

Lecture 10: Authentication

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures

Intuition

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures
- Signer signs a message m to produce a signature σ

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures
- Signer signs a message m to produce a signature σ
- A Verifier can verify that σ is indeed generated for a message m

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures
- Signer signs a message m to produce a signature σ
- A Verifier can verify that σ is indeed generated for a message m
- An adversary cannot *forge* a signature

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures
- Signer signs a message m to produce a signature σ
- A Verifier can verify that σ is indeed generated for a message m
- An adversary cannot *forge* a signature
- Two types:

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures
- Signer signs a message m to produce a signature σ
- A Verifier can verify that σ is indeed generated for a message m
- An adversary cannot *forge* a signature
- Two types:
 - 1 Private Key: Message Authentication Codes

- Intuition: Digital analogue of physical signatures
- Signer signs a message m to produce a signature σ
- A Verifier can verify that σ is indeed generated for a message m
- An adversary cannot *forge* a signature
- Two types:
 - 1 Private Key: Message Authentication Codes
 - 2 Public Key: Digital Signatures

Message Authentication Codes

- Intuition: Signer and Verifier “share a secret”

Message Authentication Codes

- Intuition: Signer and Verifier “share a secret”
- Key Generation Algorithm: $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ outputs secret key k

Message Authentication Codes

- Intuition: Signer and Verifier “share a secret”
- Key Generation Algorithm: $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ outputs secret key k
- “Signing” Algorithm: $\text{Tag}_k(m)$ outputs the tag σ

Message Authentication Codes

- Intuition: Signer and Verifier “share a secret”
- Key Generation Algorithm: $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ outputs secret key k
- “Signing” Algorithm: $\text{Tag}_k(m)$ outputs the tag σ
- Verification Algorithm: $\text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma)$ is 1 if and only if σ is a valid tag of m under the secret key k

Message Authentication Codes

- Intuition: Signer and Verifier “share a secret”
- Key Generation Algorithm: $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ outputs secret key k
- “Signing” Algorithm: $\text{Tag}_k(m)$ outputs the tag σ
- Verification Algorithm: $\text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma)$ is 1 if and only if σ is a valid tag of m under the secret key k
- Security: An adversary with oracle access to the tag oracle cannot forge the tag of a message

- $k \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$

MAC: Algorithms

- $k \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Tag}_k(m)$

MAC: Algorithms

- $k \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Tag}_k(m)$
- $\text{Ver}_k: \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

MAC: Algorithms

- $k \xleftarrow{s} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- $\sigma \xleftarrow{s} \text{Tag}_k(m)$
- $\text{Ver}_k: \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Correctness:
 $\Pr[k \xleftarrow{s} \text{Gen}(1^n), \sigma \xleftarrow{s} \text{Tag}_k(m): \text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma) = 1] = 1$

MAC: Algorithms

- $k \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Tag}_k(m)$
- $\text{Ver}_k: \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Correctness:
 $\Pr[k \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n), \sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Tag}_k(m): \text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma) = 1] = 1$
- Security: For all n.u. PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible $\nu(\cdot)$ such that:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} k \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n) \\ (m, \sigma) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{Tag}_k(\cdot)}(1^n) \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{A} \text{ did not query } m \wedge \\ \text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma) = 1 \end{array} \right] \leq \nu(n)$$

- PRF \implies MAC

MAC: Construction

- PRF \implies MAC
- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$: Output $k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$

MAC: Construction

- PRF \implies MAC
- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$: Output $k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$
- $\text{Tag}_k(m)$: Output $f_k(m)$

MAC: Construction

- PRF \implies MAC
- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$: Output $k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$
- $\text{Tag}_k(m)$: Output $f_k(m)$
- $\text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma)$: Output $f_k(m) \stackrel{?}{=} \sigma$

MAC: Construction

- PRF \implies MAC
- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$: Output $k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$
- $\text{Tag}_k(m)$: Output $f_k(m)$
- $\text{Ver}_k(m, \sigma)$: Output $f_k(m) \stackrel{?}{=} \sigma$
- Think: Proof?

