Decidability of Secure Non-interactive Simulation of Doubly Symmetric Binary Source

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Abstract. Noise, which cannot be eliminated or controlled by parties, is an incredible facilitator of cryptography. For example, highly efficient secure computation protocols based on independent samples from the doubly symmetric binary source (BSS) are known. A modular technique of extending these protocols to diverse forms of other noise without incurring any loss of round and communication complexity is the following strategy. Parties, beginning with multiple samples from an arbitrary noise source, non-interactively, albeit, securely, simulate the BSS samples. After that, they can use custom-designed efficient multi-party solutions for BSS.

Khorasgani, Maji, and Nguyen (EPRINT–2020) introduce the notion of secure non-interactive simulation (SNIS) as a natural cryptographic extension of concepts like non-interactive simulation and non-interactive correlation distillation in theoretical computer science and information theory. In SNIS, the parties apply local reduction functions to their samples to produce the samples of another distribution. This work studies the decidability problem of whether a sample from the noise \((X, Y)\) can securely and non-interactively simulate BSS samples. As is standard in analyzing non-interactive simulations, our work relies on Fourier analytic techniques to approach this decidability problem. Our work begins by algebraizing the simulation-based security definition of SNIS. Then, using this algebraized definition of security, we analyze the properties of the Fourier spectrum of the reduction functions.

Given \((X, Y)\) and BSS with parameter \(\varepsilon\), our objective is to distinguish between the following two cases. (A) Does there exist a SNIS from BSS \((\varepsilon)\) to \((X, Y)\) with \(\delta\)-insecurity? (B) Do all SNIS from BSS \((\varepsilon)\) to \((X, Y)\) incur \(\delta'\)-insecurity, where \(\delta' > \delta\)? We prove that there exists a bounded computable time algorithm achieving this objective for the following cases. (1) \(\delta = O(1/n)\) and \(\delta' = \) positive constant, and (2) \(\delta = \) positive constant, and \(\delta' = \) another (larger) positive constant. We also prove that \(\delta = 0\) is achievable only when \((X, Y)\) is another BSS, where \((X, Y)\) is an arbitrary distribution over \((-1, 1) \times (-1, 1)\). Furthermore, given \((X, Y)\), we provide a sufficient test determining is simulating BSS samples incurs a constant-insecurity, irrespective of the number of samples of \((X, Y)\).

Technically, our work proceeds by demonstrating that the weight of the Fourier spectrum of the reduction functions is at most \(O(\delta)\) on higher-order components, where \(\delta\) is the insecurity of the SNIS.

Keywords: Secure non-interactive simulation, Doubly symmetric binary source, Binary symmetric source, Decidability characterization, Biased discrete Fourier analysis, Efron-Stein decomposition, Junta theorem, Dimension reduction, Markov operator.
1 Introduction

Noise, which cannot be eliminated or controlled by parties, is an incredible facilitator of cryptography. Using interaction and private independent randomness, mutually distrusting parties can leverage such correlated noise to compute securely over their private data. For example, Rabin [40, 41] and Crépeau [8] constructed general secure computation [49, 20] protocols from erasure channels. Such correlated noise seems necessary for secure computation because it is highly unlikely that shared randomness alone can enable general secure multi-party computation [17, 32, 33]. Crépeau and Kilian [9, 10] proved that samples from noisy channels, particularly, the binary symmetric channels, suffice for general secure computation. After that, a significant body of highly influential research demonstrated the feasibility of realizing general secure computation from diverse and unreliable noise sources [28, 29, 12, 30, 11, 45, 46, 27, 6]. In particular, random samples from these noisy channels suffice for general secure computation while incurring a small increase in round and communication complexity [44].

We also know highly efficient secure computation protocols from the correlated samples of the doubly symmetric binary source. A doubly symmetric binary source with parameter \( \varepsilon \), represented by \( \text{BSS}(\varepsilon) \), provides the first party independent and uniformly random elements \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \{-1,1\} \). For every \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \), the second party gets a correlated \( y_i \in \{-1,1\} \) such that \( y_i = x_i \) with probability \( (1 - \varepsilon) \); otherwise, \( y_i = -x_i \) with probability \( \varepsilon \). These protocols efficiently use these samples (vis-à-vis, the number of samples required to compute an arbitrary circuit of fixed size securely) and have a small round and communication complexity [30, 44, 24, 23]. A modular technique of extending these protocols to diverse forms of other noise without incurring any loss of round and communication complexity is the following strategy. Parties begin with multiple samples of an arbitrary noise source \( (X,Y) \) and they securely convert them into samples of \( (U,V) = \text{BSS}(\varepsilon) \) without any interaction, a.k.a., secure non-interactive simulation [26].

