Logic and Logic Programming in Distributed Access Control (Part One)

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Outline

- A brief introduction to trust management
- Logic-based semantics for SDSI

The Trust-Management (TM) Approach

- Multi-centric access control using delegation
 - access control decisions are based on distributed policy statements issued by multiple principals
 - policy statements contain
 - attributes of principals such as permissions, roles, qualifications, characteristics
 - trust relationships

Common characteristics of TM systems

- Use public-key certificates for non-local statements
- Treat public keys as principals to be authorized
 authentication consists of verifying signatures

Digital Signature Scheme

Key space: a set of key pairs (K, K⁻¹)

- K is the verification key and is publicly available
- K⁻¹ is the signing key and is kept private
- A signing algorithm sig
 - sig(K⁻¹, M) outputs a digital signature on M
- A verification algorithm ver
 - **ver(**K, M, σ) outputs yes or no
 - $ver(K, M, sig(K^{-1}, M)) = yes$
 - w/o knowing K⁻¹, it is difficult to find σ s.t.
 ver(K,M,σ)=yes

Public-Key Certificates

- A certificate is a data record together with a digital signature
- A certificate is signed using K⁻¹
 - we say that it is issued by a public key K
- A certificate binds some information to another public key (the subject key)
- Can be verified by anyone who knows the issuer's public key
 - can one trust the issuer's public key?

Early Trust Management Langugaes

- PolicyMaker
 - Blaze, Feigenbaum & Lacy: "Decentralized Trust Management", S&P'96.
 - Blaze, Feigenbaum & Strauss: "Compliance-Checking in the PolicyMaker Trust Management System", FC'98.
- KeyNote
 - Blaze, Feigenbaum, Ioannidis & Keromytis: "The KeyNote Trust-Management System, Version 2", RFC 2714.
- SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure) / SDSI (Simple Distributed Security Framework)
 - Rivest & Lampson: SDSI A Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure, Web-page 1996.
 - □ Ellison et al.: SPKI Certificate Theory, RFC 2693.
 - □ Clarke et al.: Certificate Chain Discovery in SPKI/SDSI, JCS'01.

Datalog-based Trust Management Languages

Delegation Logic

 Li, Grosof & Feigenbaum: "Delegation Logic: A Logic-based Approach to Distributed Authorization", TISSEC'03. (Conference versions appeared in CSFW'99 and S&P'00)

SD3 (Secure Dynamically Distributed Datalog)

 Jim: "SD3: A Trust Management System with Certified Evaluation", S&P'01.

Binder

- DeTreville: "Binder, a Logic-Based Security Language", S&P'02.
- RT: A Family of Role-based Trust-management Languages

Other Closely Related Logic-based Security Languages

ABLP logic (Abadi, Burrows, Lampson, et al.)

- Lampson et al.: "Authentication in Distributed Systems: Theory and Practice", TOCS'92.
- Abadi et al.: "A Calculus for Access Control in Distributed Systems", TOPLAS'93.
- QCM (Query Certificate Managers)
 - Gunter & Jim: "Policy-directed Certificate Retrieval", SPE'00
- AF logic

Appel & Felton: "Proof-Carrying Authentication", CCS'99

History of SPKI/SDSI

SDSI (Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure)
 SDSI 1.0 and 1.1

- Rivest & Lampson 96
- SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure)
 SPKI 1.0 (Ellison 1996)
- SPKI/SDSI 2.0
 - RFC 2693 [1999]
 - [Clarke et al. JCS'01]

An Example in SDSI 2.0

- SDSI Certificates
 - □ (K_C access \Rightarrow K_C mit faculty secretary)
 - □ (K_C mit ⇔ K_M)
 - □ (K_M faculty \Rightarrow K_{EECS} faculty)
 - □ (K_{EECS} faculty $\Rightarrow K_{Rivest}$)
 - □ (K_{Rivest} secretary \Rightarrow K_{Rivest} alice)
 - □ (K_{Rivest} alice \Rightarrow K_{Alice})
- From the above certificates, K_C concludes that K_{Alice} has access