- (Only modification) Security: Adversary is allowed only one query

- (Only modification) Security: Adversary is allowed only one query
- Unconditionally-secure construction exists

- (Only modification) Security: Adversary is allowed only one query
- Unconditionally-secure construction exists
- Think & Read

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify

Digital Signature

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify
- Key Generation Algorithm: $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{s} \text{Gen}(1^n)$

Digital Signature

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify
- Key Generation Algorithm: $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- Signing Algorithm: $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$

Digital Signature

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify
- Key Generation Algorithm: $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- Signing Algorithm: $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$
- Verify Algorithm: $\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma): \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

Digital Signature

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify
- Key Generation Algorithm: $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- Signing Algorithm: $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$
- Verify Algorithm: $\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma): \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Correctness:
 $\Pr[(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n), \sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m) : \text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma) = 1] = 1$

Digital Signature

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify
- Key Generation Algorithm: $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- Signing Algorithm: $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$
- Verify Algorithm: $\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma): \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Correctness:
 $\Pr[(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n), \sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m) : \text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma) = 1] = 1$
- Security:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n) \\ (m, \sigma) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sign}_{sk}(\cdot)}(1^n, pk) \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{A} \text{ did not query } m \wedge \\ \text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma) = 1 \end{array} \right] \leq \nu(n)$$

Digital Signature

- Intuition: Only Signer can sign and everyone can verify
- Key Generation Algorithm: $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n)$
- Signing Algorithm: $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$
- Verify Algorithm: $\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma): \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Correctness:
 $\Pr[(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n), \sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Sign}_{sk}(m) : \text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma) = 1] = 1$
- Security:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^n) \\ (m, \sigma) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sign}_{sk}(\cdot)}(1^n, pk) \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{A} \text{ did not query } m \wedge \\ \text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma) = 1 \end{array} \right] \leq \nu(n)$$

- One-time Digital Signatures: Adversary is allowed only one query

One-time Digital Signature: Construction (Lamport's Signature)

- $sk := \begin{pmatrix} x_0^{(1)} & x_0^{(2)} & \dots & x_0^{(n)} \\ x_1^{(1)} & x_1^{(2)} & \dots & x_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $x_b^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$

One-time Digital Signature: Construction (Lamport's Signature)

- $sk := \begin{pmatrix} x_0^{(1)} & x_0^{(2)} & \dots & x_0^{(n)} \\ x_1^{(1)} & x_1^{(2)} & \dots & x_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $x_b^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $pk := \begin{pmatrix} y_0^{(1)} & y_0^{(2)} & \dots & y_0^{(n)} \\ y_1^{(1)} & y_1^{(2)} & \dots & y_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $y_b^{(i)} = f(x_b^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$

One-time Digital Signature: Construction (Lamport's Signature)

- $sk := \begin{pmatrix} x_0^{(1)} & x_0^{(2)} & \dots & x_0^{(n)} \\ x_1^{(1)} & x_1^{(2)} & \dots & x_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $x_b^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $pk := \begin{pmatrix} y_0^{(1)} & y_0^{(2)} & \dots & y_0^{(n)} \\ y_1^{(1)} & y_1^{(2)} & \dots & y_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $y_b^{(i)} = f(x_b^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $\text{Sign}_{sk}(m): \sigma := (x_{m_1}^{(1)}, x_{m_2}^{(2)}, \dots, x_{m_n}^{(n)})$

One-time Digital Signature: Construction (Lamport's Signature)

- $sk := \left(\begin{array}{cccc} x_0^{(1)} & x_0^{(2)} & \dots & x_0^{(n)} \\ x_1^{(1)} & x_1^{(2)} & \dots & x_1^{(n)} \end{array} \right)$, where $x_b^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $pk := \left(\begin{array}{cccc} y_0^{(1)} & y_0^{(2)} & \dots & y_0^{(n)} \\ y_1^{(1)} & y_1^{(2)} & \dots & y_1^{(n)} \end{array} \right)$, where $y_b^{(i)} = f(x_b^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $\text{Sign}_{sk}(m): \sigma := \left(x_{m_1}^{(1)}, x_{m_2}^{(2)}, \dots, x_{m_n}^{(n)} \right)$
- $\text{Ver}_{pk}(\sigma): \bigwedge_{i \in [n]} f(\sigma_i) \stackrel{?}{=} y_{m_i}^{(i)}$

One-time Digital Signature: Construction (Lamport's Signature)

- $sk := \begin{pmatrix} x_0^{(1)} & x_0^{(2)} & \dots & x_0^{(n)} \\ x_1^{(1)} & x_1^{(2)} & \dots & x_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $x_b^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $pk := \begin{pmatrix} y_0^{(1)} & y_0^{(2)} & \dots & y_0^{(n)} \\ y_1^{(1)} & y_1^{(2)} & \dots & y_1^{(n)} \end{pmatrix}$, where $y_b^{(i)} = f(x_b^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [n]$
and $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- $\text{Sign}_{sk}(m): \sigma := (x_{m_1}^{(1)}, x_{m_2}^{(2)}, \dots, x_{m_n}^{(n)})$
- $\text{Ver}_{pk}(\sigma): \bigwedge_{i \in [n]} f(\sigma_i) \stackrel{?}{=} y_{m_i}^{(i)}$
- Proof?