# Local Differential Privacy (Part 1)

- Definition
- Frequency Oracle
  - Tianhao Wang, Jeremiah Blocki, Ninghui Li, Somesh Jha: <u>Locally Differentially Private Protocols for Frequency</u> <u>Estimation</u>. USENIX Security Symposium 2017
- Heavy Hitter Identification
  - Tianhao Wang, Ninghui Li, Somesh Jha: <u>Locally Differentially</u> <u>Private Heavy Hitter Identification</u>. IEEE TDSC (2021)
- Frequent Itemset Mining
  - Tianhao Wang, Ninghui Li, Somesh Jha: <u>Locally Differentially</u> <u>Private Frequent Itemset Mining</u>. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018

### From DP to LDP: Formal Definition

Idea of DP: Any output should be about as likely regardless of whether or not I am in the dataset A randomized algorithm *A* satisfies ε-differential privacy, iff for any two neighboring datasets *D* and *D'* and for any output *O* of *A*,

$$\Pr[\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{D}) = \mathbf{O}] \le \exp(\mathbf{\varepsilon}) \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{D}') = \mathbf{O}]$$

A randomized algorithm A satisfies  $\varepsilon$ -local differential privacy, iff for any two nputs x and x' and for any output y of A,  $\Pr[A(x) = y] \le \exp(\varepsilon) \cdot \Pr[A(x') = y]$ 

Run by $\varepsilon$  is also called privacy budgetSmaller  $\varepsilon \rightarrow$  stronger privacy

berson

Idea of LDP: Any output should be about as likely regardless of my secret

# Properties of (Centralized) DP

A randomized algorithm A satisfies  $\varepsilon$ -differential privacy, iff for any two neighboring datasets D and D' and for any output O of A,

 $\Pr[\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{D}) = \mathbf{O}] \le \exp(\mathbf{\varepsilon}) \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{D}') = \mathbf{O}]$ 

- Post-processing (of the output) is free
  - does no What about LDP?
- Parallel composition
  - partition the dataset into subsets, each applying an  $\varepsilon_i$ -DP algorithm, the overall result satisfies  $\max(\varepsilon_i)$ -DP
- Sequential composition
  - apply k DP algorithms, each using  $\varepsilon_i$ , result satisfies  $\sum \varepsilon_i$  DP

# Properties of LDP

A randomized algorithm A satisfies  $\varepsilon$ -local differential privacy, iff for any two inputs x and x' and for any output y of A,  $\Pr[A(x) = y] \le \exp(\varepsilon) \cdot \Pr[A(x') = y]$ 

- Post-processing is also free
  - does not consume privacy budget
- No direct parallel composition
  - because each user only has one record, which cannot be partitioned
  - but one can apply different questions to different subsets of users
- Sequential composition
  - apply k LDP algorithms, each using  $\varepsilon_i$ , result satisfies  $\sum \varepsilon_i$  LDP

### Key difference between DP and LDP

- DP concerns two neighboring datasets
- LDP concerns any two values
- As a result, the amount of noise is different: In aggregated result for counting queries
  - Noise in DP is  $\Omega(1)$  (sensitivity is constant)
  - But in LDP, even noise for each user is constant, the aggregated result is  $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$  [1]
  - If the result is normalized (divide the result with n), noise is  $\Omega\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$  versus  $\Omega\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right)$

[1] Optimal lower bound for differentially private multi-party aggregation by T.-H. H. Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song





### Frequency Estimation

- Assumption: each user has a single value x from a categorical domain D
- Goal: Estimate the frequency of any value in D



### Frequency Oracle Framework

y



x ≔ E(v)
takes input value v from
domain D and outputs an
encoded value x
y ≔ P(x)

takes an encoded value x and outputs y.