![Fig. 1. Pictorial summary of the system for secure non-interactive joint simulation.](image)

**Secure non-interactive simulation.** Khorasgani, Maji, and Nguyen [26] introduced the notion of secure non-interactive simulation of joint distributions. The high-level objective of this cryptographic primitive is to non-interactively and securely simulate samples from a distribution \( (U,V) \) when the parties al-
ready have multiple independent samples from another distribution \((X, Y)\). This cryptographic primitive is a natural cryptographic extension of highly influential concepts in theoretical computer science and information theory, like, non-interactive simulation (beginning with the seminal works of Gács and Körner [16], Witsenhausen [43], and Wyner [47]), non-interactive correlation distillation [38, 36, 48, 3, 7]. The sequel succinctly presents the intuition underlying this concept (for formal definition refer to Appendix F).

Refer to Figure 1 for the following discussion. Let \((X, Y)\) be a joint distribution over the sample space \(X \times Y\). The system samples \(n\) independent samples drawn according to the distribution \((X, Y)\). That is, \((x^n, y^n) \sim (X, Y) \otimes n\). The system delivers the samples \(x^n\) to Alice and \(y^n\) to Bob. Alice applies a local reduction function \(f_n: X^n \rightarrow U\) to her sample \(x^n\) and outputs \(u' = f_n(x^n)\). Similarly, Bob applies a local reduction function \(g_n: Y^n \rightarrow V\) to her sample \(y^n\) and outputs \(v' = g_n(y^n)\).

There exists a secure non-interactive joint simulation (SNIS) of \((U, V)\) from \((X, Y)\) with insecurity tolerance \(\delta \in [0, 1]\), if the following three conditions are satisfied.

1. The correctness of the non-interactive simulation ensures that the distribution of the joint samples \((u', v')\) when \((x^n, y^n) \sim (X, Y) \otimes n\), is \(\delta\)-close to the distribution \((U, V)\) (in the statistical distance).
2. The security against an adversarial Alice insists that there exists a (randomized) simulator \(\text{Sim}_A: U \rightarrow X^n\) such that the real distribution \((X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n))\) is \(\delta\)-close to the ideal distribution \((\text{Sim}_A(U), U, V)\).
3. Similarly, the security against an adversarial Bob insists that there exists a simulator \(\text{Sim}_B: V \rightarrow Y^n\) such that the distribution \((f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n), Y^n)\) is \(\delta\)-close to the distribution \((U, V, \text{Sim}_B(V))\).

Tersely, one represents this secure reduction as \((U, V) \sqsubseteq_{f_n, g_n}^\delta (X, Y) \otimes n\).

**Problem statement.** In general, given two noise sources \((X, Y)\) and \((U, V)\), one needs to determine whether there exists a secure non-interactive simulation of \((U, V)\) samples from the samples of \((X, Y)\). More formally, given the source distribution \((X, Y)\), the target distribution \((U, V)\) and an insecurity tolerance \(\delta \in [0, 1]\), does there exist \(n \in \mathbb{N}\) and reduction functions \(f_n\) and \(g_n\) witnessing a secure non-interactive reduction? Our work studies this decidability problem (referred to as, decidability of SNIS) specifically for the case where \((U, V) = \text{BSS}(\varepsilon)\).

**Relation to the decidability on non-interactive simulation.** Starting with the seminal works of Gács and Körner [16], Witsenhausen [43], and Wyner [47], deciding whether non-interactive simulation (NIS) of \((U, V)\) using \((X, Y)\) is possible or not has been a challenging problem. Only recently, progress on the decidability of (the gap-version of) the general problem was made [19, 13, 18].

Our decidability problem studies the general decidability of non-interactive simulation with the additional constraint of security. There is no outright evidence whether our decidability problem reduces to this existing literature. In particular, the tests of [19] does not extend to the decidability of SNIS because
they rely on generating samples from correlated Gaussians, which is insecure (see Appendix D for a discussion). Our technical approach employs tools from biased Fourier analysis that are similar to those used in the literature of NIS.

