CS590U
Access Control: Theory and Practice

Lecture 6 (January 26)
Information Flow, Confinement & Covert Channels
A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow

Dorothy Denning
CACM 1976
An information flow model is defined by $FM = \langle SC, \oplus, \to \rangle$

- where $SC$ is a finite set of security classes
- $\oplus$ is the class-combining operator
  - is an associative and commutative binary operator
  - $A \oplus B$ denotes the security class of information that includes information both of $a$ and of $b$
- $\to$ is a binary operation that specifies from which class information can flow into which class
When Information Flows

Examples

- $y := x$
- $z := x; \quad y := z$
- $z := x + y;$
- $z := x \oplus y;$
- if $x = 1$ then $y := 1$
- if $(x = 1)$ and $(y = 1)$ then $z := 1$
- if $x = 1$ then if $y = 1$ then $z := 1$
Why Lattice?

- If the following holds, then $\langle SC, \to \rangle$ is a lattice
  - $\langle SC, \to \rangle$ is a poset
  - SC is finite
  - SC has a lower bound $L$ such that $L \to A$ for all $A \in SC$
  - $\otimes$ is the least upper bound operator
A Note on the Confinement Problem

Butler Lampson
CACM October 1973
The Confinement Problem

- Confine a program’s execution so that it cannot transmit information to any other program except its caller.

  Motivation:

  - a customer uses a service program and wants to ensure that the inputs are not leaked by the service program
Ways to leak information

0. The service has memory and can be called by its owner
1. The service writes to a permanent file that can be read by its owner
2. The service writes to a temporary file that can be read by its owner
3. The service sends a message to the owner’s process using interprocess communication
Ways to leak information

4. Information may be encoded in the bill rendered for the service, or payment for resources used by the service program.
5. Using file lock as a shared boolean variable.
6. By varying its ratio of computing to input/output or its paging rate, the service can transmit information to a concurrently running process.
Confinement rules (from the paper)

- A confined program must be memoryless, i.e., it must not be able to preserve information within itself from one call to another
- **Total isolation**: A confined program shall make no calls on any other program
  - sufficient to ensure confinement
  - quite impractical as even system calls may be dangerous and thus need to be forbidden
Less Restrictive Case

- Trusted programs: programs trusted not to leak data or help any confined program that calls them leak data
- **Transitivity**: if a confined program calls another program which is not trusted, then the called program must also be confined.
- It is difficult to write a trustworthy operating system, as some information path are subtle and obscure.
Writing a Trustworthy Program

- A trustworthy program must guard against any possible leakage of data.
- In an operating system, the number of possible channels is large, but finite.
- It is necessary to enumerate all of them and to block each one.
Three Categories of Channels

- Storage: write/read files
- Legitimate: bill for the service program
- Covert: CPU/memory usage

The following simple principle is sufficient to block all legitimate & covert channels:

- Masking: A program is confined must allow its caller to determine all its inputs into legitimate and covert channels. We say that the channels are masked by the caller.
On Blocking Covert Channels

- Enforcement: The supervisor must ensure that a confined program’s input to covert channels conforms to the caller’s specifications.
  - this may require slowing the program down, generating spurious disk references, or whatever, but it is conceptually straightforward
  - The cost of enforcement may be high. A cheaper alternative is to bound the capacity of the covert channels.
A Comment on the Confinement Problem

Steven B. Lipner
SOSP 1975
Key observations

- The confinement problem is similar in objective to MAC security
  - the common objective is to stop information flow
- Supposedly, *-property solves confinement problem for storage channels
  - Identifying all objects is difficult, but can be done
Closing “Covert Channels” is the most difficult

- To close “timing channels”
  - each subject must be constrained to see a virtual time depending only on its activities
  - seems to solve the covert channel problem
  - unclear whether this is possible, because each user also has sense of time outside the system
Conclusion of this paper

- While the storage and legitimate channels of Lampson can be closed with a minimal impact on system efficiency, closing the covert channel seems to impose a direct and unreasonable performance penalty.
- Closing the covert channels seems at a minimum very difficult, and may very well be impossible in a system where physical resources are shared.
Other Discussions on Covert Channels
Covert Channels in MLS

- Covert storage channels: In BLP, if a file is considered to be an object, a low subject may be able to see file names of high, which can encode information.
  - low users can write high files; thus it reasonable to know names of high files
- Covert timing channels
Covert channels are often noisy

However, information theory and coding theory can be used to encode and decode information through noisy channels

Military requires cryptographic components be implemented in hardware

- to avoid trojan horse leaking keys through covert channels
The Resource Matrix Approach

- An approach to systematically identify covert channels
  - Conference version in Oakland 1982.
Intuition

- Finding all resources that are shared between high and low users
  - covert channels rely on sharing of some resource that can be used in an unexpected way to transfer information
The Matrix

- Each system resource has a row
- Each lowest-level system operation that can be performed on resources is a column
- Each cell contains a subset of \{R,M\}
  - R means referencing the resource
  - M means modifying the resource
Criteria for Identifying Covert Channels

- E.g., a storage channel exists when a high user can change an attribute of a shared resource and a low user can detect the change.

- E.g., the criteria for a timing channel includes a shared common attribute, a shared time reference, and a means for modulating changes to this attribute.
Polyinstantiation

- Suppose that a High user creates a file named agents, when a Low user tries to create the same file, it would fail, thus leaking information
  - may be solved using naming conventions
- The problem gets more difficult in databases:
  Suppose that a High user allocate classified cargo to a ship, then a Low user may think the ship is empty and tries to allocate other cargos
  - one approach is to use a cover story
End of Lecture 6

- Next lecture
  - Integrity, Biba, Clark-Wilson