Introduction to Differential Privacy

Jeremiah Blocki CS-555 11/22/2016

Credit: Some slides are from Adam Smith

Google	differential privacy
Scholar	About 3,000,000 results (0.06 sec)

Articles

Case law

My library

Differential privacy: A survey of results

<u>C Dwork</u> - International Conference on Theory and Applications of ..., 2008 - Springer Abstract Over the past five years a new approach to **privacy**-preserving data analysis has born fruit [13, 18, 7, 19, 5, 37, 35, 8, 32]. This approach differs from much (but not all!) of the related literature in the statistics, databases, theory, and cryptography communities, in that ... Cited by 2557 Related articles All 32 versions Web of Science: 365 Cite Save More

Any time

Since 2016 Since 2015 Since 2012 Custom range...

Mechanism design via differential privacy

F McSherry, <u>K Talwar</u> - ... of Computer Science, 2007. FOCS'07. ..., 2007 - ieeexplore.ieee.org Abstract We study the role that **privacy**-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents, which must encourage players to honestly report information. Specifically, we ... Cited by 708 Related articles All 25 versions Cite Save



Microsoft[®] Research

Differential Privacy




Differential privacy





Privacy in Statistical Databases



- What information can be released?
- Two conflicting goals
 Utility: Users can extract "global" statistics
 Privacy: Individual information stays hidden
- How can these be made precise?

(How context-dependent **must** they be?)

Secure Function Evaluation

- Several parties, each with input x_i , want to compute a function $f(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n)$
- Ideal world: all parties hand their inputs to a trusted party who computes $f(x_1,...,x_n)$ and releases the result
- There exist secure protocols for this task
 - Idea: a simulator can geneerate a dummy transcript given only the value of f
- Privacy: use SFE protocols to jointly data mine
 - Horizontal vs vertical
 - Lots of papers

Why not use crypto definitions?

• Attempt #1:

 \blacktriangleright **Def'n**: For every entry i, no information about x_i is leaked


(as if encrypted)

Problem: no information at all is revealed!

Tradeoff privacy vs utility

• Attempt #2:

- \succ Agree on summary statistics f(DB) that are safe
- Def'n: No information except f(DB)
- Problem: why is f(DB) safe to release?
- Tautology trap
- > (Also: how do you figure out what **f** is?)



Question 1: How many people in this room have cancer?

Question 2: How many students in this room have cancer?


The difference (A1-A2) exposes my answer!



Why not use crypto definitions?

- **Problem**: Crypto makes sense in settings where the line between "inside" and "outside" is well-defined
 - E.g.psychologist:
 - "inside" = psychologist and patient
 - "outside" = everyone else
- Statistical databases: fuzzy line between inside and outside

Privacy in Statistical Databases



- What information can be released?
- Two conflicting goals
 Utility: Users can extract "global" statistics
 Privacy: Individual information stays hidden
- How can these be made precise?

(How context-dependent **must** they be?)

Straw Man #0


L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely

1. Abstract

In this document, I report on experiments I conducted using 1990 U.S. Census summary data to determine how many individuals within geographically situated populations had combinations of demographic values that occurred infrequently. It was found that combinations of few characteristics often combine in populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some individuals. Clearly, data released containing such information about these individuals should not be considered anonymous. Yet, health and other person-specific data are publicly available in this form. Here are some surprising results using only three fields of information, even though typical data releases contain many more fields. It was found that 87% (216 million of 248 million) of the population in the United States had reported characteristics that likely made them unique based only on {5-digit ZIP, gender, date of birth}. About half of the U.S. population (132 million of 248 million or 53%) are likely to be uniquely identified by only {place, gender, date of birth}, where place is basically the city, town, or municipality in which the person resides. And even at the county level, {county, gender, date of birth} are likely to uniquely identify 18% of the U.S. population. In general, few characteristics are needed to uniquely identify a person.

Straw man #I: Exact Disclosure



- Def'n: safe if adversary cannot learn any entry exactly
 - leads to nice (but hard) combinatorial problems
 - Does not preclude learning value with 99% certainty or narrowing down to a small interval
- Historically:
 - Focus: auditing interactive queries
 - Difficulty: understanding relationships between queries
 - E.g. two queries with small difference

Two Intuitions for Data Privacy

- "If the release of statistics S makes it possible to determine the value [of private information] more accurately than is possible without access to S,a disclosure has taken place." [Dalenius]
 - Learning more about me should be hard

- Privacy is "protection from being brought to the attention of others." [Gavison]
 - Safety is blending into a crowd

Suppose adversary knows that I smoke.

Question 0: How many patients smoke?


Question1: How many smokers have cancer?

Question 2: How many patients have cancer?

If adversary learns that smoking \rightarrow cancer then he learns my health status.


Privacy Violation?

Preventing Attribute Disclosure




- Large class of definitions
 - > safe if adversary can't learn "too much" about any entry
 - ➤ E.g.:
 - Cannot narrow X_i down to small interval
 - For uniform X_i , mutual information $I(X_i; San(DB)) \cdot \epsilon$
- How can we decide among these definitions?