### 1.1 Our Contribution

To enable the algebraic treatment of our problem, our paper algebraizes the simulation-based security definition of SNIS (refer to Claim 1). This algebraization ensures that the insecurity of simulation-secure SNIS is a two-factor approximation of the insecurity of algebraic-secure SNIS. For example, perfectly simulation-secure SNIS remains perfectly algebraic-secure SNIS, and statistically simulation-secure SNIS remains statistically algebraic-secure SNIS. In the sequel, consequently, we rely only on the algebraic definition of security.

Our results prove the feasibility to distinguish whether a SNIS with \( \delta \)-insecurity exists or any SNIS must be \( \delta' \)-insecure, where \( \delta' > \delta \). That is, we solve the gap-version of the decidability problem, similar to the literature of decidability in NIS [19, 13, 18]. This gap is inherent to the technical tools used in this area (see, for example, the discussion in [13]).

**Result I.** Given \((X,Y)\) and \((U,V) = \text{BSS}(\varepsilon')\), we prove that there exists a bounded computable time algorithm that distinguishes between the following two cases.

1. \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon)\) reduces to \((X,Y) \otimes^n\) with \(\delta_n = O(1/n)\) insecurity.
2. The reduction of \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon)\) to \((X,Y)^*\) has a constant insecurity.

A distribution is redundancy-free if both its marginal distributions have full support.

**Informal Theorem 1** Let \((X,Y)\) be a redundancy-free finite joint distribution over \((\Omega,\Omega)\), \(\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)\), and \(\delta > 0\) be the insecurity parameter. There exists an algorithm running in bounded computable time that distinguishes between the following two cases.

1. There exists a sequence of insecurity parameters \(\delta_n = O(1/n)\) and a sequence of reduction functions \(f_n, g_n : \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}\) such that for infinitely many \(n\), we have \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq^\delta_n f_n, g_n (X,Y) \otimes^n\).
2. For all \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), and reduction functions \(f_n, g_n : \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}\), it is the case that \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \not\subseteq^\delta_{f_n, g_n} (X,Y)^\otimes^n\).

Typically, in cryptography, one insists on \(\delta_n\) being negligible in \(n\). Our result applies even for the case of \(\delta_n = O(1/n)\) insecurity as well. It is instructive to remind the reader that our result does not imply that either \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')\) reduces to \((X,Y)\) with \(O(1/n)\)-insecurity, or this reduction must incur a constant insecurity. Our result states that it is possible to distinguishes these two cases. Theorem 6 presents the formal restatement of this result.

Furthermore, we prove that certain distributions \((X,Y)\) can yield a SNIS to \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')\) only with constant-insecurity. The following result is a corollary of (the technical) Informal Theorem 4 discussed later in this section.
Corollary 1. For any $\varepsilon' \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, any $\rho \in [0, 1]$, and any joint distribution $(X, Y)$ over $\{-1, 1\} \times \{-1, 1\}$ of maximal correlation $\rho$, the insecurity of any protocol for non-interactive secure simulation of $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ from $(X, Y)$ using arbitrary number of independent samples is at least

$$\frac{1}{4} \min \left(\left((1 - 2\varepsilon')^2 - \rho^{2k}\right)^2, \left((1 - 2\varepsilon')^2 - \rho^{2(k+1)}\right)^2\right),$$

where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\rho^k \geq (1 - 2\varepsilon') > \rho^{k+1}$.

The maximal correlation of $(X, Y)$ is defined in Subsection 2.4 and is efficiently computable. Observe that our result states that even using a large number of samples of $(X, Y)$ does not help securely realize $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ with a statistically small insecurity. This result demonstrates the power of interaction in secure computation over $\text{BSS}$.

Towards this objective, we demonstrate that it is possible to distinguish whether $(X, Y)$ must be $\text{BSS}((X, Y))$, such that $(1 - 2\varepsilon')^k = (1 - 2\varepsilon')$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $(X, Y)$ is a joint distribution over $\{-1, 1\} \times \{-1, 1\}$.

**Informal Theorem 2** Let $\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)$ and $(X, Y)$ be an arbitrary joint distribution over $\{-1, 1\} \times \{-1, 1\}$. Suppose there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and Boolean functions $f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ such that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \equiv_{f_n,g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n}$. Then, the distribution $(X, Y)$ must be a $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon)$, where $(1 - 2\varepsilon')^k = (1 - 2\varepsilon')$, where $n \geq k \in \mathbb{N}$.

[26] proved a restricted version of this result. They show that if $(X, Y) = \text{BSS}(\varepsilon)$, then $(1 - 2\varepsilon)^k = (1 - 2\varepsilon')$, and the parity reduction realizes the SNIS. Theorem 1 formally restates this informal theorem.