*P* is  $\varepsilon$  -LDP iff for any v and v'from *D*, and any valid output *y*,  $\frac{\Pr[P(E(v))=y]}{\Pr[P(E(v'))=y]} \le e^{\varepsilon}$ 



•  $c \coloneqq Est(\{y\})$ takes reports  $\{y\}$  from all users and outputs estimations c(v) for any value v in domain D



# Random Response (Warner'65)

• Survey technique for private questions



- To get unbiased estimation of the distribution:
  - If  $n_v$  out of n people have the disease, we expect to see

 $E[I_v] = 0.75n_v + 0.25(n - n_v)$  "yes" answers

•  $c(n_v) = \frac{I_v - 0.25n}{0.5}$  is the unbiased estimation of number of patients

# Concrete Example (Let's do math)

A patient will answer "yes" w/p 75%, and "no" w/p 25%

	truth	->yes	->no
yes	80	40+20	0+20
no	20	0+5	10+5

$I_{m} = 0.25n$	observed	65	35
$c(n_v) = \frac{1}{0.5}$	estimate	80	20

# (Simple) Proofs

- $E[c(n_v)] = n_v$
- We have

• 
$$c(n_v) = \frac{I_v - 0.25n}{0.5}$$
  
•  $E[I_v] = 0.75n_v + 0.25(n - n_v)$   
•  $E[c(n_v)] = \frac{E[I_v] - 0.25n}{0.5} = \frac{0.75n_v + 0.25(n - n_v) - 0.25n}{0.5} = n_v$ 

- Can be extended to other protocols
- Variance can be derived similarly

### Probabilistic Analysis

Compare the result c(v) with the ground truth  $n_v$ .

- c(v) is a random variable
- Show that c(v) is unbiased:  $E[c(n_v)] = n_v$
- Compute the variance of c(v): Var[c(v)]
- Use appropriate inequality to bound the error
  - Bernstein or Hoeffding inequalities
- Transform from variance to error bound
  - Since c(v) is a binomial variable (sum of iid Bernoulli variables)

### From Two to Any Categories



# Generalized Random Response (Direct Encoding)

<ul> <li>User:</li> <li>Intuitively, the higher p, the more accurate</li> <li>Encode x - v (suppose v from v - (1,2,, w))</li> </ul>						
<ul> <li>Toss a</li> <li>If it is l</li> </ul>	However, when d is large, p becomes small (for the same $\varepsilon$ ) $1-p$					
• Otherwise, report any other value with probability $q = \frac{1}{d-1}$						
3	p(d=2)	p(d=8)	p(d = 128)	p(d = 1024)		
0.1	0.52	0.13	0.016	0.001		
1	0.73	0.27	0.027	0.002		
2	0.88	0.51	0.057	0.007		
4	0.98	0.88	0.307	0.05		
<ul> <li>Unbiase To get rid of dependency on domain size, we move to the unary encoding protocols.</li> </ul>						

# Unary Encoding (Basic RAPPOR)

- Encode the value v into a bit string  $\mathbf{x} \coloneqq \vec{0}, \mathbf{x}[v] \coloneqq 1$ • e.g.,  $D = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, v = 3$ , then  $\mathbf{x} = [0, 0, 1, 0]$
- $\bullet$  Perturb each bit, preserving it with probability p

• 
$$p_{1 \to 1} = p_{0 \to 0} = p = \frac{e^{\varepsilon/2}}{e^{\varepsilon/2} + 1}$$
  $p_{1 \to 0} = p_{0 \to 1} = q = \frac{1}{e^{\varepsilon/2} + 1}$   
•  $p_{1 \to 0} = p_{0 \to 1} = q = \frac{1}{e^{\varepsilon/2} + 1}$ 

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\Pr[P(E(v'))=x]}{\Pr[P(E(v'))=x]} \le \frac{p_{1\to 1}}{p_{0\to 1}} \times \frac{p_{0\to 0}}{p_{1\to 0}} = e^{\varepsilon}$$

- Since x is unary encoding of v, x and x' differ in two locations
- Intuition:
  - By unary encoding, each location can only be 0 or 1, effectively reducing d in each location to 2. (But privacy budget is halved.)
  - When *d* is large, UE is better than DE.
- To estimate frequency of each value, do it for each bit.