Differential Privacy



- Lithuanians example:
 - Adv. learns height even ifAlice not in DB
- Intuition [DM]:
 - "Whatever is learned would be learned regardless of whether or not Alice participates"
 - > Dual:Whatever is already known, situation won't get worse




x' is a neighbor of x if they differ in one row



x' is a neighbor of x if they differ in one row

> Neighboring databases induce **close** distributions on transcripts



x' is a neighbor of x if they differ in one row

Definition: A is ε -differentially private if, for all neighbors x,x', for all subsets S of transcripts $Pr[A(x) \in S] \leq e^{\varepsilon} Pr[A(x') \in S]$ Neighboring databases induce **close** distributions on transcripts

• Note that ε has to be non-negligible here

> Triangle inequality: **any** pair of databases at distance $< \varepsilon n$

 \geq If $\varepsilon < 1/n$ then users get no info!

Why this measure?

For Statistical difference doesn't make sense with $\varepsilon > 1/n$

 \succ E.g. choose random i and release *i*, x_i

 \succ This compromises someone's privacy w.p. 1

Definition: A is ε –differentially private

if, for all neighbors x,x',

for all subsets S of transcripts

Neighboring databases induce **close** distributions on transcripts

 $\Pr[A(\mathbf{x}) \in S] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \Pr[A(\mathbf{x}') \in S]$

Differential Privacy

• Another interpretation [DM]:

You learn the same things about me regardless of whether I am in the database

 Suppose you know I am the height of median Canadian
 You could learn my height from database! But it didn't matter whether or not my data was part of it.
 Has my privacy been compromised? No!

Definition: A is ε –differentially private


if, for all neighbors x,x',

for all subsets S of transcripts


Neighboring databases induce **close** distributions on transcripts

 $\Pr[A(x) \in S] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \Pr[A(x') \in S]$

Graphs: Edge Adjacency




Graphs: Edge Adjacency




Johnny's mom does not learn if he watched Saw from the output A(G).

Privacy for Two Edges?




Limitations



Johnny's mom may now be able tell if he watches R-rated movies from A(G).

Output Perturbation



Intuition: $f(\mathbf{x})$ can be released accurately when f is insensitive to individual entries X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n

$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$

$$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$$

- What does G~G' mean?
- Example: Change one attribute
- Q₁(G) = #users who watched Lion King
- $\Delta Q_1 = ?$

$$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$$

- What does G~G' mean?
- Example: Change one attribute
- Q₂(G) = #users who watched Toy Story
- $\Delta Q_2 = 1$

$$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$$

- What does G~G' mean?
- Example: Change one attribute
- $Q(G) = Q_1(G) + Q_2(G)$
- $\Delta Q_2 = ?$

$$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$$

- What does G~G' mean?
- Example: Change one attribute
- Q₁(G) = #users who watched Lion King
- $\Delta Q_1 = ?$

$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$

What does G~G' mean?

• Example: Add/delete one row?

$\Delta Q \coloneqq \max_{G \sim G'} |Q(G) - Q(G')|$


- Example: Add/delete one row?
- $Q(G) = Q_1(G) + Q_2(G)$
- $\Delta Q = ?$

Traditional Differential Privacy Mechanism

Fact: The Laplacian Mechanism:

$$A(G) = Q(G) + Lap\left(\frac{\Delta Q}{\varepsilon}\right)$$

satisfies $(\varepsilon, 0)$ -differential privacy.




33

Traditional Differential Privacy Mechanism

$PDF_G(x) \propto e^{-|x\varepsilon|}$






34


Traditional Differential Privacy Mechanism

÷.

$$\forall x, \frac{PDF_G(x)}{PDF_{G'}(x)} = \frac{e^{-|x\varepsilon|}}{e^{-|(x-1)\varepsilon|}} \le e^{-\varepsilon}$$



Differential Privacy



Examples of low global sensitivity

• Example: $GS_{average} = \frac{1}{n}$ if $x \in [0, 1]^n$ > Add noise Lap $(\frac{1}{n})$

Comparison: to estimate a frequency (e.g.proportion of diabetics) in underlying population, get sampling noise

- Many natural functions have low GS, e.g.:
 - Histograms and contingency tables
 - Covariance matrix
 - Distance to a property
 - > Functions that can be approximated from a random sample
- [BDMN] Many data-mining and learning algorithms access the data via a sequence of low-sensitivity questions

> e.g. perceptron, some "EM" algorithms, SQ learning algorithms

Why does this help?

With relatively little noise:

- Averages
- Contingency tables
- Matrix decompositions
- Certain types of clustering

Differential Privacy

Protocols

- Output perturbation
 - (Release f(x) + noise)
 - Sum queries
 - [DiN'03,DwN'04,BDMN'05]
 - "Sensitivity" frameworks
 - [DMNS'06, NRS'07]
- Input perturbation
 - ("randomized response")
 - Frequent item sets [EGS'03]
 - (Various learning results)

Lower bounds

- Limits on communication models
 - Noninteractive [DMNS'06]
 "Local" [NSW'07]
- Limits on accuracy
 - "Many" good answers allow reconstructing database
 - [DiNi'03,DMT'07]
- Necessity of "differential" guarantees [DN]

Resources

foundations and Trends" in Theoretical Computer Science \$31-4

The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy

Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth



BARNES NOBLE \$99



Free PDF:

https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~aaroth/Papers/privacybook.pdf