

## Lecture 08: Shamir Secret Sharing (Introduction)

# Objective

- The objective of this new cryptographic primitive is to share a secret  $s$  among  $n$  people such that the following holds. The following conditions are satisfied for a fixed number  $t < n$ .
  - If  $< t$  parties get together, then they get no additional information about the secret.
  - If  $\geq t$  parties get together, then they can correctly reconstruct the secret.
- In this lecture, we study an introductory version of this cryptographic primitive

- We have seen that  $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \times)$  is a field, when  $p$  is a prime
  - Recall that  $+$  is integer addition modulo the prime  $p$
  - Recall that  $\cdot$  is integer multiplication modulo the prime  $p$
  - For example, the additive inverse of  $x$  is  $(p - x)$ , for  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  (because  $x + (p - x) = 0 \pmod{p}$ )
  - In the homework, you have shown that the multiplicative inverse of  $x$  is  $x^{p-2}$ , for  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  (i.e.,  $x \times (x^{p-2}) = 1 \pmod{p}$ )

For a working example, suppose  $p = 5$ . Therefore,  $x^{p-2} = x^3$  is the multiplicative inverse of  $x$  in  $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +, \times)$

- The multiplicative inverse of 1 is  $1^{p-2} = 1$ , i.e.  $(1/1) = 1$
- The multiplicative inverse of 2 is  
 $2^{p-2} = 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 4 \times 2 = 3$ , i.e.  $(1/2) = 3$
- The multiplicative inverse of 3 is  
 $3^{p-2} = 3 \times 3 \times 3 = 4 \times 3 = 2$ , i.e.  $(1/3) = 2$
- The multiplicative inverse of 4 is  
 $4^{p-2} = 4 \times 4 \times 4 = 1 \times 4 = 4$ , i.e.  $(1/4) = 4$

Interpreting “fractions” over the field  $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \times)$

- When we write  $4/3$
- We mean  $4 \cdot (1/3)$ ,
- That is 4 multiplied by the “multiplicative inverse of 3”
- That is 4 multiplied by 2 (because in the previous slide, we saw that the multiplicative inverse of 3 in  $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +, \times)$  is 2)
- The answer, therefore, is 3 (because  $4 \times 2 = 3 \pmod{5}$ )

## Note

While working over real numbers, we associate “ $4/3$ ” to the fraction “ $1.333\cdots$ ,” i.e. a fractional number. But when working over the field  $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \times)$  we will interpret the expression “ $4/3$ ” as the number “ $4 \times \text{mult-inv}(3)$ ”

## Coding Exercise

Students are highly encouraged to go to [cocalc.com](http://cocalc.com) and explore field arithmetic using sage

# Secret Sharing: Goal (Introduction)

- Suppose a central authority  $P$  has a secret  $s$  (some natural number)
- The central authority wants to share the secret among  $n$  parties  $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n$  such that
  - **Privacy.** No party can reconstruct the secret  $s$ .
  - **Reconstruction.** Any two parties can reconstruct the entire secret  $s$

# Secret Sharing: Algorithms (Introduction)

**Sharing Algorithm:** SecretShare ( $s, n$ ).

- Takes as input a secret  $s$
- Takes as input  $n$ , the number of shares it needs to create
- Outputs a vector  $(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n)$  the *secret shares* for each party

**Reconstruction Algorithm:** SecretReconstruct ( $i_1, s^{(1)}, i_2, s^{(2)}$ ).

- Takes as input the identity  $i_1$  of the first party and identity  $i_2$  of the second party
- Takes as input their respective secrets  $s^{(1)}$  and  $s^{(2)}$
- Outputs the reconstructed secret  $\tilde{s}$
- The probability that the reconstructed secret  $\tilde{s}$  is identical to the original secret  $s$  is close to 1



The intuition underlying the construction:

- Given one point in a plane, there are a lot of straight lines passing through it (In fact, we need the fact that *every* length of the intercept on the  $Y$ -axis is equally likely)
- But, given two points in a plane, there is a *unique* line passing through it; thus the length of the intercept on the  $Y$ -axis is unique

# Example: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (Introduction) II

Let  $(\mathbb{F}, +, \times)$  be a field such that  $\{0, 1, \dots, n\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  and the secret  $s \in \mathbb{F}$ . The secret-sharing algorithm is provided below.

SecretShare  $(s, n)$ .

- Choose a random line  $\ell(X)$  passing through the point  $(0, s)$ .  
Note that the equation of the line is  $a \cdot X + s$ , where  $a$  is randomly chosen from  $\mathbb{F}$
- Evaluate the line  $\ell(X)$  at  $X = 1, X = 2, \dots, X = n$  to generate the secret shares  $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n$ . That is,  
 $s_1 = \ell(X = 1), s_2 = \ell(X = 2), \dots, s_n = \ell(X = n)$

# Example: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (Introduction) III

The reconstruction algorithm is provided below.

