CS590U
# **Access Control: Theory and Practice**

Lecture 23 (April 5)

Capability-Based Systems

Capability vs. ACL

- ACL
  - an access control list is associated with each object
- Capabilities
 - a list of capabilities is associated with each subject

The Confused Deputy Problem

- The compiler program is SYSX/FORT.
- Other files under SYSX include STAT and BILL.
- The compiler program needs to write to files in SYSX directory, so it is given authority to write to files in SYSX.
- A user who runs SYSX/FORT can provide a file name to receive output info.
- A malicious user may use SYSX/BILL as the output name, resulting in billing info being erased.

Analysis of The Confused Deputy Problem

- The compiler runs with authority from two sources
    - the invoker
    - the system admin (who installed the compiler and controls billing and other info)
- It is the deputy of two masters
- There is no way to tell which master the deputy is serving when accessing a piece of resource

More Analysis

- Compare with setuid in UNIX and the associated security problems
- Compare with the Trojan horse problem
- How can this problem be solved?

The Capability Approach

- The compiler program is given capabilities to access SYSX/STAT and SYSX/BILL, which are stored in capability slots 1 & 2

- When the invoker runs the compiler program, it gives a capability to write to the output file, which is stored in capability slot 3. The invoker cannot give a capability for SYSX/BILL if it doesn't have the capability.

- When writing billing info, the program uses capability in slot 2. When writing the output, it uses capability in slot 3.

Overview of KeyKOS

- A capability-based microkernel operating system

- A message-based system
 - objects call other objects by sending a key-addressed message

Basic Concepts in KeyKOS

- Domains
  - Similar to processes in UNIX
  - A domain has 16 general slots and several special slots (e.g., address slot)
  - A domain is an object and may be identified in a gate key
- Keys (capabilities)
  - A key designates a specific object and certain authority over the object

Domains Calling Domains

- When one domain calls another domain
  - The calling domain identifies a general slot and invoke the key in it (should be a gate key)
  - The calling domain may add other keys to be passed to the called domain
  - The called domain receives a message, which include the keys chosen by the calling domain, and in addition, a resume key, implicitly generated by the system

The KeyKOS Microkernel

- It provides
  - several types of primitive objects
  - multiprogramming and scheduling support
  - single-level store. Domains are unaware of the distinction between main storage and disk
  - virtual memories for domains
  - gate keys by which messages are sent between domains
 - an invariant interpretation of keys
  - ......

Implications of the Capability System

- The confused deputy problem can be resolved.

- Other problems may arise, however. For example,
  - Roles of programmers and system admins may be mingled?
 - How does one user share files with another user?

Capability Myths Demolished

## Mark S. Miller, Ka-Ping Yee, Jonathan Shapiro

Three Myths

- **Equivalence myth: ACL systems and capability systems are equivalent**
  - they are just alternative ways of representing access matrices

- **Confinement myth: Capability systems cannot enforce confinement**

- **Irrevocability myth: Capability-based access cannot be revoked**

Four Models

- ACLs as columns (of access matrices)
- Capabilities as rows
- Capabilities as keys
- Object capabilities

On Equivalence

- While both ACLs and capabilities can represent a static access matrix, state changes are different in ACL systems and capability systems.

Designation and Authority

- [See the figures comparing ACLs with capabilities]
- ACL systems need a namespace for objects
- In capability systems, a capability can serve both to designate a resource and to provide authority.
- Property A: No designation without authority
  - ACL systems do not have this.
 - [Is this a feature or a bug?]

Granularity of Subjects

- ACLs also need a namespace for subjects
  - as they need to refer to subjects
- Implications
  - the set of subjects cannot be too many or too dynamic
  - most ACL systems treat users as subjects, and do not support fine-grained subjects
- Property B: Dynamic Subject Creation

Power to Edit Authorities

- In (almost) all ACL systems, the power to edit authorities is aggregated by resource
  - naturally compatible with DAC model
- In capabilities systems, the power to edit authorities is aggregated by subject
- Property C: Subject-Aggregated Authority Management

ACLs as Columns vs. Capabilities as Rows

- ACL-based systems do not have the following properties
  - Property A: No designation without authority
  - Property B: Dynamic Subject Creation
 - Property C: Subject-Aggregated Authority Management

On Confinement

- "The Confinement Myth"
    1. capability systems cannot limit the propagation of authority
    2. capability systems cannot solve the confinement problem
- Observation
    - In object capabilities, for A to give a capability over C to B, A must have a capability over C and a capability over B
   - [addresses 2, but doesn't fully address 1.]

On Irrevocability

- "The irrevocability myth"
  - once a subject holds a capability, no one but the subject can remove the capability
  - delegation is trivial, and revocation is infeasible
- By adding indirection, one can achieve the effect of revocation
 - [See the paper]

On the Ability to Enforce *-property

- Boebert claims that "an unmodified capability system cannot enforce the *-property"
  - a low-level user can write the "write low capability" to a place readable by a high-level user
- The authors claim that
  - capabilities cannot be written to data segments; thus the above attack doesn't work
- Unresolved issues
 - What about sending messages from low to high?

Capabilities Are Not Bit Strings

- Gong asserted
  - "Generally a capability is a bit string and can propagate in many ways without detection."
- One category of capability systems, known as password capability system, are like that.

The Capabilities-as-Keys Model

- Capabilities are copyable, unforgeable keys
    - resources are protected by locks
    - accessing a resource requires selecting a key
- Ambient authority means that a user's authority is automatically exercised, but not selected.
    - causes the confused deputy problem
- Property D: No Ambient Authority

Capabilities-as-Keys vs. Object Capabilities

- **Property E. Composability of Authorities**
  - [Not sure what this property means]
  - access and authorization can be unified

- **Property F. Access-Controlled Delegation Channels**
 - before A can delegate to B, A must hold a capability over B

Capabilities, ACLs, and Trust Management

- Some Trust Management systems can be viewed as capability systems
- ACLs store subject identifiers with resources
- Capabilities store resource identifiers with subjects
- More generally, ACLs (or policies) identify the attributes that enable access, and subjects have attribute capabilities
 - this is what role-based trust management is about

Thoughts on OS Access Control and Capabilities

- Static/Dynamic
  - static: resource sharing between users
  - dynamic: access control relationships among processes

- It is unclear whether capability-based systems can handle static resource sharing

Relevant Open Questions

- Are capability-based systems fundamentally better than ACL-based systems such as UNIX?

- Can one add an additional layer of access control to ACL-based systems to improve its access control?

- If so, how the this layer work?

Security Enhanced Linux

- Adding an additional layer of access control
  - introduce the notion of domains and types
  - at any point, a process is running as one domain
  - resources are classified into types
  - policy rules determine
    - what kind of access domains have over types
    - how can one domain transit into another domain
    - what types newly created objects should be
    - etc.

Next Lecture

- Database access control
    - The Griffith-Wades scheme (Mahesh)
    - Access control in Oracle (Ji-Won)