Information Security CS 526 Topic 17

The Bell LaPadula Model

Readings for This Lecture

- Wikipedia
 - Bell-LaPadula model
- David E. Bell: Looking Back at the Bell-La Padula Model



Access Control at Different Abstractions

- Using principals
 - Determines which principals (user accounts) can access what documents
- Using subjects
 - Determines which subjects (processes) can access what resources
 - This is where BLP focuses on

Multi-Level Security (MLS)

- There are security classifications or security levels
 - Users/principals/subjects have security clearances
 - Objects have security classifications
- Example of security levels
 - Top Secret
 - Secret
 - Confidential
 - Unclassified
- In this case Top Secret > Secret > Confidential > Unclassified
- Security goal (confidentiality): ensures that information do not flow to those not cleared for that level

Multi-level Security (MLS)

 The capability of a computer system to carry information with different sensitivities (i.e. classified information at different security levels), permit simultaneous access by users with different security clearances and needs-to-know, and prevent users from obtaining access to information for which they lack authorization.

Discretionary access control fails to achieve MLS

- Typically use Mandatory Access Control
- Primary Security Goal: Confidentiality

Mandatory Access Control

- Mandatory access controls (MAC) restrict the access of subjects to objects based on a system-wide policy
 - denying users full control over the access to resources that they create. The system security policy (as set by the administrator) entirely determines the access rights granted

Bell-LaPadula Model: A MAC Model for Achieving Multi-level Security

- Introduce in 1973
- Air Force was concerned with security in timesharing systems
 - Many OS bugs
 - Accidental misuse
- Main Objective:
 - Enable one to formally show that a computer system can securely process classified information

What is a Security Model?

- A model describes the system
 - e.g., a high level specification or an abstract machine description of what the system does
- A security policy

- defines the security requirements for a given system

- Verification techniques that can be used to show that a policy is satisfied by a system
- System Model + Security Policy = Security Model


Approach of BLP

- Use state-transition systems to describe computer systems
- Define a system as secure iff. every reachable state satisfies 3 properties
 - simple-security property, *-property, discretionarysecurity property
- Prove a Basic Security Theorem (BST)
 - so that give the description of a system, one can prove that the system is secure

The BLP Security Model

- A computer system is modeled as a statetransition system
 - There is a set of subjects; some are designated as trusted.
 - Each state has objects, an access matrix, and the current access information.
 - There are state transition rules describing how a system can go from one state to another
 - Each subject s has a maximal sec level $L_m(s)$, and a current sec level $L_c(s)$
 - Each object has a classification level

Elements of the BLP Model



The BLP Security Policy

- A state is secure if it satisfies
 - Simple Security Condition (no read up):
 - S can read O iff $L_m(S) \ge L(O)$
 - The Star Property (no write down): for any S that is not trusted
 - S can read O iff $L_c(S) \ge L(O)$ (no read up)
 - S can write O iff $L_c(S) \le L(O)$
- (no read up) (no write down)
- Discretionary-security property
 - every access is allowed by the access matrix
- A system is secure if and only if every reachable state is secure.

Implication of the BLP Policy Objects **Highest** Can Write Max Level Subject Current Can Read & Write Level Can Read Lowest

STAR-PROPERTY

- Applies to subjects not to principals and users
- Users are trusted (must be trusted) not to disclose secret information outside of the computer system
- Subjects are not trusted because they may have Trojan Horses embedded in the code they execute
- Star-property prevents overt leakage of information and does not address the covert channel problem

Is BLP Notion of Security Good?

- The objective of BLP security is to ensure
 - a subject cleared at a low level should never read information classified high
- The ss-property and the *-property are sufficient to stop such information flow at any given state.
- What about information flow across states?

BLP Security Is Not Sufficient!

- Consider a system with s₁,s₂,o₁,o₂
 - $f_{S}(s_{1}) = f_{C}(s_{1}) = f_{O}(o_{1}) = high$
 - $f_{S}(s_{2}) = f_{C}(s_{2}) = f_{O}(o_{2}) = low$
- And the following execution
 - s_1 gets access to o_1 , read something, release access, then change current level to low, get write access to o_2 , write to o_2
- Every state is secure, yet illegal information exists
- Solution: tranquility principle: subject cannot change current levels, or cannot drop to below the highest level read so far

Main Contributions of BLP

- The overall methodology to show that a system is secure
 - adopted in many later works
- The state-transition model
 - which includes an access matrix, subject security levels, object levels, etc.
- The introduction of *-property
 - ss-property is not enough to stop illegal information flow

Other Limitations with BLP

- Deal only with confidentiality, does not deal with integrity at all
 - Confidentiality is often not as important as integrity in most situations
 - Addressed by integrity models (such as Biba, Clark-Wilson, which we will cover later)
- Does not deal with information flow through covert channels

Overt (Explicit) Channels vs. Covert Channels

- Security objective of MLS in general, BLP in particular is
 - high-classified information cannot flow to low-cleared users
- Illegal information flow via overt channels (e.g., read/write an object) is blocked by BLP
- Illegal information flow by covert channels can still occur
 - communication channel based on the use of system resources not normally intended for communication between the subjects (processes) in the system

Examples of Covert Channels

- Using file lock as a shared boolean variable
- By varying its ratio of computing to input/output or its paging rate, the service can transmit information to a concurrently running process
- Timing of packets being sent
- Covert channels are often noisy
- However, information theory and coding theory can be used to encode and decode information through noisy channels

More on Covert Channels

- Covert channels cannot be blocked by *-property
- It is generally very difficult, if not impossible, to block all covert channels
- One can try to limit the bandwidth of covert channels
- Military requires cryptographic components be implemented in hardware
 - to avoid trojan horse leaking keys through covert channels

More on MLS: Security Levels

- Used as attributes of both subjects & objects

 clearance & classification
- Typical military security levels:
 - top secret \geq secret \geq confidential \geq unclassified
- Typical commercial security levels
 - restricted \geq proprietary \geq sensitive \geq public

Security Categories


- Also known as compartments
- Typical military security categories
 - army, navy, air force
 - nato, nasa, noforn
- Typical commercial security categories
 - Sales, R&D, HR
 - Dept A, Dept B, Dept C

Security Labels

- Labels = Levels × P (Categories)
- Define an ordering relationship among Labels
 (e1, C1) ≤ (e2, C2) iff. e1 ≤e2 and C1 ⊆ C2
- This ordering relation is a partial order
 - reflexive, transitive, anti-symmetric
 - e.g., ⊆
- All security labels form a lattice

An Example Security Lattice

- levels={top secret, secret}
- categories={army,navy}



The need-to-know principle

- Even if someone has all the necessary official approvals (such as a security clearance) to access certain information they should not be given access to such information unless they have a *need to know*: that is, unless access to the specific information necessary for the conduct of one's official duties.
- Can be implemented using categories and or DAC

Coming Attractions ...

 Non-interference and nondeducability