**Result III.** We know that efficiently general secure computation can be founded on (sufficiently small) constant-insecure samples of $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$, see, for example, [23]. So, it suffices to securely realize $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ with a constant insecurity. Towards this objective, we demonstrate that it is possible to distinguish whether $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ reduces to $(X, Y)^n$ with $\delta$-insecurity, where $\delta$ is a constant, or any SNIS of $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ from $(X, Y)^n$ is $c \cdot \delta$-insecure, where $c > 1$ is a constant.

**Informal Theorem 3** Let $\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)$ and $(X, Y)$ be an arbitrary joint distribution over $\{-1, 1\} \times \{-1, 1\}$. There exist $c > 0$, $\delta_0 > 0$ such that the following statement holds. For any insecurity parameter $\delta < \delta_0$, there is an algorithm running in bounded computable time that distinguishes between the following two cases.

1. There exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and reduction functions $f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ such that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \equiv_{f_n,g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n}$.
2. For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and reduction functions $f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$, it must be the case that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \not\equiv_{c \cdot \delta} (X, Y)^{\otimes n}$.

We remind the reader that $c \cdot \delta$ must be less than one; otherwise, item 2 above is always false. Theorem 5 is the formal restatement of this result.
Technical results. We summarize two technical tools that are central to most of the results presented above. First, we prove a necessary condition for SNIS of $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ from $(X, Y)^*$ with $\delta \to 0$ insecurity.

Informal Theorem 4 Let $(X, Y)$ be a redundancy-free joint distribution over $\{-1, 1\} \times \{-1, 1\}$ with maximal correlation $\rho$. Suppose there exist a sequence $\delta_n \in [0, 1]$ converging to 0, and a sequence of reduction functions $f_n, g_n$ such that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq_{f_n, g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n}$. Then, there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(1 - 2\varepsilon')^2 = \rho^{2k}$.

We emphasize that this test is not sufficient. Corollary 1, presented above, is a consequence of this result (formally restated as Theorem 3).

Finally, we prove a concentration of Fourier weight for SNIS.

Informal Theorem 5 Let $\rho \in [0, 1]$ and $\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)$. There exists a constant $c > 0$ such that the following holds. Suppose there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$, a finite joint distribution $(X, Y)$ over $(\Omega, \Omega)$ and reduction functions $f_n, g_n : \mathcal{X}^n \to \{-1, 1\}$ such that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq_{f_n, g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n}$ for some $\delta_n \geq 0$, and the maximal correlation of $(X, Y)$ is $\rho$. Then, the Fourier weight (with respect to the biased Fourier bases) of both $f_n$ and $g_n$ on degrees greater than $k$ is at most $c \cdot \delta_n$.

We use this result (Theorem 2 restates the formal version) to highlight how our technical approach diverges from the techniques of [19, 13, 18] for NIS-decidability. In NIS-decidability, [19, 13, 18] rely on the invariance principle [35] to arrive at a similar conclusion as Theorem 2. However, the invariance principle preserves correlation, but not the security of the reduction. Consequently, our technical approach uses appropriate junta theorems [15, 31] to circumvent this bottleneck. (See Appendix D for a more detail discussions)

1.2 Technical Overview

The proofs of the decidability problems Informal Theorem 3 and Informal Theorem 1 follow a sequence of steps described below. Let $\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)$, $\rho' = 1 - 2\varepsilon'$ and $(X, Y)$ be an arbitrary finite joint distribution with maximal correlation $\rho$ (refer to Subsection 2.4 for the definition). Let $\pi_x$ and $\pi_y$ be the marginal distribution of $X$ and $Y$, respectively. Let $T$ be the Markov operator associated with $(X, Y)$ (see Subsection 2.5 for the formal definition).

Step 1: Algebraization of Security. We first give an algebraized definition of SNIS of $\text{BSS}$ from any finite joint distribution (see Definition 2). We show that if the insecurity in the simulation-based definition is $\delta$, then it is at most $2\delta$ in the algebraic definition, and vice-versa (refer to Claim 1). This result implies that the gap version of SNIS with respect to the simulation-based definition is decidable if and only if the gap version of SNIS with respect to the algebraic definition is decidable.

For brevity, we shall use $f_n$ to represent $f_n(X^n)$ and $g_n$ to represent $g_n(Y^n)$ in this document.