# Laplacian (Gaussian)

- Instead of using randomize response for each bit, add Laplacian (Gaussian) noise to each bit.
  - Sensitivity is 2, because two vectors differ in two bits.
- It is equivalent to the centralized setting, but the number of record is only 1.
- The server aggregates the results.
- This is worse than UE.

# Optimized Unary Encoding (UE)

• In UE, 1 and 0 are treated symmetrically

• 
$$p_{1\to 1} = p_{0\to 0} = \frac{e^{\varepsilon/2}}{e^{\varepsilon/2}+1}$$
,  $p_{1\to 0} = p_{0\to 1} = \frac{1}{e^{\varepsilon/2}+1}$ 

- **Observation:** In the input, there are a lot more 0's than 1's when *d* is large.
- Key Insight: Perturb 0 and 1 differently and should reduce  $p_{0 \to 1}$  as much as possible

$$\begin{array}{ll} \bullet \ p_{1 \rightarrow 1} = \frac{1}{2}, & p_{1 \rightarrow 0} = \frac{1}{2} \\ \bullet \ p_{0 \rightarrow 0} = \frac{e^{\varepsilon}}{e^{\varepsilon} + 1}, & p_{0 \rightarrow 1} = \frac{1}{e^{\varepsilon} + 1} \\ \bullet \ \frac{p_{1 \rightarrow 1}}{p_{0 \rightarrow 1}} \times \frac{p_{0 \rightarrow 0}}{p_{1 \rightarrow 0}} \le \ e^{\epsilon} \end{array}$$

# Binary Local Hash

Local, Private, Efficient Protocols for Succinct Histograms R. Bassily, A. Smith. STOC 2015.

- The original protocol uses a shared random matrix; this is an equivalent description
- Each user uses a random hash function H from D to {0,1} (g=2)
- The user then perturbs the hashed bit (encode) with probabilities

• 
$$p = \frac{e^{\varepsilon}}{e^{\varepsilon} + g - 1} = \frac{e^{\varepsilon}}{e^{\varepsilon} + 1}$$
,  $q = \frac{1}{e^{\varepsilon} + g - 1} = \frac{1}{e^{\varepsilon} + 1}$ 

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\Pr[P(E(v)) = H(v)]}{\Pr[P(E(v')) = H(v)]} = \frac{p}{q} \le e^{\varepsilon}$$

- The user then reports the bit and the hash function
- The aggregator increments the reported group

• 
$$E[I_v] = n_v \cdot p + (n - n_v) \cdot (\frac{1}{2}q + \frac{1}{2}p)$$

• Unbiased Estimation:  $c(v) = \frac{l_v - n \cdot \frac{1}{2}}{p - \frac{1}{2}}$ 

### Example



#### Because of $\frac{1}{2}$ , results is worse than UE



# Optimized Local Hash (OLH)

- Observation: It is not necessary to hash into one bit.
- Conjecture: By hashing into a larger range, the result might be better.
- Technique: Optimize variance.
- Result: When  $g = e^{\varepsilon} + 1$ , we can achieve better accuracy.
- Intuition:
  - In original BLH, secret is compressed into a bit, perturbed and transmitted.
  - Balance between the two steps.

### Comparison of Mechanisms



Table 1: Comparison of Communication Cost, Computation Cost Incurred by the Aggregator, and Variances for different methods.



### Two other protocols

- Subset Selection
  - S. Wang, L. Huang, P. Wang, Y. Nie, H. Xu, W. Yang, X. Li, and C. Qiao. Mutual information optimally local private discrete distribution estimation. arXiv 2016.
  - M. Ye and A. Barg. Optimal schemes for discrete distribution estimation under locally differential privacy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 2018.
- Hadamard Response
  - A. Jayadev, Z. Sun, and H. Zhang. Communication Efficient, Sample Optimal, Linear Time Locally Private Discrete Distribution Estimation. arXiv 2018.

