Lecture 18: Pseudorandom Functions

Pseudo-random Functions (PRF)

- Let $\mathcal{G}_{m,n,k} = \{g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_{2^k}\}$ be a set of functions such that each $g_i \colon \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$
- This set of functions $\mathcal{G}_{m,n,k}$ is called a pseudo-random function if the following holds.
  Suppose we pick $g \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}_{m,n,k}$. Let $x_1, \ldots, x_t \in \{0,1\}^m$ be distinct inputs. Given $(x_1, g(x_1)), \ldots, (x_{t-1}, g(x_{t-1}))$ for any computationally bounded party the value $g(x_t)$ appears to be uniformly random over $\{0,1\}^n$

Secret-key Encryption using Pseudo-Random Functions

Before we construct a PRF, let us consider the following secret-key encryption scheme.

1. Gen(): Return $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{id} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{1, \ldots, 2^k\}$
2. $\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{id}}(m)$: Pick a random $r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^m$. Return $(m \oplus g_{\mathsf{id}}(r), r)$, where $m \in \{0,1\}^n$.
3. $\mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{id}}(\widetilde{c}, \widetilde{r})$: Return $\widetilde{c} \oplus g_{\mathsf{id}}(\widetilde{r})$.

Features. Suppose the messages $m_1, \ldots, m_u$ are encrypted as the cipher-texts $(c_1, r_1), \ldots, (c_u, r_u)$.

- As long as the $r_1, \ldots, r_u$ are all distinct, each one-time pad $g_{\mathsf{id}}(r_1), \ldots, g_{\mathsf{id}}(r_u)$ appear uniform and independent of others to computationally bounded adversaries. So, this encryption scheme is secure against computationally bounded adversaries!
- The probability that any two of the randomness in $r_1, \ldots, r_u$ are not distinct is very small (We shall prove this later as "Birthday Paradox")
- This scheme is a "state-less" encryption scheme. Alice and Bob do not need to remember any private state (except the secret-key sk)!

- We shall consider the construction of Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali (GGM) construction.
- Let $G\colon \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^{2k}$ be a PRG. We define $G(x) = (G_0(x), G_1(x))$, where $G_0, G_1\colon \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^k$
- Let $G'\colon \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a PRG
- We define $g_{\mathrm{id}}(x_1x_2\dots x_m)$ as follows

$$G'\left(G_{x_m}(\cdots G_{x_2}(G_{x_1}(\mathrm{id}))\cdots)\right)$$

Construction of PRF II

Consider the execution for $x = x_1 x_2 x_3 = 010$. Output z is computed as follows.



We give the pseudocode of algorithms to construct PRG and PRF using a OWP $f\colon \{0,1\}^{k/2} \to \{0,1\}^{k/2}$

- Suppose $f\colon \{0,1\}^{k/2} \to \{0,1\}^{k/2}$ is a OWP
- We provide the pseudocode of a PRG $G\colon \{0,1\}^{k} \to \{0,1\}^{t}$, for any integer t, using the one-bit extension PRG construction of Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate construction. Given input $s \in \{0,1\}^{k}$, it outputs $G(s)$.

$G(k,t,s)$:

1. Interpret $s = (r,x)$, where $r,x \in \{0,1\}^{k/2}$
2. Initialize bits $=$ [ ] (i.e., an empty list)
3. Initialize $z = x$
4. For $i = 1$ to t:
    1. bits.append($\langle r,z\rangle$), here $\langle \cdot,\cdot\rangle$ is the inner-product
    2. $z = f(z)$
5. Return bits

Pseudocodes II

- We provide the pseudocode of the PRF $g_{\mathrm{id}} \colon \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$, where $\mathrm{id} \in \{0,1\}^k$, using the GGM construction. Given input $x \in \{0,1\}^m$, it outputs $g_{\mathrm{id}}(x)$.

$g(m, n, k, \mathrm{id}, x)$:

1. Interpret $x = x_1 x_2 \dots x_m$, where $x_1, \dots, x_m \in \{0,1\}$
2. Initialize $\mathrm{inp} = \mathrm{id}$
3. For $i = 1$ to m:
    1. Let $y = G(k, 2k, \mathrm{inp})$
    2. If $x_i = 0$, then inp is the first k bits of y. Otherwise (if $x_i = 1$), inp is the last k bits of y.
4. Return $G(k, n, \mathrm{inp})$