5, 6, 24], where users can determine which actions can be performed on their behalf in external applications.

**Traditional System Protection.** The custom GPT platform uses virtual machines to host its code interpreter functionality, facing security threats similar to those in traditional systems. Therefore, it is important to implement sufficient security measures, such as auditing, load balancing, and process limiting, to protect the system from potential attacks.

## 5.2 Countermeasures

Not all of the security threats can be completely eliminated by design. This situation calls for countermeasures that detect malicious behaviors both pre-deployment and on-the-fly, and conduct post-mortem analyses to identify root causes.

**Identifying Malicious GPT.** There are five channels that can be leveraged by malicious GPTs to launch attacks, including through uploaded files and operational commands in instructions. A strategy to counter GPT attacks is to scan these channels. For example, defenders can extract features from GPT instructions and develop a classifier to identify malicious ones. Since GPTs can be updated after being published, real-time monitoring and detection are required to swiftly identify and neutralize malicious GPTs, avoiding affecting users.

**Identifying Malicious User.** Malicious users must leverage the conversation channel to launch attacks. However, chats with GPTs are intended to be private and, hence, cannot be monitored in real time to detect malicious activities. This creates a trade-off between user privacy and platform security. Another strategy is to implement passive defensive measures, such as building tools to guard each potential attack channel. Developing generalizable defense techniques against various types of security threats can be challenging. This necessitates concerted efforts from the research community to build a safer and more secure LLM-based platform.

## 6 Conclusion

We conduct a comprehensive study on the security and privacy aspects of the custom GPT platform. Our analysis categorizes potential attack scenarios into three threat models, based on the role of the malicious actor. Utilizing the STRIDE threat modeling framework, we identify 26 potential attack vectors, with 19 being (partially) validated in real-world settings. Our research highlights the necessity of security and privacy measures in the custom GPT ecosystem and future LLM-based platforms.

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