Claim 1. Let $(X, Y)$ be a finite distribution over $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ with probability mass distribution $\pi$. Let $\pi_x$ and $\pi_y$ be the two marginal distributions. Let $f_n, g_n : \mathcal{X}^n \to$
\(-1,1\) such that \(f_n \in L^2(\mathbb{X}^n, \pi_x^\otimes n)\), \(g_n \in L^2(\mathbb{Y}^n, \pi_y^\otimes n)\), and \(\delta\) is some insecurity parameter. Let \(T\) and \(\overline{T}\), respectively, be the Markov operator and the adjoint Markov associated with the source distribution \((X,Y)\). Then, the following statements hold.

1. If \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_n, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\), then \(\mathbb{E}[f_n] \leq \delta\), \(\mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta\), \(\|T^\otimes n g_n - \rho \cdot f_n\|_1 \leq 2\delta\), and \(\|\overline{T}^\otimes n f_n - \rho' \cdot g_n\|_1 \leq 2\delta\).

2. If \(\mathbb{E}[f_n] \leq \delta\), \(\mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta\), \(\|T^\otimes n g_n - \rho' \cdot f_n\|_1 \leq \delta\), and \(\|\overline{T}^\otimes n f_n - \rho' \cdot g_n\|_1 \leq \delta\), then \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_n, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\).

Appendix A proves Claim 1.

**Step 2: Fourier Concentration of Reduction Functions.** Next, we show that if a pair of reduction functions \(f_n, g_n : \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\}\) achieves \(\delta\)-insecurity, the Fourier tails, which is the summation of the square of all high degree Fourier coefficients, of both these reduction functions is \(O(\delta)\). The technical tool to prove this result relies on the orthogonal (Efron-Stein) decomposition technique and a few other technical results (refer to Proposition 5, Proposition 6) from [35], which sate that the higher order terms in the Efron-Stein decomposition of \(T^\otimes n g_n\) have very small \(L_2\) norm compared to the \(L_2\) norm of the corresponding higher order terms in the Efron-Stein decomposition of \(g_n\), if the maximal correlation of \((X,Y)\) is strictly less than 1. In the setting of Informal Theorem 1 \((\delta_n = O(1/n))\), it implies that the total influence of the reduction function is a constant that does not depend on \(n\) (refer to Corollary 2). This step does not change the reduction functions but gives Fourier concentration property of the reduction functions.

**Step 3: Dimension Reduction by Applying Junta Theorem.** In Informal Theorem 3, when the insecurity bound \(\delta\) is sufficiently small, the Fourier tails of reduction functions is small enough so that we can apply Bourgain’s Junta Theorem (over biased measures) [5, 31]. In Informal Theorem 1, applying the generalized Friedgut’s Junta Theorem [15] for function with constant total influence also gives us two junta functions. In both cases, this step always gives us two constant-size junta functions \(\tilde{f}_n, \tilde{g}_n : \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\}\) that are close to the two original reduction functions \(f_n, g_n\) in \(L_1\) norm, respectively. Our proof shows that if \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_n, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\), then \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_n, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\). Since \(\tilde{f}_n\) and \(\tilde{g}_n\) are junta functions, it is clear that there exists \(n_0 \in \mathbb{N}\) and functions \(\tilde{f}_{n_0}, \tilde{g}_{n_0} : \Omega^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1,1\}\) such that \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_n, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\) if and only if \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_{n_0}, g_{n_0}, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\) (refer to Theorem 7, Theorem 4).

**Step 4: Solving the Decidability Problems.** This step is identical to the step in [19, 13, 18]. Once we have the constant \(n_0\), an algorithm for deciding the SNIS problems works as follows. The algorithm brute forces over all possible reduction functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \Omega^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1,1\}\). If the algorithm finds any functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0}\) such that \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f,\varepsilon'} f_{n_0}, g_{n_0}, \delta, \varepsilon, \{X,Y\}^n \odot \mathbb{S}\), it outputs Yes. Otherwise, it returns No.

**Remainder of the results.** Finally, we give an overview for Informal Theorem 2 and Informal Theorem 4. Let \(\varepsilon' \in (0,1/2)\), \(\rho' = 1 - 2\varepsilon'\) and \((X,Y)\) be
an arbitrary 2-by-2 joint distribution with maximal correlation $\rho$. Let $\pi_x$ and $\pi_y$ be the marginal distribution of $X$ and $Y$, respectively. Let $T$ be the Markov operator associated with $(X,Y)$.

