

Secret Sharing

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## **Secret Sharing**

- The notion of secret sharing was introduced independently by Shamir and Blakley in 1979
- For integers n and t such that n > t >= 0, an (n,t)-secret sharing (SS) scheme is a method used by a dealer D
  - to share a secret s among a set of n parties (the sharing phase) in such a way that
  - in the reconstruction phase any subset of t+1 or more parties can compute s, but subsets of size t or fewer cannot
- What is the relation between n and t
  - against a passive adversary controlling any t parties?
  - against an active adversary controlling any t parties?

#### **Secret Sharing Basics**

Sharing Phase



### **Secret Sharing Basics**

Reconstruction Phase



### **Shamir Secret Sharing**

- Shamir's secret sharing based on polynomial evaluations and Lagrange interpolation is the standard SS scheme
- To share a secret s  $\in F_p$  along n < p players, the dealer D
  - chooses a degree-t polynomial
    f<sub>D</sub>(x) = s + r<sub>1</sub>x + r<sub>2</sub>x<sup>2</sup> + ... + r<sub>t</sub>x<sup>t</sup>, for coefficients r<sub>i</sub> ∈ F<sub>p</sub> chosen uniformly at random
  - computes and send  $y_i = f(i)$  to i<sup>th</sup> node/party; share  $s_i = (i, y_i)$
  - We represent the output of sharing phase as [s]
- Any subset Q of t+1 or more players, can reconstruct the secret s as  $s = \sum_{i \in Q} \lambda_i y_i$ , where  $\lambda_i = \prod_{j \in Q} \sum_{i \in Q} \frac{j}{j-i}$

This secret sharing is additive homomorphic

### **Example: (4,1)-Secret Sharing**



### **Shamir Secret Sharing Examples**

(n,1)-secret sharing
 (n,2)-secret sharing

![](_page_18_Figure_2.jpeg)

### **Attacks on Secret Sharing**

Attacking Secrecy/Privacy

![](_page_19_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### Attacking Correctness

![](_page_20_Figure_2.jpeg)

### **Bounding Adversary Behavior**

- What is the relation between n and t
  - against a passive adversary controlling any t parties?
  - against an active adversary controlling any t parties?

(Discussion on the board)

- What if the dealer is malicious?
  - Example Scenarios: Multi-party Computations; Threshold Cryptography

### **Attacks on Secret Sharing**

Attacking Commitment

![](_page_22_Figure_2.jpeg)

## **Verifiable Secret Sharing**

- Secret sharing with three properties
  - Secrecy
  - Correctness
  - Commitment

(Discussion on the board)