4-tuple Reduction in RFC 2693

Name strings can be reduced using 4-tuples \Box (K₁ A₁ \Rightarrow K₂) reduces "K₁ A₁ A₂ ... A_n" to " $K_2 A_2 ... A_n$ " • e.g., (K_{C} mit $\Rightarrow K_{M}$) reduces " K_{C} mit faculty secretary" to "K_M faculty secretary" $\Box (\mathsf{K}_1 \mathsf{A}_1 \rightleftharpoons \mathsf{K}_2 \mathsf{B}_1 \dots \mathsf{B}_m)$ reduces " $K_1 A_1 A_2 \dots A_n$ " to " $K_2 B_1 \dots B_m A_2 \dots A_n$ " • e.g., (K_M faculty $\Rightarrow K_{FFCS}$ faculty) reduces " K_M faculty secretary" to " K_{FFCS} faculty secretary"

Applying 4-tuple Reduction in the Example

From (K_C access)

to $(K_C \text{ mit faculty secretary})$ to $(K_M \text{ faculty secretary})$ to $(K_{EECS} \text{ faculty secretary})$ to $(K_{Rivest} \text{ secretary})$ to $(K_{Rivest} \text{ alice})$

to (K_{Alice})

Papers on Semantics for SPKI/SDSI

Develop specialized modal logics

- Abadi: "On SDSI's Linked Local Name Spaces", CSFW'97, JCS'98.
- Halpern & van der Meyden:
 - "A logic for SDSI's linked local name spaces", CSFW'99, JCS'01
 - "A Logical Reconstruction of SPKI", CSFW'01, JCS'03
- Howell & Kotz: "A Formal Semantics for SPKI", ESORICS'00

Other approaches

- □ Li: "Local Names in SPKI/SDSI", CSFW'00
- Jha & Reps: "Analysis of SPKI/SDSI Certificates Using Model Checking", CSFW'02
- Li & Mitchell: "Understanding SPKI/SDSI Using First-Order Logic", CSFW'03 (Contains the results presented here)

What is a Semantics?

- Elements of a semantics
 - syntax for statements
 - syntax for queries
 - an entailment relation that determines whether a query Q is true given a set P of statements

Why a Formal Semantics?

- What can we gain by a formal semantics
 - understand what queries can be answered
 - defines the entailment relation in a way that is precise, easy to understand, and easy to compute
- How can one say a semantics is good
 - subjective metrics:
 - simple, natural, close to original intention
 - defines answers to a broad class of queries
 - can use existing work to provide efficient deduction procedures for answering those queries

Concepts in SDSI

- Concepts
 principals
 - identifiers
 - local names
 - name strings

K, K₁ A, B, A₁ e.g., mit, faculty, alice K A, K₁ A₁ e.g., K_M faculty, K_{Rivest} alice K A₁ A₂ ... A_n ω , ω_1 e.g., K_C mit faculty secretary

Statements in SDSI

- 4-tuple (K, A, ω, V)
 - K is the issuer principal
 - A is an identifier
 - \square ω is a name string
 - V is the validity specification
- We write (K A ⇒ ω) for a 4-tuple
 ignoring validity specification

A Rewriting Semantics for SDSI

- A set P of 4-tuples defines a set of rewriting rules, denoted by RS[P]
- Queries have the form "can ω_1 rewrite into ω_2 ?"
- Answer a query is not easy.
 - $\hfill \$ cannot naively search for all ways of rewriting $\omega_1,$ as there may be recursions
 - e.g., (K friend ⇔ K friend friend)
- What can we do?

Deduction Based on the Rewriting Semantics (1)

- Limit queries to the form "can ω_1 rewrite into K?"
 - In [Clarke et al.'01], the following closure mechanism is used
 - rewrite 4-tuples
 - e.g., apply (K_C mit ⇔ K_M) to rewrite (K_C access ⇔ K_C mit faculty secretary), one gets (K_C access ⇔ K_M faculty secretary)
 - compute the closure of a set of 4-tuples,
 - obtained by applying 4-tuples that rewrites to a principal
 - then use the resulting shortening 4-tuples to rewrite ω_1
 - Search is not goal-directed

Deduction Based on the Rewriting Semantics (2)

- Limit to queries like "can ω_1 rewrite into K?"
 - In [Li CSFW'00], the following XSB logic program is given