SecretReconstruct  $(i_1, s^{(1)}, i_2, s^{(2)})$ .

- Compute the equation of the line

$$\ell'(X) := \frac{s^{(2)} - s^{(1)}}{i_2 - i_1} \cdot X + \left( \frac{i_2 s^{(1)} - i_1 s^{(2)}}{i_2 - i_1} \right)$$

- Let  $\tilde{s}$  be the evaluation of the line  $\ell'(X)$  at  $X = 0$ . That is, return  $\tilde{s} = \ell'(0) = \left( \frac{i_2 s^{(1)} - i_1 s^{(2)}}{i_2 - i_1} \right)$ .

# Example: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (Introduction) IV

## Privacy Argument

- Given the share of only one party  $(i_1, s^{(1)})$ , there is a unique line passing through the points  $(i_1, s^{(1)})$  and  $(0, \alpha)$ , for every  $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ .
- So, *all secrets are equally likely from this party's perspective*

In the future, we will mathematically formalize and prove the *italicized* statement above

- Suppose yesterday morning the central authority  $P$  gets the secret  $s = 3$
- And the central authority wants to share the secret among  $n = 4$  parties
- Note that we can work over  $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \times)$ , where  $p = 5$ 
  - Because  $\{1, \dots, 4\} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

## Execution of the Secret-sharing Algorithm

- The central authority picks a random line that passes through  $(0, s) = (0, 3)$
- The equation of such a line looks like

$$\ell(X) = k \cdot X + 3,$$

where  $k$  is an element in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  chosen uniformly at random

- Suppose it turns out that  $k = 2$
- Now, the shares of the four parties are the evaluation of the line  $\ell(X)$  at  $X = 1$ ,  $X = 2$ ,  $X = 3$ , and  $X = 4$ .
- So, the secret shares of parties 1, 2, 3, and 4 are respectively

$$s_1 = \ell(X = 1) = 2 \times 1 + 3 = 0$$

$$s_2 = \ell(X = 2) = 2 \times 2 + 3 = 2$$

$$s_3 = \ell(X = 3) = 2 \times 3 + 3 = 4$$

$$s_4 = \ell(X = 4) = 2 \times 4 + 3 = 1$$

- Yesterday, at the end of the day, the central authority provided each party their respective secret share (that is, the central authority provides 0 to party 1, 2 to party 2, 4 to party 3, and 1 to party 4)
  - Note that the equation of the line  $\ell(X)$  is hidden from the parties
  - All that the party  $i$  knows is that the line  $\ell(X)$  passes through the point  $(i, s_i)$
- After that, parties 1, 2, 3, and 4 part ways and go to their own homes

Today, let us zoom into Party 3's home

- Party 3 has secret share 4
- To find the secret  $s$ , party 3 enumerates all lines passing through the point  $(3, 4)$

$$\ell_0(X) = 0 \cdot X + 4$$

$$\ell_1(X) = 1 \cdot X + 1$$

$$\ell_2(X) = 2 \cdot X + 3$$

$$\ell_3(X) = 3 \cdot X + 0$$

$$\ell_4(X) = 4 \cdot X + 2$$



- Note that the central authority could have picked up *any* of these lines yesterday
- Note that
  - The line  $\ell_0$  has intercept 4 on the  $Y$ -axis (i.e., the evaluation of the line at  $X = 0$ ),
  - The line  $\ell_1$  has intercept 1 on the  $Y$ -axis,
  - The line  $\ell_2$  has intercept 3 on the  $Y$ -axis,
  - The line  $\ell_3$  has intercept 0 on the  $Y$  axis, and
  - The line  $\ell_4$  has intercept 2 on the  $Y$ -axis
- So, it is equally likely that the central authority shared the secret 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 yesterday

Tomorrow, Party 3 decides to meet Party 1, and they will work together on reconstructing the secret. Their reconstruction steps are provided below.

- Party 1's secret share is 0, and Party 3's secret share is 4
- So, the line has to pass through the points (1, 0) and (3, 4)
- The slope of the line is

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{4 - 0}{3 - 1} &= 4 \times (1/2) \\ &= 4 \times 3, && \text{because the multiplicative inverse of 2 is 3} \\ &= 2\end{aligned}$$

- So, the equation of the line is of the form

$$\ell'(X) = 2 \cdot X + c$$

- And, at  $X = 1$  the line evaluates to 0. So, the line is  
 $\ell'(X) = 2 \cdot X + 3$

- Note that the reconstructed line is identical to the line used by the central authority!
- The intercept of the line  $\ell'(X)$  on the  $Y$ -axis is  $\tilde{s} = \ell'(X = 0) = 3$ , which is identical to the secret shared by the central authority!

# Generalization

In the next lecture, we will see how to generalize this construction so that we can ensure that any  $t$  parties can recover the secret, and no  $(t - 1)$  parties can recover the secret, where  $t \in \{2, \dots, p - 1\}$