### K-Anonymity

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### How do you publicly release a database without compromising individual privacy?

The Wrong Approach:

- Just leave out any *unique* identifiers like name and SSN and hope that this works.
- The triple (DOB, gender, zip code) suffices to uniquely identify at least 87% of US citizens in publicly available databases (Sweeney).
- Moral: Any real privacy guarantee must be proved and established mathematically.

### Definitions

- *Database* a table with n rows (records) and m columns (attributes)
- Alphabet of a Database  $(\Sigma)$  the range of values that individual cells in the database can take.
- Note that the alphabet of the k-anonymized database is Σ ∪ {\*}

### How do you publicly release a database without compromising individual privacy?

- · Models: K-Anonymity (Sweeney), Output Perturbation
- K-Anonymity: attributes are suppressed or generalized until each row is identical with at least k-1 other rows.
   At this point the database is said to be k-anonymous.
- K-Anonymity thus prevents definite database linkages. At worst, the data released narrows down an individual entry to a group of k individuals.
- Unlike Output Perturbation models, K-Anonymity guarantees that the data released is accurate.

#### Methods for Achieving K-Anonymity

- Suppression can replace individual attributes with a \*
- Generalization replace individual attributes with a broader category Example: (Age: 26 => Age: [20-30])
- We will be looking at K-Anonymity with suppression

#### **Examples** The following database: first last age race Harry Stone 34 Afr-Am John Reyser 36 Cauc Beatrice Stone 34 Afr-Am John Delgado 22 Hisp Can be 2-Anonymized with suppression as follows: first last age race Stone 34 Afr-Am \* John \* Stone 34 Afr-Am John \* \* Note: Rows 1 and 3 are identical and Rows 2 and 4 are identical

### Minimum Cost K-Anonymity

- Obviously, we can guarantee k-anonymity by replacing every cell with a \*, but this renders the database useless.
- The cost of K-Anonymous solution to a database is the number of \*'s introduced.
- A minimum cost k-anonymity solution suppresses the fewest number of cells necessary to guarantee k-anonymity.

### Results

- Minimum Cost 3-Anonymity is NP-Hard for |Σ| = O(n) (Meyerson, Williams 2004)
- Minimum Cost 3-Anonymity is NP-Hard for |Σ| = 3 (Aggarwal et al. 2005)
- Minimum Cost 3-Anonymity is NP-Hard for |Σ| = 2 (Dondi et al. July 2007)
- We independently proved the same thing this summer.

Theorem: Minimum Cost 3-Anonymity is NP-Hard even with  $|\Sigma| = 2$ 

- Lemma 1: There is a polynomial time reduction from the Edge Partition into Triangles and 4-stars problem to binary 3-Anonymity
- Lemma 2: Edge Partition into Triangles and 4-stars is NP-Complete









# Lemma 2: Exactly One In Three SAT $\leq_p$ Edge Partition into Triangles And 4-Stars

- Exactly One In Three Sat: Given a formula φ whose clauses each contain 3 variables, is there an assignment such that each clause contains exactly one true variable?
- Exactly One In Three SAT is known to be NP-Complete.
- $G_{\phi}$  is constructed from clause gadgets and variable gadgets.







## Lemma 2: Exactly One In Three Sat $\leq_p$ Edge Partition into Triangles And 4-Stars

Proof Motivation:

Given a formula  $\phi$  with variables  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  and clauses  $c_1, \dots, c_n$ , we can build a graph G using clause and variable gadgets such that any partition of G into 4-Stars corresponds to a satisfying assignment of  $\phi$  and vice versa.

### Is Minimum Cost 2-Anonymity NP-Hard?

- Without loss of generality, a 2-Anonymization partitions the rows into doubles and triples.
   Larger groups of rows could be split into smaller subgroups.
- Intuition 1: Minimum Weight Matching is easy and triples can only increase the number of stars per row.
- Problem: In some cases it is actually beneficial to use groups of three. Example:

### Theorem: 2-Anonymity is in P

- We can reduce a 2-Anonymity instance to the Simplex Matching Problem
- Anshelevich and Karagiozova just showed that there is a polynomial time algorithm to solve Simplex Matching (STOC, 2007)

#### Simplex Matching

- Given a hypergraph H with hyperedges of size 2 and 3, and a cost function C(e) such that:
- 1.  $(u,v,w) \in E(H) \rightarrow (u,v), (v,w), (u,w) \in E(H)$
- 2.  $C(u,v) + C(u,w) + C(v,w) \le 2 C(u,v,w)$

Find the minimum cost node partition into hyperedges

#### 2-Anonymity $\leq_p$ Simplex Matching

- Given a database D, build a hypergraph H with a node v<sub>i</sub> for each row r<sub>i</sub>.
- Let  $C_{i,j,}$  denote the number of \*'s needed to anonymize the rows  $r_i, r_j$ . Similarly, define  $C_{i,j,k}$ .
- For every pair of rows (r<sub>i</sub>,r<sub>j</sub>) add a hyperedge e<sub>i,j</sub> with cost C(e<sub>i,j</sub>)=C<sub>i,j</sub>
- For every triple  $(r_{i},r_{j},r_{k})$  add a hyperedge  $e_{i,j,k}$  with  $C(e_{i,j,k})=C_{i,j,k}$

Do the Simplex Conditions Apply?

- $(u,v,w) \in E(H) \rightarrow (u,v), (v,w), (u,w) \in E(H)$ Because E(H) contains every pair.
- Note that adding an extra row to a double can only increase the number of \*'s per row.

$$\frac{1}{3}C_{i,j,k} \geq \frac{1}{2}C_{i,j}, \frac{1}{2}C_{j,k}, \frac{1}{2}C_{i,k}$$

Therefore,  

$$2C_{i,j,k} \ge C_{i,j} + C_{j,k} + C_{i,k}$$

### $\text{2-Anonymity} \leq_{\mathsf{p}} \text{Simplex Matching}$

- Recall that the optimal 2-Anonymity solution partitions the rows into groups of size 2 and 3. Larger groups can be split into smaller groups of size 2 and 3.
- Therefore, the optimal 2-Anonymity solution corresponds to the minimum cost partition of V(H) into hyperedges.
- Because the Simplex Conditions apply we can find the minimum cost partition of V(H) into hyperedges in polynomial time.