### Subset Selection

• Encode value v into a bit string  $x \coloneqq \vec{0}, x[v] \coloneqq 1$ 

• e.g.,  $D = \{1,2,3,4\}, v = 3$ , then x = [0,0,1,0]

- Instead of perturbing each bit independently, as in Unary Encoding, do the following things:
  - Randomly partition D into g subsets of equal size (|D| is divided by  $g, g = e^{\varepsilon} + 1$ )
  - Report the subset that contains v w/p p, report any other subset w/p q
  - $\frac{p}{q} \le e^{\varepsilon}$
- Variance is slightly better than OUE (by a constant, especially when |D| is small).

### Hadamard Response

- In Binary Local Hash, each user uses a random hash function H from D to {0,1}
- The original description uses a random matrix
  - Each user takes a random column
  - Each entry corresponds to one value
- In Hadamard Response, the Hadamard matrix is used (less random)
- Evaluation is asymptotically faster
- When |D| is large, and one is only interested in a subset of D (as the case of heavy hitter identification), theoretical evaluation time is the same (but practically faster than evaluating hash functions).
- Not clear whether can be generalized to non-binary case

# Summary of LDP Frequency Oracle Mechanisms

- Generalized Random Response
- Unary Encoding (SUE and OUE)
  - Can also be viewed as reporting random subsets
  - A variant to fix the size of reported subset
- Local Hashing Approach (BLH and OLH)
  - One way to implement BLH is to use Hadamard Response

# On answering multiple questions

- Previously works (including centralized DP) suggest splitting privacy budget
- For example, when a user answers two questions, privacy budgets are  $\varepsilon/2$  and  $\varepsilon/2$  (assuming the two questions are of equal importance)
- In the centralized setting, there are sequential composition and parallel composition
  - By partitioning users, one uses to parallel composition
  - By split privacy budget, one uses sequential composition
  - The two can basically produce equivalent results
- What about the local setting?

# On answering multiple questions

- Measure the frequency accuracy for one question
  - Assume OLH is used, for each question

• 
$$Var[c(v)/n] = \frac{q \cdot (1-q)}{n \cdot (p-q)^2} = \frac{4e^{\varepsilon}}{n \cdot (e^{\varepsilon}-1)^2}$$

- Assume sample variance is small
- Normalize since two approach have different number of users
- Two settings:
  - Split privacy budget:  $Var[c(v)/n] = \frac{4e^{\varepsilon/2}}{n \cdot (e^{\varepsilon/2}-1)^2}$

• Partition users: 
$$Var\left[c(v)/\frac{1}{2}n\right] = \frac{8e^{\varepsilon}}{n \cdot (e^{\varepsilon}-1)^2}$$

- Algebra shows that it is better to partition users
- Can be generalized to Q > 2 questions

# On answering multiple questions

- If one is interested in K > 1 questions
  - Partition users:  $Var[c(v)/\{Q \ c \ K\}n] = \frac{4\{Q \ c \ K\}e^{\varepsilon}}{n \cdot (e^{\varepsilon}-1)^2}$
  - Split privacy budget: faster estimation algorithm
    - Appendix in Locally Differentially Private Heavy Hitter Identification. T. Wang, N. Li, S. Jha. arXiv 2017
    - CALM: Consistent Adaptive Local Marginal for Marginal Release under Local Differential Privacy. Z. Zhang, T. Wang, N. Li, S. He, J. Chen. CCS 2018
  - Variance is more complicated
    - Conjecture when K > Q/2, split privacy budget will be better

### How to interpret the results

- Amount of noise is constant for each category
- If the true count is small, it may be overwhelmed by the noise, especially when domain size is big
- Estimates that are close to the quantity of noise will be replaced with 0



# LDP Applications

Applications built from LDP algorithms

Focus on

- Heavy hitter identification
- Frequent itemset mining



# Heavy Hitter Estimation

# The heavy hitter problem

- Goal: Find the k most frequent values from a large D
- Scenario (Application): Find the most popular
  - url
  - hashtag
  - new phrase
- Assumption:
  - each user has a single value x and it is represented in bits
  - *D* is large (when *D* is small, frequency oracle suffices)

