CS590U
Access Control: Theory and Practice

Lecture 1 (Jan 11)
Introduction to the Course
Instructor Info

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- Office hour
  - Tuesday 4:20pm to 5:20pm
  - Thursday 4:20pm to 5:20pm
Coursework

- Lectures & participations (10%)
- Readings
  - before each lecture
- Eight assignments (40%)
  - problems
  - review of assigned papers
Coursework

- A course project (individual)
  - Pre-proposal: Jan 20
  - Proposal: Feb 8 (10%)
  - Presentation: Apr 19 to 28 (10%)
  - Final report: Apr 30 (Sat) (30%)
Pre-proposal (Due Jan 20)
Submit paper copy before class

- List 1 to 3 project topics you find interesting
  - Why these topics interest you?
  - What are your plans?
  - What related backgrounds do you have?

- Propose new project ideas
  - Background, problem, plan, references …
Check the course homepage
Why a Course on Access Control?
What is Access Control?

- Quote from Security Engineering by Ross Anderson
  - Its function is to control which principals (persons, processes, machines, …) have access to which resources in the system --- which files they can read, which programs they can execute, and how they share data with other principals, and so on.
Access Control is Pervasive

- Application
  - business applications

- Middleware
  - DBMS

- Operating System
  - controlling access to files, ports

- Hardware
  - memory protection, privilege levels
Access Control is Important

- Quote from Security Engineering
  - Access control is the traditional center of gravity of computer security. It is where security engineering meets computer science.

- TCSEC evaluates security of computer systems based on access control features + assurance
Access Control is Interesting

- Has (relatively) well-developed theories
  - 30+ years history
  - some (quite involved) theory (apparently) not useful for other fields
- Many interesting and deep results
- Many misconceptions and debates
- A large percentage of published works contain serious errors
  - Corollary: Be skeptical, don’t believe too much what others have said, try form your own opinions
Access Matrix

- A set of subjects \( S \)
- A set of objects \( O \)
- A set of rights \( R \)
- An access control matrix
  - one row for each subject
  - one column for each subject/object
  - elements are right of subject on another subject or object
An Incomplete History of Access Control Research
Earlier Years: Time-Sharing Operating Systems

- Reference monitors (1972)
- Access matrix (1971)
- Discretionary access control
  - trojan horse can leak information
- Access control list
- Capabilities
- Multics
Military Wants Confidentiality

- Mandatory access control
- Label-based access control
- Bell-LaPadula (1973+)
- Covert channel
- Verifying security
- Security kernels
- TCSEC (1983)
Safety Properties

- The HRU undecidability result (1976)
- The Take-Grant scheme (1977)
- Grammatical systems
- Schematic Protection Model (1985)
- Typed Access Matrix (1992)

Security Analysis
- in Trust Management
- in Role-Based Access Control
- in Discretionary Access Control
What About Integrity?

- Biba integrity model
- High watermark/low watermark
- Clark-Wilson
- Chinese Wall
- Domain-Type enforcement
Information Flow Problems

- Noninterference (1982)
- Nondeducibility (1986)
- Composing security
- Information flow in programs
  - Denning’s work
  - Language-based security
Database Access Control

- System R approach: grant/revoke, view
- Ingres approach (query rewriting)
- Multilevel databases
- Object/relational databases
- Real systems
  - SQL grant/revoke, view, stored procedures, fine-grained access control
- Privacy centric
Role-Based Access Control

- In database context [1990]
- Generic access control approach [1992]
- Constraints
- Administration
- Relationships with DAC and MACs
- Extensions
Access Control in Distributed Systems

- ABLP Logic
- Trust management
  - PolicyMaker, KeyNote, QCM/SD3,
  Delegation Logic, Binder, RT
- Automated trust negotiation
Other Topics

- Java
- Operating system wrappers
- XML access control
- Workflow systems
- Computer Supported Collaborative Work
- Firewall
- Cryptographic approach
Why is Access Control Complex?
Objects are often complex

- Objects may be structured:
  - directories/files
  - database, table, row, column, view
  - XML documents

- Identifying objects may be hard
Subjects are complex

- What are subjects?
  - human users
  - principals (e.g., accounts, public keys)
  - processes

- What are the relationships among subjects?
  - whose authority to use?

- On what basis does one grant access?
Systems may be large

- Number of subjects may be hundreds of thousands
Access Control States May Change

- Who can make changes?
- What kinds of changes can be made?
- Often not clearly specified
  - lead to many many misconceptions in access control
Security Objectives Often Unclear

- What properties do we want an access control system to have?
  - allow legitimate sharing, forbid illegitimate sharing
  - what sharings are legitimate?

- The criteria of goodness is often unclear.
Very Limited Understanding of Usability Issues

- Not much thought has been put into usability issues.
- Not clear what can/should be done.
MisConceptions that

- MisConceptions that we are fighting
  - Safety analysis is hard
  - RBAC is more expressive than DAC

- Debates
  - Bell-LaPadula vs. System Z
  - Capability vs. ACL
Grand Challenges in Access Control

- Operating system access control
  - Unix is bad, Windows seems worse, SELinux is unusable, is there any hope?

- Enterprise security management
  - RBAC is useful but limited, what is the next RBAC?

- A uniform approach to database access control

- A unified theory/methodology that can be fruitfully applied most of the times

- Meaningful verification techniques

- Usability theory/facts/guidelines
End of Lecture 1

- Next lecture:
  - my funded research projects
  - project topics