First, we show that if there exist a sequence $\delta_n$ converging to 0 and sequences of reduction functions $f_n, g_n$ such that we can simulate $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ with $\delta_n$ insecurity using reduction functions $f_n, g_n$, then $(\rho')^2 = \rho^{2k}$ for some positive integer $k$ using biased Fourier analysis over Boolean hypercube. The main technical tool is a generalization of the equation $T_\rho \chi_S = \rho \chi_S$ to correlated spaces, that is, $T \phi_S = \rho \cdot \psi_S$ and $T \psi_S = \rho \cdot \phi_S$, where $T_\rho$ is the Bonami-Beckner noise operator, $T$ and $\overline{T}$ is the Markov operator and the adjoint operator associated with the source distribution $(X,Y)$, and $\chi_S, \phi_S, \psi_S$ are Fourier bases over the uniform measure, $\pi_x$-biased measure, and $\pi_y$-biased measure, respectively (Claim 4). With this additional technical tool, we can further prove that the Fourier spectrum of reduction functions (mostly) concentrated on a constant degree $k$. This helps us to show that there exists a constant $c$ such that $\min_{S \subseteq [n]} (|\rho^2 - \rho^{|S|}|)^2 \leq c \cdot \delta_n$ for infinitely many $n$, which implies that $\rho^2 = \rho^{2k}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$ since $\delta_n$ converges to 0.

In the perfect security case, the Fourier spectrum of the reduction functions $f_n, g_n$ over biased measures $\pi_x, \pi_y$, respectively, are all concentrated on some constant degree $k$ (Claim 2). We show that there does not exist any such functions unless both the measures $\pi_x, \pi_y$ are uniform (Claim 3).

Figure 2 summarizes the high-level overview of the dependence between our technical results, i.e., which results are used to prove which results.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Notation

We denote $[n]$ as the set $\{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ and $\mathbb{N}_{<m} = \{0, 1, \ldots, m-1\}$. For two functions $f, g : \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$, the equation $f = g$ means that $f(x) = g(x)$ for every $x \in \Omega$. We use $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V}$, or $\Omega$ to denote the sample spaces, and $\pi$ usually denotes a probability distribution. $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ is a joint probability space. For $x^n \in \mathcal{X}^n$, we represent $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ as the $i$-th coordinate of $x^n$. A Boolean function is a $\{-1,1\}$-valued function. Sometimes we omit the $n$ when it is clear from the context.

**Correlated Spaces.** We usually use $(X,Y)$ denotes the joint distribution over $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ with probability mass function $\pi$, and $\pi_x, \pi_y$ denote the marginal probability distributions of $X$ and $Y$, respectively. Sometimes we will use $(\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}, \pi)$ to denote the joint distribution. In this paper, we always use the following notation for the expectation of functions $f_n \in L^2(\mathcal{X}^n, \pi_x \otimes \pi)$, $g_n \in L^2(\mathcal{Y}^n, \pi_y \otimes \pi)$ over correlated spaces.

$$
\mathbb{E}[f_n] := \mathbb{E}_{x^n \sim \pi_x \otimes \pi} [f_n(x^n)], \quad \mathbb{E}[g_n] := \mathbb{E}_{y^n \sim \pi_y \otimes \pi} [g_n(x^n)]
$$

$$
\mathbb{E}[f_n g_n] := \mathbb{E}_{(x^n,y^n) \sim \pi} [f_n(x^n) \cdot g_n(y^n)]
$$
We say that a joint distribution \((X,Y)\) is \textit{redundancy-free} if the sizes of the support of the two marginal distributions \(\pi_x, \pi_y\) are \(|X|\) and \(|Y|\), respectively. In this paper, we consider only redundancy-free joint distributions.

\textbf{Statistical Distance.} The statistical distance (total variation distance) between two distributions \(P\) and \(Q\) over a finite sample space \(\Omega\) is defined as \[ SD(P,Q) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in \Omega} |P(x) - Q(x)|. \]

\textbf{Binary Symmetric Source.} A binary symmetric source with flipping probability \(\varepsilon \in (0,1)\), denoted as \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon)\), is a joint distribution over the sample space \([-1,1] \times [-1,1]\) such that if \((X,Y) \sim \text{BSS}(\varepsilon)\), then \(\Pr[X = 1, Y = -1] = \varepsilon/2\), and \(\Pr[X = -1, Y = 1] = \varepsilon/2\). We write \(\rho = |1 - 2\varepsilon|\) to denote the correlation of the source \(\text{BES}(\varepsilon)\).