# A First Solution

- Simpler Goal: Find one most frequent value from *D*
- Idea:
  - Users are partitioned into four groups
  - Each user reports one portion of its string (segment)
  - Server queries FO to one find frequent pattern in each segment
  - Concatenate the four frequent patterns

![](_page_34_Figure_7.jpeg)

# A First Solution

- Goal: Find k most frequent values from D
- Idea:
  - Server use FO to find k frequent nettorns in each Drawback:
  - Composing the four segment candidate sets gives a very large set of results.
     Sets of requeric parterns

![](_page_35_Figure_5.jpeg)
### Proposals

- Building a rappor with the unknown: Privacypreserving learning of associations and data dictionaries
  - G. Fanti, V. Pihur, and U. Erlingsson, PoPETS 2016.
  - Segment Pair Method
- Local, Private, Efficient Protocols for Succinct Histograms
  - R. Bassily, A. Smith. STOC 2015.
  - Multiple Channel Method
- Prefix Extending Methods (state-of-the-art)

### Segment Pair Method

- Each user reports a pair of two randomly chosen segments.
- A-priori principle:
  - A pair of segments is frequent iff both segments are frequent
  - A string is frequent iff any pair of segments is frequent
- Step 1: For e
- Step 2: For e
- Step 3: Build
  - each node
- Drawback: There are many possible pairs, accuracy for each group is limited

$$(Var[c(v)/n] = \frac{4e^{\varepsilon}}{n \cdot (e^{\varepsilon} - 1)^2})$$





- each edge represents a frequent segment pair
- Step 4: Find cliques in the graph (heavy hitter candidates)
- Step 5: Estimate frequencies of the heavy hitters

## Multiple Channel Method

- Suppose there is only one heavy hitter, we can afford the Cartesian product, which contains only one element.
- Use multiple channels and isolate heavily Drawback:
- hitters. To avoid collision, many (n<sup>1.5</sup>) channels are used.
  Each
  Number of users in each channel is limited. Computational cost is high.
  - In channel m(v), report v[i],
  - In other channels, report a uniformly random bit.
- Aggregator identifies the dominant bits in each channel
- Estimate frequencies of the heavy hitters

## Prefix Extending Method

- Start from a prefix, and gradually extend this prefix.
- Identify the frequent patterns for a small prefix first, and then extend to a larger prefix.
- Result for the last group can be used for frequency estimation



OLH.Q(`deadbe \*\* ')->`deadbeef' OLH.Q(`dead \*\* ')->`deadbe' OLH.Q(`de \*\* ')->`dead' OLH.Q(` \*\* ')->`dead'

## Prefix Extending Style Proposals

- Practical locally private heavy hitters
  - R. Bassily, K. Nissim, U. Stemmer, and A. Thakurta, NIPS'17
  - TreeHist
- Locally Differentially Private Heavy Hitter Identification
  - T. Wang, N. Li, S. Jha: arXiv 2017.
  - PEM
- Privtrie: Effective frequent term discovery under local differential privacy
  - N. Wang, X. Xiao, Y. Yang, T. D. Hoang, H. Shin, J. Shin, and Y. Ge, ICDE'18
  - PrivTrie (For a different setting)

### Comparison

Assume the size of domain D is  $2^m$ ; each value is encoded into m bits

- TreeHist
  - Partition the users into m groups, each reporting one additional bit
    - Research Question:

- PEM
  - How to determine number of additional bits each
    Pro
    - phase examines?

report as many pits as possible

- PrivTrie (interactive)
  - Propose to allocate less users on the top, more in the lower levels
  - One bit at a time

### More Bits or Fewer Bits?

- Intuition:
  - More bits -> Less groups -> More users in one -> More accurate and less rounds
  - Less bits -> Less candidates -> Less likely an infrequent pattern becomes frequent
- Analyze the expected utility score.
- An optimization problem!