Deduction Based on the Rewriting Semantics (3)

- [Li, Winsborough & Mitchell, CCS'01, JCS'03]
 - develop a graph-based search algorithm for a language RT₀, a superset of SDSI
 - combines bottom-up search and goal-directed topdown search with tabling specifically for the kind of rules in RT₀
 - can deal with distributed discovery

Deduction Based on the Rewriting Semantics (4)

- Use techniques for model checking pushdown systems [Jha & Reps CSFW'02]
 - SDSI rewriting systems correspond to string rewriting systems modeled by pushdown systems
 - algorithms for model checking pushdown systems can be used
 - takes time O(N^3), where N is the total size of the SDSI statements

SDSI and Pushdown Systems



State: K₁ State: K₂

A name string corresponds to a configuration

"rewrites into" equivalent to "reaches"

Recap of the Rewriting-based Semantics

- Defines answers to queries having the form "can ω_1 rewrite into ω_2 ?"
- Specialized algorithms (either developed for SDSI or for model checking pushdown systems) are needed
- Papers by Abadi and Halpern and van der Meyden try to come up with axiom systems for the rewriting semantics

Set-based Semantic Intuitions

- Each name string is bound to a set of principals
- (K A $\Rightarrow \omega$) means the local name "K A" is bound to a superset of the principal set that ω is bound to

Defining Set-based Semantics (1)

- A valuation V maps each local name to a set of principals
- A valuation V can be extended to map each name string to a set of principals
 - $\Box \underline{V}(\mathsf{K}) = \{\mathsf{K}\}\$

$$\Box \underline{V}(K A) = V(K A)$$

 $\Box \underline{V} (\mathsf{K} \mathsf{B}_1 \dots \mathsf{B}_m) = \underbrace{\mathbf{\tilde{E}}}_{j=1..n} \underline{V} (\mathsf{K}_j \mathsf{B}_2 \dots \mathsf{B}_m)$

• where m>1 and $V(KB_1) = \{K_1, K_2, ..., K_n\}$

Defining Set-based Semantics (2)

- A 4-tuple (K A $\Rightarrow \omega$) is the following constraint □ V (K A) $\supseteq \underline{V}(\omega)$
- The semantics of P is the least valuation V_P that satisfies all the constraints
- Queries
 - □ "can ω rewrite into K?" answered by checking whether "K ∈ <u>V</u>_P (ω)".
- Does not define answers to "can ω_1 rewrite into ω_2 ".

□ asking whether $\underline{V}_{\mathbf{P}}(\omega_1) \supseteq \underline{V}_{\mathbf{P}}(\omega_2)$ is incorrect

Relationship Between the Rewriting Semantics and the Set Semantics

- Theorem: Given P, ω_1 , and ω_2 , ω_1 rewrites into ω_2 using P if and only if for any P' \supseteq P, $\underline{V}_{P'}$ (ω_1) \supseteq $\underline{V}_{P'}$ (ω_2).
- Corrolary: Given P, ω, and K, ω rewrites into K using P if and only if <u>V</u>_P (ω) ⊇ { K }

A Logic-Programming-based Semantics Derived from the Set-based Semantics

- Translate each 4-tuple into a LP clause
 - Using a ternary predicate m
 - m(K, A, K') is true if $K' \in V(K A)$
 - □ (K A \Rightarrow K') to m(K, A, K')
 - □ (K A \Rightarrow K₁ A₁) to m(K, A, ?x) :- m(K₁, A₁, ?x)
 - □ (K A \Rightarrow K₁ A₁ A₂) to m(K,A,?x) :- m(K₁,A₁,?y₁), m(?y₁,A₂,?x)
 - □ (K A \Rightarrow K₁ A₁ A₂ A₃) to m(K,A,?x) :- m(K₁,A₁,?y₁), m(?y₁,A₂,?y₂), m(?y₂,A₃,?x) The minimal Herbrand model determines the semantics

An Alternative Way of Defining the LPbased Semantics (1)

• Define a macro contains • contains[ω][K'] means that K' $\mathbf{\hat{I}} V (\omega)$ • contains[K][K'] \equiv (K= K') • contains[K A][K'] \equiv m(K, A, K') • contains[K A₁ A₂ ... A_n][K'] \equiv \$y (m(K, A₁, y) $\mathbf{\hat{U}}$ contains[y A₂ ... A_n][K']) where n>1

