## Lecture 28: Public-key Cryptography

Public-key Cryptography

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- In private-key cryptography the secret-key sk is always established ahead of time
- The secrecy of the private-key cryptography relies on the fact that the adversary does not have access to the secret key sk
- For example, consider a private-key encryption scheme
  - The Alice and Bob generate sk  $\leftarrow$  Gen() ahead of time
  - 2 Later, when Alice wants to encrypt and send a message to Bob, she computes the cipher-text c = Enc<sub>sk</sub>(m)
  - The adversary see c but gains <u>no additional information</u> about the message m
  - Bob can decrypt the message  $\widetilde{m} = \text{Dec}_{sk}(c)$
  - Note that the knowledge of sk distinguishes Bob from the adversary

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- If |sk| ≥ |m|, then we can construct private-key encryption schemes (like, one-time pad) that is secure against adversaries with unbounded computational power
- If |sk| = O(|m|<sup>ε</sup>), where ε ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, then we can construction private-key encryption schemes using pseudorandom generators (PRGs)
- What if, |sk| = 0? That is, what if Alice and Bob never met? How is "Bob" any different from an "adversary"?

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- We shall introduce the Decisional Diffie-Hellmann (DDH) Assumption and the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol,
- We shall introduce the El Gamal (public-key) Encryption Scheme, and
- Finally, abstract out the design principles learned.

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# Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Computational Hardness Assumption I

- Let (G, ○) be a group of size N that is generated by g. We represent it as (G, ○) = ⟨g⟩.
  - We shall represent  $g^0 = e$ , the identity of the group  $(G, \circ)$
  - We shall use the short-hand to represent  $g^i = \overbrace{g \circ g \circ \cdots \circ g}^{i}$
  - Then, we have the set  $G = \left\{g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots, g^{N-1}
    ight\}$
  - We have already seen how to compute  $g^a$  efficiently, for  $a \in \{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$  (Think)
  - We can easily compute the  $inv(g^a)$  (Think)
- Note that we are <u>not</u> providing the entire set *G* written as a set. This has *N* entries and is too long (for intuition, think of *N* as 1024-bit number, so *N* is roughly  $2^{1024}$ ). We only provide a succinct way to generate the group *G* by providing the generator *g*

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## Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Computational Hardness Assumption II

#### Definition (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption)

There exists groups  $(G, \circ) = \langle g \rangle$  such that no computationally-bounded adversary can efficiently distinguish the following two distributions

- The distribution of  $(g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$ , where  $a, b \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$ , and
- The distribution of  $(g^a, g^b, g^c)$ , where  $a, b, c \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$

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## Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Computational Hardness Assumption III

### Remarks:


- Note that DDH Assumption is a "belief" and not a "fact." If it is proven that such groups exist where DDH assumption holds, then this proof will also imply that  $P \neq NP$
- We emphasize that the DDH assumption need not hold for *any* group. There are *specially constructed groups* where DDH assumption is believed to hold
- For a fixed value of  $A = g^a$  and  $B = g^b$ , note that there is a unique value of  $g^{ab}$
- The definition, intuitively, states that "Given  $A = g^a$  and  $B = g^b$ , the adversary cannot (efficiently) distinguish  $g^{ab}$  from a random  $C = g^c$ ." Alternately, "even given  $A = g^a$  and  $B = g^b$ , the element  $g^{ab}$  looks random to a computationally bounded adversary."

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# Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Computational Hardness Assumption IV

- Note that it is implicit in the DDH assumption that given A = g<sup>a</sup> and g, it is computationally inefficient to compute a = log<sub>g</sub> A, i.e., computing the *discrete logarithm* is hard in the group (Think)
- Note that if a = 0 (i.e., A = e) then it is clear that  $g^{ab} = e$  as well. Then the adversary can distinguish between  $g^{ab}$  and  $g^c$  (random c). But it is unlikely that a = 0 (or, b = 0) will be chosen. It is possible that there are particular values of a and b when an adversary can distinguish  $g^{ab}$  from  $g^c$ , but the DDH assumption says that those <u>bad values</u> of a and b are unlikely to be chosen. Thus, it is extremely crucial that a, b are picked at random from the set  $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$

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Public-key Cryptography

- Note that both parties can computed the key g<sup>ab</sup>
- An adversary sees  $A = g^a$  and  $B = g^b$ . From this adversary's perspective, the key  $g^{ab}$  is indistinguishable from the random element  $g^c$ . So, the key sk =  $g^{ab}$  is perfectly hidden from the adversary

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### Remarks.

- Why is this algorithm efficient? Alice can compute A from the generator g and a using the "repeated squaring technique" that you proved in HW0. Similarly, Alice can also compute the key  $sk = B^a$  by repeated squaring technique.
- What advantage does the parties have over the adversary? Alice knows *a*, therefore she can compute *A* and *B<sup>a</sup>* efficiently. Bob knows *b*, therefore he can compute *B* and *A<sup>b</sup>* efficiently. Adversary, however, only sees *A* and *B*, and DDH states that it is computationally infeasible to distinguish *g<sup>ab</sup>* from a random group element *g<sup>c</sup>*. Note that if the adversary can compute the discrete log log<sub>*g*</sub> *A*, then it can easily compute *B<sup>log<sub>g</sub> A*, the key.</sup>


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- At the end of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol, Alice and Bob has established a secret key sk that is hidden from the adversary
- Note that Alice and Bob did not have to meet earlier to establish this secret key (contrast this with the private-key encryption scenario, where Alice and Bob have to meet first to establish a secret-key sk)
- Now, we can use the key sk generated by the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol and run any private-key cryptographic primitive using the secret key sk
  - The benefit is that Alice and Bob did not have to meet earlier
  - The downside is that the scheme is secure only against computationally bounded adversaries

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Summary of this Scheme. Run the one-time pad private-key encryption over the group  $(G, \circ)$  using the key generate by the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol.

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Recall the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol.

Public-key Cryptography


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- To encrypt a message  $m \in G$ , Alice encrypts as follows  $c = m \circ sk = m \circ g^{ab}$
- To decrypt a cipher-text  $c \in G$ , Bob decrypts as follows  $\widetilde{m} = c \circ inv(sk) = c \circ g^{-ab}$

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### ElGamal Public-key Encryption IV

We summarize this protocol (ElGamal Encryption) below.



Public-key Cryptography

- The element *B* sent by Bob is Bob's public-key. It is announced to the world by Bob only once.
- Whoever wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, uses Bob's public-key *B*
- The pair of elements (A, c) sent by Alice is the cipher-text
- Bob can easily decrypt by computing  $\widetilde{m} = c \circ inv(A^b)$
- The algorithm followed by Alice is her encryption algorithm. To encrypt a new message m', Alice will choose a fresh random a' and compute  $A' = g^{a'}$  and  $c' = m' \circ B^{a'}$

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