### Optimize expected utility

- Goal: Maximize expected number of heavy hitters that can be identified
- Findings:
  Inpl
  Ideally (infeasible), all users report full string, and probe the EO for all possible string gives optimal
- Out probe the FO for all possible string gives optimal result.
  - add The constraint will be the computational power.
- Assle Each group should take as many bits as possible.
  - A reasonable distribution (the more close the better)
  - Probabilistic approximations

# Frequent Itemset Mining

### Frequent Itemset Mining

- Can be used for association rule mining etc
- Each user has a set of values

Strawman Method:

- Encode the itemset as a value in a bigger domain (of size 2<sup>d</sup>).
   Disadvantage:
- Cannot scale.
- If an item is contained in many infrequent itemsets, it will not be captured

Challenges: 1. Each user has multiple items 2. Each user's itemset size is different

 $\{a, c, e\} \ \{b, e\} \ \{a, b, e\} \ \{a, d, e\} \ \{a, b, c, d, e, f\}$ 

- The goal is to find the frequent *singletons* and *itemsets*
- Top-3 singletons: e(5), a(4), b(3) Top-3 itemsets: {e}(5), {a}(4), {a, e}(4)

### Proposals

- Heavy hitter estimation over set-valued data with local differential privacy. In CCS, 2016.
  - Z. Qin, Y. Yang, T. Yu, I. Khalil, X. Xiao, and K. Ren. CCS 2016.
  - LDPMiner
- Locally Differentially Private Frequent Itemset Mining
  - T. Wang, N. Li, S. Jha: IEEE SP 2018.
  - SVIM/SVSM

Pad and Sample Frequency Oracle

- Each user's itemset size is different
  - Pad it to a fixed length *l*
- Each user now has *l* items (or more)
  - Sample one at uniform random
  - Report via LDP (e.g., using Random Response)



### LDPMiner

#### • Phase 1 (identify candidates)

- Pad to l Item set length l User<sub>i</sub> with  $l_i > l$ *l* is the 90 percentile of the 17 21 55 301 1034 69 .... size distribution **Observations** Rand Τ I 1. The value of *l* affects error in two ways. Repo 2. Sampling may have a privacy amplification effect. Collector Potentiai 2k nequent items Top-k Heavy Potential Heavy Hitters Hitters returned Phase 2 Phase 2 (estimate frequency) Randomized Data • Intersects  $\boldsymbol{v}$  with the 2k items Could find frequent items only. • Pad to 2kLeft finding frequent itemsets as
  - Ensures no missed item
  - Randomly select one
  - Report

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an open problem.

### Sources of error



Under Estimation:

Items are selected with 1/6 but multiplied with 5 It decreases when l increases

## Goal: Identification



### Privacy Amplification

- LDP bounds the perturbation.
  - E.g., in Random Response.



- $= \Pr[Sample(a, b) = a] \times \Pr[P(a) = a]$ 
  - $+ \Pr[Sample(a, b) = b] \times \Pr[P(b) = a]$

## SVIM: Set-Value Item Mining 🚬



- Phase 1 (identify candidates)
  - Randomly select one (l = 1)
  - Report ٠
  - Potential 2k frequent items returned
- Phase 2 (estimate len
  - Intersects  $\boldsymbol{v}$  with th ones
  - Report the size
  - The 90-percentile *l* is returned
- Phase 3 (estimate frequency)
  - Pad to l
  - Randomly select one
  - Report via Adaptively chosen FO



Update Frequent itemsets Itemset Mining (more in paper)

SVIM (Set Value Item Mining)

Find S

Find L

Estimate

Update

Build IS

Find L

Estimate

items

Report itemset

S

Report size

S, L

IS Report size

IS, L Report intersected itemsets

port intersected itemset



# Reporting Numerical Attributes

#### **Numerical Mean Oracle**



#### Numerical Mean Oracle Proposals

- Collecting and analyzing data from smart device users with local differential privacy
  - T. T. Nguyen, X. Xiao, Y. Yang, S. C. Hui, H. Shin, and J. Shin. arXiv'16
- Collecting telemetry data privately
  - B. Ding, J. Kulkarni, and S. Yekhanin. NIPS'17

### **Using Existing Methods**

- Apply Laplace/Gaussian noise
  - Noise is too much
- Use any Frequency Oracle
  - With the domain range partitioned into many bins
  - Transforms numerical problem to categorical problem
  - Pro: Have a better understanding of the distribution
  - Con: No optimal partition
    - Example: all values are 0.01; when there are two bins: [-1,0), [0, +1], estimation will be far from truth

#### The Method

Discretize the problem, but using an unbiased, non-deterministic way.

