

Lecture 08: Shamir Secret Sharing (Security Argument)

The Setting

- We shall work over \mathbb{Z}_p , where p is a prime number
- We want to share to n parties and support t reconstruction, where $n \leq p - 1$
- Let $\mathbb{P}[S = s]$ be the probability that the secret is s
- Recall, that the secret sharing algorithm samples a random polynomial $p[X]$ of degree $\leq (t - 1)$ such that $p[X = 0] = s$
- The secret shares of parties $\{1, \dots, n\}$ are defined to be $p[X = 1], \dots, p[X = n]$
- For $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, the random variable S_i represents the secret share distribution of the i -th party

Developing Notion of Security II

- Suppose parties i_1, \dots, i_k , where $k < t$, are colluding
- Their respective secrets are s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_k}
- We want to say that a secure secret sharing scheme provides no additional information about the secrets
- Mathematically, this is summarized as

Definition (Secure Secret-sharing Scheme)

For all $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ we have

$$\mathbb{P}[S = s] = \mathbb{P}[S = s | S_{i_1} = s_{i_1}, S_{i_2} = s_{i_2}, \dots, S_{i_k} = s_{i_k}]$$

Developing Notion of Security III

A Clarification

- Suppose we want to share a message $s \in \{0, 1\}$ among 4 parties such that any two of them can reconstruct it
- So, we choose $p = 5$
- The probability of the secret is as follows

$$\mathbb{P}[S = 0] = 0.9$$

$$\mathbb{P}[S = 1] = 0.1$$

$$\mathbb{P}[S = 2] = 0$$

$$\mathbb{P}[S = 3] = 0$$

$$\mathbb{P}[S = 4] = 0$$

- The security of a secret-sharing scheme insists that even after seeing the secret-shares, the conditional distribution of secrets should remain the same

The outline for the proof of security for Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme

- Remember, this is only a proof outline. You will prove the entire result formally in the homework

Developing Notion of Security V

- Consider the following manipulation

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{P} [S = s | S_{i_1} = s_{i_1}, \dots, S_{i_k} = s_{i_k}] \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{P} [S = s, S_{i_1} = s_{i_1}, \dots, S_{i_k} = s_{i_k}]}{\mathbb{P} [S_{i_1} = s_{i_1}, \dots, S_{i_k} = s_{i_k}]} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{P} [p[X = 0] = s, p[X = i_1] = s_{i_1}, \dots, p[X = i_k] = s_{i_k}]}{\mathbb{P} [p[X = i_1] = s_{i_1}, \dots, p[X = i_k] = s_{i_k}]} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{P} [S = s] \cdot \overbrace{\frac{1}{p} \cdot \frac{1}{p} \cdots \frac{1}{p}}^{k\text{-times}}}{\overbrace{\frac{1}{p} \cdot \frac{1}{p} \cdots \frac{1}{p}}^{k\text{-times}}} = \mathbb{P} [S = s] \end{aligned}$$

The previous manipulation relied on the following two results

Claim

$$\mathbb{P} [p[X = 0] = s, p[X = i_1] = s_{i_1}, \dots, p[X = i_k] = s_{i_k}] = \mathbb{P}[S = s] \cdot \frac{1}{p^k}$$
$$\mathbb{P} [p[X = i_1] = s_{i_1}, \dots, p[X = i_k] = s_{i_k}] = \frac{1}{p^k}$$

You will prove this result in the homework.