\textbf{Definition 1 (Junta Function).} A function \(f: \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}\) is called a \(k\)-\textit{junta} for \(k \in \mathbb{N}\) if it depends on at most \(k\) inputs of coordinate; in other words, \(f(x) = g(x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}, \ldots, x_{i_k})\), where \(i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_k \in [n]\). Informally, we say that \(f\) is a \textit{“junta”} if it depends on only a constant number of coordinates.

\subsection*{2.2 Secure Non-interactive Simulation: Definition}

Appendix F recalls the notion of secure non-interactive simulation of joint distributions using a simulation-based security definition as defined in [26].
In this paper we are mainly focus on the case that the target distribution is a BSS. We give an algebrized definition of simulating BSS from any distribution as follows.

**Definition 2 (Algebraic Definition).** Let \((X,Y)\) be correlated random variables distributed according to \((X \times Y, \pi)\). We say that \(\operatorname{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq f_n, g_n(X,Y)\) if there exists reduction functions \(f_n \in L^2(X^n, \pi_x \otimes^n), g_n \in L^2(Y^n, \pi_y \otimes^n)\) such that

1. **Correctness:** \(\mathbb{E}[f_n] \leq \delta, \mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta,\) and \(\mathbb{E}[f_ng_n] \leq \delta\).
2. **Corrupted Alice:**
   \[\|T^n g_n - \rho' \cdot f_n\|_1 \leq \delta,\]
   where \(T\) is the Markov operator associated with the source distribution \((X,Y)\).
3. **Corrupted Bob:**
   \[\|T^n f_n - \rho' \cdot g_n\|_1 \leq \delta,\]
   where \(T\) is the adjoint Markov operator associated with \((X,Y)\).

We provide a proof showing that this algebraic definition and the original (simulation-based) definition of SNIS are 2-approximate, in term of insecurity parameter, of each other in Appendix A.

**Problem 1 (GAP–ALG–SNIS((X,Y))).** Let \((X,Y)\) be a joint distribution over the sample space \((X', Y)\), and \((U,V)\) be a joint distribution over the sample space \((U', V)\), and let \(\delta, \delta' > 0\) be some insecurity parameters, distinguish between the following two cases:

1. There exists a positive integer \(n\), and functions \(f_n : X^n \rightarrow U\) and \(g : Y^n \rightarrow V\) such that \((U,V) \sqsubseteq f_n, g_n(X,Y)\).
2. For every positive integer \(n\), and for every reduction functions \(f_n : X^n \rightarrow U\) and \(g : Y^n \rightarrow V\), we have \((U,V) \not\sqsubseteq f_n, g_n(X,Y)\).

**Remarks.** When \(\delta' = c\delta\) for some constant \(c > 1\), we call it multiplicative gap-SNIS. When \(\delta' = \delta + \varepsilon\) for some \(\varepsilon > 0\), we call it additive gap-SNIS.

### 2.3 Fourier Analysis Basics

We recall some background in Fourier analysis over product measure that we will use in this paper. We follow the notation of [39].

**Fourier Analysis over Higher Alphabet**

**Definition 3.** Let \((\Omega, \pi)\) be a finite probability space where \(|\Omega| \geq 2\) and \(\pi\) denotes a probability distribution over \(\Omega\). Let \(\pi^n\) denotes the product probability distribution on \(\Omega^n\) and \(\pi^{\otimes n}(x_1x_2\ldots x_n) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \pi(x_i)\). For \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), we write
$L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^{\otimes n})$ to denote the real inner product space of functions $f: \Omega^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with inner product
\[
\langle f, g \rangle_{\pi^{\otimes n}} = \mathbb{E}_{x^n \sim \pi^{\otimes n}} [f(x^n)g(x^n)].
\]
Moreover, the $L_p$-norm of a function $f \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^{\otimes n})$ is defined as
\[
\|f\|_p := \mathbb{E}_{x^n \sim \pi^{\otimes n}} [\|f(x^n)\|^p]^{1/p}.
\]

**Definition 4.** A Fourier basis for an inner product space $L^2(\Omega, \pi)$ is an orthonormal basis $\phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_{m-1}$ with $\phi_0 \equiv 1$, where by orthonormal, we mean that for any $i \neq j$, $\langle \phi_i, \phi_j \rangle = 0$ and for any $i$, $\langle \phi_i, \phi_i \rangle = 1$.

It can be shown that if $\phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_{m-1}$ is a Fourier basis for $L^2(\Omega, \pi^{\otimes n})$, then the collection $(\phi)_{\alpha \in \mathbb{N}_0^m}$ (each $\alpha_i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, m-1\}$) is a Fourier basis for $L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^{\otimes n})$.