- Encode the value v into a bit  $x \in \{-1, +1\}$ 
  - $\Pr[E(v) = +1] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}v, \Pr[E(v) = -1] = \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2}v$
  - This step ensures that encoding is unbiased.
- Perturb the bit, with a frequency oracle
  - Satisfy LDP
  - Provides better results

#### **Complicated Numerical Settings**

- $D \neq [-1, +1]$ 
  - $\circ \quad \text{If } D = [a, b]$ 
    - First convert to [-1, +1]; then convert the result back.
- $D = [-1, +1]^d$ 
  - Numerical vector setting
  - *d* is number of dimensions
  - Split privacy budget into each dimension
  - Report only one dimension (partition users)

### Summary so far

- Random Response
- Frequency Oracles
- How to use FO
- Mean Oracle
- How to use MO

	categorical	numerical
Scalar	FO	Prob. Assign+RR
Vector	Split Users	Split Users

#### **Consistency of Distribution Estimate**

**Consistency**:  $\sum_{v \in D} \hat{x}_v = 1$  and  $\hat{x}_v \ge 0, \forall v \in D$ 

Enforce consistency: project the estimate frequencies onto simplex (L1 unit ball) Post-processing algorithms [7]



[7]T. Wang, Z. Li, N. Li, M. Lopuhaa-Zwakenberg, and B. Skoric. Locally differentially private frequency estimation with consistency. In NDSS, 2020.

#### Improvement on HH

How to enforce consistency on Hierarchy Histogram(HH)? Previous work[6] only focus on  $\sum_{v \in D} \hat{x}_v = 1$  constraint, but no  $\hat{x}_v \ge 0$ Our solution: **HH-ADMM**, idea from centralized DP[8]. Transform it to a constrained optimization problem

Minimize  $\frac{1}{2}(\widehat{x} - \widetilde{x})$ 

subject to  $A\widehat{x} = \mathbf{0}, \widehat{x} \ge \mathbf{0}, \widehat{x}_{\mathbf{0}} = 1$ 

where  $\hat{x}$  and  $\tilde{x}$  are all nodes in hierarchy histogram, elements in A

$$a_{ij} \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i = j \\ -1, \text{ node } j \text{ is a chil of node } i \\ 0, & \text{othersize} \end{cases}$$

[6] T. Kulkarni, G. Cormode, and D. Srivastava. Answering range queries under local differential privacy. PVLDB, 2019

[8] J. Lee, Y. Wang, and D. Kifer. Maximum likelihood postprocessing for differential privacy under consistency constraints. SIGKDD 2015.

#### **Ordered Nature of Numerical Domain**

1. Values in numerical domain has distance between each other.

- Same L2 distance can results in very different distributions(A v.s. B and A v.s. C).
- Better metric to measure distribution distance: Wasserstein distance or KS distance.

2. Adjacent numerical values' frequencies do not vary dramatically.







#### General Wave Mechanism (GW)

**Intuition**: in numerical domain, a report  $\tilde{v}$  that is different from but close to the true value v also carries useful information about the distribution.

WLOG, assume that input domain D = [0, 1] and output domain  $\tilde{D} = [-b, 1 + b]$ . Let  $M_v(\tilde{v}) = \Pr[\Psi(v) = \tilde{v}]$  be the probability density function of input v.

#### Definition (General Wave Mechanism (GW)).

There is a wave function  $W: R \to [q, e^{\epsilon}q]$  with constant q > 0 and  $\epsilon > 0$ , such that the output probability density function  $M_{\nu}(\tilde{\nu}) = W(\tilde{\nu} - \nu)$ :

1. 
$$W(z) = q$$
, for  $|z| > b$ 

2. 
$$\int_{-b}^{b} W(z) dz = 1 - q$$

**Theorem 1**: GW satisfies  $\epsilon$ -LDP.



#### Square Wave Mechanism (SW)

How to decide the shape of wave in GW?

