

Cryptography

CS 555

Topic 17: Textbook RSA encryption

Outline and Readings

- Outline
 - One-way functions
 - RSA
- Readings:
 - Katz and Lindell: Chapter 6.0, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 7.2



Towards One-Way Function

- We know how to use Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) and Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) to construct encryption schemes and MAC.
- We know what algorithms that are used in practice in instantiate PRG and PRF.
 - But we cannot prove that they are PRG or PRF; we can only assume that they are
- Can we prove that some constructions are PRG or PRF based on something else?

One-Way Function

- A function f is one-way if
 - It is easy to compute
 - It is hard to invert, that is, given $y=f(x)$, where x is randomly chosen, it is difficult to find x' such that $f(x')=y$
- A one-way permutation is length-preserving (input and output have the same size) and one-to-one.
- Candidates for one-way functions
 - Multiplication: $f(x,y) = xy$


Relationship of One-Way Functions and Cryptography

- Secure encryption and MAC schemes imply/require the existence of one-way functions
- Given a one-way function, one can construct PRG, PRF, PRP
 - Thus one can construct secure encryption and MAC schemes
 - Details are more suitable for 655
- One-way functions are foundation of modern cryptography theory

Trapdoor One-way Functions

Definition:

A function $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ is a trapdoor one-way function iff $f(x)$ is a one-way function; however, given some extra information it becomes feasible to compute f^{-1} : given y , find x s.t. $y = f(x)$



Public-Key Encryption Needs One-way Trapdoor Functions

- Given a public-key crypto system,
 - Alice has public key K
 - \mathbf{E}_K must be a one-way function, knowing $y = \mathbf{E}_K[x]$, it should be difficult to find x
 - However, \mathbf{E}_K must **not** be one-way from Alice's perspective. The function \mathbf{E}_K must have a trapdoor such that knowledge of the trapdoor enables one to invert it

RSA Algorithm

- Invented in **1978** by Ron **R**ivest, Adi **S**hamir and Leonard **A**dleman
 - Published as R L Rivest, A Shamir, L Adleman, "*On Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems*", Communications of the ACM, vol 21 no 2, pp120-126, Feb 1978
- Security relies on the difficulty of factoring large composite numbers
- Essentially the same algorithm was discovered in 1973 by Clifford Cocks, who works for the British intelligence

Z_{pq}^*

- Let p and q be two large primes
- Denote their product $n=pq$.
- $Z_n^* = Z_{pq}^*$ contains all integers in the range $[1, pq-1]$ that are relatively prime to both p and q
- The size of Z_n^* is
$$\Phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1) = n - (p+q) + 1$$
- For every $x \in Z_{pq}^*$, $x^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1$

Exponentiation in Z_{pq}^*

- Motivation: We want to use exponentiation for encryption
- Let e be an integer, $1 < e < (p-1)(q-1)$
- When is the function $f(x) = x^e$, a one-to-one function in Z_{pq}^* ?
- If x^e is one-to-one, then it is a permutation in Z_{pq}^* .

Review: Euler's Theorem

Euler's Theorem

Given integer $n > 1$, such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ then

$$a^{\Phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

Corollary: Given integer $n > 1$, such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ then $a^{\Phi(n)-1} \pmod{n}$ is a multiplicative inverse of $a \pmod{n}$.

Corollary: Given integer $n > 1$, x, y , and a positive integers with $\gcd(a, n) = 1$. If $x \equiv y \pmod{\Phi(n)}$, then

$$a^x \equiv a^y \pmod{n}.$$

Corollary (Fermat's "Little" Theorem):

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

Exponentiation in Z_{pq}^*

- Claim: If e is relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$ then $f(x)=x^e$ is a one-to-one function in Z_{pq}^*
- Proof by constructing the inverse function of f .
As $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1))=1$, then there exists d and k s.t. $ed=1+k(p-1)(q-1)$
- Let $y=x^e$, then $y^d=(x^e)^d=x^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)}=x \pmod{pq}$,
i.e., $g(y)=y^d$ is the inverse of $f(x)=x^e$.

RSA Public Key Crypto System

Key generation:

Select 2 large prime numbers of about the same size, p and q

Compute $n = pq$, and $\Phi(n) = (q-1)(p-1)$

Select a random integer e , $1 < e < \Phi(n)$, s.t.
 $\gcd(e, \Phi(n)) = 1$

Compute d , $1 < d < \Phi(n)$ s.t. $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\Phi(n)}$

Public key: (e, n)

Private key: d

RSA Description (cont.)

Encryption

Given a message M , $0 < M < n$ $M \in \mathbb{Z}_n - \{0\}$

use public key (e, n)

compute $C = M^e \bmod n$ $C \in \mathbb{Z}_n - \{0\}$

Decryption

Given a ciphertext C , use private key (d)

Compute $C^d \bmod n = (M^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = M^{ed} \bmod n = M$

RSA Example

- $p = 11, q = 7, n = 77, \Phi(n) = 60$
- $d = 13, e = 37$ ($ed = 481; ed \bmod 60 = 1$)
- Let $M = 15$. Then $C \equiv M^e \pmod n$
 - $C \equiv 15^{37} \pmod{77} = 71$
- $M \equiv C^d \pmod n$
 - $M \equiv 71^{13} \pmod{77} = 15$

Coming Attractions ...

- RSA Security
- Prime number generation
- Reading: Katz & Lindell: 7.2

