# Lecture 33: Working Example for RSA Assumption 

## Recall: RSA Assumption

- We pick two primes uniformly and independently at random $p, q \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} P_{n}$
- We define $N=p \cdot q$
- We shall work over the group $\left(\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}, \times\right)$, where $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ is the set of all natural numbers $<N$ that are relatively prime to $N$, and $\times$ is integer multiplication $\bmod N$
- We pick $y \stackrel{\Phi}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$
- Let $\varphi(N)$ represent the size of the set $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$, which is $(p-1)(q-1)$
- We pick any $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(N)}^{*}$, that is, $e$ is a natural number $<\varphi(N)$ and is relatively prime to $\varphi(N)$
- We give $(n, N, e, y)$ to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ as ask her to find the $e$-th root of $y$, i.e., find $x$ such that $x^{e}=y$

RSA Assumption. For any computationally bounded adversary, the above-mentioned problem is hard to solve

## Working Example I

- We shall use $p=3$ and $q=11$
- So, we have $N=p \cdot q=33$
- Moreover, we have

$$
\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}=\{1,2,4,5,7,8,10,13,14,16,17,19,20,23,25,26,28,29,31,32\}
$$

- Now, $\varphi(N)=(p-1)(q-1)=2 \cdot 10=20$. Verify that this is the size of $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$
- For this example, we shall choose $e=3$ (note that 3 is relatively prime to $\varphi(N)=20$ )


## Working Example II

Let us start the repeated squaring procedure. The first row represents each element of $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ and the second row is the square of the corresponding element in the first row.

| $x$ | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 32 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $x^{2}$ | 1 | 4 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 31 | 1 | 4 | 31 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 4 | 1 | 31 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 4 | 1 |

## Working Example III

Using repeated squaring, we compute the third row that is the fourth-power of the element in the first row.

| $x$ | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 32 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $x^{2}$ | 1 | 4 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 31 | 1 | 4 | 31 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 4 | 1 | 31 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 4 | 1 |
| $x^{4}$ | 1 | 16 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 4 | 1 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 31 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 4 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 16 | 1 |

## Working Example IV

We add a row that computes $y=x^{e}$ (recall that $e=3$ in our case). We can obtain $x^{3}$ by multiplying $x \times x^{2}$.

| $x$ | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## Working Example V

We can now verify from the table that $x^{3}$ is a bijection from $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ to $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ (because 3 is relatively prime to $\varphi(N)$ )
We recall the following result (stated without proof) from the previous lecture.

## Theorem

For any $e \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\operatorname{gcd}(e, \varphi(N))=1$ and $e<\varphi(N)$, the function $x^{e}: \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ is a bijection.

Since $x^{e}$ is a bijection, we can uniquely define $y^{1 / e}$ for any $y \in \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$. For example, if $y=19$ then $y^{1 / e}=13$, where $e=3$.
The RSA assumption states that, for a random $y$, finding $y^{1 / e}$ is a computationally difficult task!

## Working Example VI

Let $d$ be an integer $<\varphi(N)$ such that $e \cdot d=1 \bmod N$. In our case, we have $d=7$.
Let us calculate a row corresponding to $x^{7}$. We can calcualte this by multiplying $x \times x^{2} \times x^{4}$.

| $x$ | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 32 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $x^{2}$ | 1 | 4 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 31 | 1 | 4 | 31 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 4 | 1 | 31 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 4 | 1 |
| $x^{4}$ | 1 | 16 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 4 | 1 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 31 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 4 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 16 | 1 |
| $y=x^{e}=x^{3}$ | 1 | 8 | 31 | 26 | 13 | 17 | 10 | 19 | 5 | 4 | 29 | 28 | 14 | 23 | 16 | 20 | 7 | 2 | 25 | 32 |
| $x^{d}=x^{7}$ | 1 | 29 | 16 | 14 | 28 | 2 | 10 | 7 | 20 | 25 | 8 | 13 | 26 | 23 | 31 | 5 | 19 | 17 | 4 | 32 |

## Working Example VII

Note that $d$ is also relatively prime to $\varphi(N)$, and, hence, the mapping $x^{d}$ is also a bijection.

## Working Example VIII

But note that, given $d$, we can easily compute the e-th root of $y$. Check that $y^{d}$ is identical to $y^{1 / e}$.

| $x$ | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 32 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $x^{2}$ | 1 | 4 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 31 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 4 | 1 | 31 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 4 |
| $x^{4}$ | 1 | 16 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 4 | 1 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 31 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 4 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 16 | 1 |
| $y=x^{e}=x^{3}$ | 1 | 8 | 31 | 26 | 13 | 17 | 10 | 19 | 5 | 4 | 29 | 28 | 14 | 23 | 16 | 20 | 7 | 2 | 25 | 32 |
| $x^{d}=x^{7}$ | 1 | 29 | 16 | 14 | 28 | 2 | 10 | 7 | 20 | 25 | 8 | 13 | 26 | 23 | 31 | 5 | 19 | 17 | 4 | 32 |
| $y^{d}=y^{7}$ | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 32 |

## Quick Summary

- The function $x^{e}: \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$ is a bijection for all $e$ such that $\operatorname{gcd}(e, \varphi(N))=1$
- Given $(n, N, e, y)$, where $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$, it is difficult for any computationally bounded adversary to compute the e-th root of $y$, i.e., the element $y^{1 / e}$
- But given $d$ such that $e \cdot d=1 \bmod \varphi(N)$, it is easy to compute $y^{1 / e}$, because $y^{d}=y^{1 / e}$

Now, think how we can design a key-agreement scheme using these properties. Once the key-agreement protocol is ready, we can use a one-time pad to create an public-key encryption scheme.