A special case of GW mechanism is SW Mechanism.

Definition (Square Wave Mechanism (SW) ).

$$M_{v}(\tilde{v}) = \begin{cases} p = \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{2be^{\epsilon} + 1}, \text{ if } |v - \tilde{v}| \leq b \\ q = \frac{1}{2be^{\epsilon} + 1}, \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$



#### **Square Wave Mechanism**

Why square wave instead of other wave shape?

**Intuition**: Given different values  $v \neq v'$ , if  $M_v$  and  $M_{v'}$  are identical, then there is no way to distinguish those values; the further apart  $M_v$  and  $M_{v'}$  are, the easier to tell them apart.

**Theorem 2.** For any fixed b and  $\epsilon$ , the SW is the GW that maximizes the Wasserstein distance between any two output distributions of two different inputs.

**Lemma 1**. Given  $v_1, v_2 \in D$  as inputs to GW, where  $v_2 > v_1$  and let  $\Delta = v_2 - v_1 > 0$ , the Wasserstein distance between the output distributions of general wave mechanism is  $\Delta(1 - (2b+1)q)$ .

**Lemma 2.** For any fixed b and  $\epsilon$ , the minimum q for GW is  $q = \frac{1}{2be^{\epsilon}+1}$ , which is achieved if any only if the mechanism is SW.



#### **Square Wave Mechanism**

How to choose parameter b ?

- Heuristic choice:  $b = \frac{\epsilon e^{\epsilon} e^{\epsilon} + 1}{2e^{\epsilon}(e^{\epsilon} 1 \epsilon)}$ , to maximize the upper bound of mutual information.
- When  $\epsilon \to 0, b \to \frac{1}{2}; \epsilon \to \infty, b \to 0.$

#### Post-processing: EM

The reports  $\tilde{v}$  are in  $\tilde{D} = [-b, 1+b]$ .

How to map them back to D = [0, 1]?

- 1. Generate histogram with  $\tilde{d}$  bins on  $\tilde{D}$  for the reported values.
- 2. Use EM algorithm to estimate the histogram with *d* bins on D.

Algorithm 1 Post-processing EM algorithm Input:  $M, \tilde{v}$ Output:  $\hat{x}$ while not converge do E-step:  $\forall i \in \{1, ..., d\},$   $P_i = \hat{x}_i \sum_{j \in [\tilde{d}]} n_j \frac{\Pr\left[\tilde{v} \in \tilde{B}_j | v \in B_i, \hat{x}\right]}{\Pr\left[\tilde{v} \in \tilde{B}_j | \hat{x}\right]}$   $= \hat{x}_i \sum_{j \in [\tilde{d}]} n_j \frac{M_{j,i}}{\sum_{k=1}^d M_{j,k} \hat{x}_k}$ M-step:  $\forall i \in \{1, ..., d\},$   $\hat{x}_i = \frac{P_i}{\sum_{k'=1}^d P_{k'}}$ end while Return  $\hat{x}$ 

#### Post-processing: EM with smoothing (EMS)

How to use the prior knowledge that adjacent numerical values' frequencies do not vary dramatically?

Smoothing after every M-step:  $\hat{x}_i = \frac{1}{2}\hat{x}_i + \frac{1}{4}(\hat{x}_{i-1} + \hat{x}_{i+1})$ 



#### Experiments

#### Four datasets:



#### Metrics:

- 1. Wasserstein distance and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance
- 2. Range queries
- 3. mean/variance/quantiles

#### **Experiments**

**Wasserstein distance (a.k.a earth mover distance)**: Given a frequency vector x, the cumulative function  $P(x, v) = \sum_{i=1}^{v} x_v$ , one dimension Wasserstein distance :

$$W_1(\boldsymbol{x}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{x}}) = \sum_{v \in D} |P(\boldsymbol{x}, v) - P(\widehat{\boldsymbol{x}}, v)|$$