An Alternative Way of Defining the LPbased Semantics (2)

- Translates a 4-tuple (K A ⇒ ω) into a FOL sentence
 - $\Box \forall z \text{ (contains}[K A][z] \Leftarrow \text{ contains}[\omega][z])$
- This sentence is also a Datalog clause
- A set P of 4-tuples defines a Datalog program, denoted by SP[P]
 - The minimal Herbrand model of SP[P] defines the semantics

An Example of Translation

From (K_c access \Rightarrow K_c mit faculty secretary) to $\forall z$ (contains[K_c access][z] \Leftarrow **contains**[K_c mit faculty secretary][z]) to $\forall z \ (\mathbf{m}(\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{C}}, \operatorname{access}, z) \Leftarrow$ y_1 (m(K_c, mit, y_1) \hat{U} contains[y_1 faculty secretary][z]) to $\forall z \forall y_1 (\mathbf{m}(\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{C}}, \operatorname{access}, z) \Leftarrow$ $m(K_{C}, mit, y_{1})$ **Ú** $\exists y_2 (m(y_1, faculty, y_2) \hat{\mathbf{U}} contains[y_2 secretary] [z])$ to $\forall z \forall y_1 \forall y_2 (\mathbf{m}(\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{C}}, \operatorname{access}, z) \Leftarrow$ $m(K_{C}, mit, y_{1})$ **Ú** $m(y_1, faculty, y_2)$ **Ú** $m(y_2, \text{ secretary, } z])$

Set semantics is equivalent to LP semantics

- The least Herbrand model of SP[P] is equivalent to the least valuation, i.e.,
 - □ $K' \in V_P(K A)$ iff. m(K,A,K') is in the least Herbrand model of SP[P]
- Same limitation as set-based semantics
 - does not define answers to containment between arbitrary name strings

A First-Order Logic (FOL) Semantics

- A set P of 4-tuples defines a FOL theory, denoted by Th[P]
- A query is a FOL formula
 - " ω_1 rewrites into ω_2 " is translated into $\forall z \text{ (contains}[\omega_1][z] \Leftarrow \text{ contains}[\omega_2][z])$
 - Other FOL formulas can also be used as queries
- Logical implication determines semantics

FOL Semantics is Extension of LP Semantics

- LP semantics is FOL semantics with queries limited to LP queries
 - m(K,A,K') is in the least Herbrand model of SP[P] iff. Th[P] |= m(K,A,K')

Equivalence of Rewriting Semantics and FOL Semantics

- Theorem: for string rewriting queries, the string rewriting semantics is equivalent to the FOL semantics
 - □ Given a set P of 4-tuples, it is possible to rewrite ω_1 into ω_2 using the 4-tuples in P if and only if Th[P] |= "z (contains[ω_1][z] ⇐ contains[ω_2][z])

Advantages of FOL semantics: Computation efficiency

- A large class of queries can be answered efficiently using logic programs

 including rewriting queries
 - □ e.g., whether ω rewrites into K B₁ B₂ under P can be answered by determining whether SP[P \cup (K' A'⇔ ω) \cup (K B₁⇔K'₁) \cup (K'₁ B₂⇔K'₂)] |= m(K',A', K'₂)


where K', K'₁, and K'₂ are new principals

this proof procedure is sound and complete
 this result also follows from results in proof theory regarding Harrop Hereditary formulas

Advantages of FOL semantics: Extensibility

- Additional kinds of queries can be formulated and answered, e.g.,
- Additional forms of statements can be easily handled, e.g.,
 - □ (K A \Rightarrow K₁ A₁ \cap K₂ A₂) maps to $\forall z (m(K,A,z) \Leftarrow m(K_1,A_1,z) \mathbf{\hat{U}} m(K_2,A_2,z))$

Summary: 4 Semantics



Advantages of FOL Semantics: Summary

- Simple
 - captures the set-based intuition
 - defined using standard FOL
- Extensible
 - additional policy language features can be handled easily
 - allow more meaningful queries
- Computation efficiency