**Definition 5.** Fix a Fourier basis $\phi_0, \phi_1, \ldots, \phi_{m-1}$ for $L^2(\Omega, \pi)$, then every $f \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^{\otimes n})$ can be uniquely written as $f = \sum_{\alpha \in \mathbb{N}_0^m} \hat{f}(\alpha) \phi_\alpha$ where $\hat{f}(\alpha) = \langle f, \phi_\alpha \rangle$. The real number $\hat{f}(\alpha)$ is called the Fourier coefficient of $f$ on $\alpha$.

The Fourier weight of $f$ at degree $k$ is defined as $W^k[f] := \sum_{\alpha: \text{Supp}(\alpha) = k} \hat{f}(\alpha)^2$. We also denote $W^{>k}[f] := \sum_{\alpha: \text{Supp}(\alpha) > k} \hat{f}(\alpha)^2$.

For $\alpha \in \mathbb{N}_0^m$, we denote $|\alpha| := |\{i \in [n] : \alpha_i \neq 0\}|$. We say that the degree of a function $f \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^{\otimes n})$, denoted by $\deg(f)$, is the largest value of $|\alpha|$ such that $\hat{f}(\alpha) \neq 0$. For every coordinate $i \in [n]$, we denote $\lnf_i[f]$ as the $i$-th influence of $f$ and $\lnf(f)$ as the total influence of $f$.

**Proposition 1.** For any real-valued function $f \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^{\otimes n})$, if $\deg(f) = k$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Then $\lnf(f) \leq k$.

**Biased Fourier Analysis over Boolean Cube.** In the special case when $\Omega = \{-1, 1\}$, we define the product Fourier basis functions $\phi_S$ for $S \subseteq [n]$ as
\[
\phi_S(x) = \prod_{i \in S} \phi(x_i) = \prod_{i \in S} \left(\frac{x_i - \mu}{\sigma}\right),
\]
where $p = \pi(-1), \mu = 1 - 2p, \sigma = 2\sqrt{p}\sqrt{1-p}$.

**2.4 Maximal Correlation.**

We recall the definition of maximal correlation of a joint distribution and its properties in this subsection.
Definition 6 (Maximal Correlation [22, 43, 1, 42, 2]). Let $(X, Y)$ be a finite joint distribution over $(X, Y)$ with probability mass function $\pi$. The Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Renyi maximal correlation of $(X, Y)$ is defined as follows:

$$
\rho(X; Y) := \max_{(f, g) \in S} \mathbb{E}[fg],
$$

where $S$ represents the set of all real-valued function $f \in L^2(X, \pi_x)$ and $g \in L^2(Y, \pi_y)$ satisfying the following two conditions:

$$
\mathbb{E}[f] = \mathbb{E}[g] = 0,
\mathbb{E}[f^2] = \mathbb{E}[g^2] = 1.
$$

In case that $S = \emptyset$ (which happens precisely when at least one of $X$ and $Y$ is constant almost surely), $\rho(X; Y)$ is defined to be 0.

For example, the maximal correlation of BSS$(\varepsilon)$ is $|1 - 2\varepsilon|$ for every $\varepsilon \in [0, 1]$. Note that maximal correlation of any distribution is always between 0 and 1.

Imported Theorem 1 (Tensorization [43]) If $(X_1, Y_1)$ and $(X_2, Y_2)$ are independent, then

$$
\rho(X_1, X_2; Y_1, Y_2) = \max\{\rho(X_1; Y_1), \rho(X_2, Y_2)\}
$$

and so if $(X_1, Y_1), (X_2, Y_2)$ are i.i.d., then $\rho(X_1, X_2; Y_1, Y_2) = \rho(X_1; Y_1)$.

The following proposition shows that maximal correlation is an easily computable quantity.

Proposition 2 ([43]). The maximal correlation of a finite joint distribution $(X, Y)$ is the second largest singular value of the Markov operator $T$ (defined in Subsection 2.5) associated with $(X, Y)$, in other words, it is the square root of the second largest eigenvalue of the Markov operator $TT^{T}$, where $T$ is the adjoint Markov operator of $T$.

2.5 Markov Operator

Definition 7 (Markov Operator [34]). Let $(X, Y)$ be a finite distribution over $(X, Y)$ with probability mass distribution $\pi$. The Markov operator associated with this distribution, denoted by $T$, maps a function $g \in L^p(Y, \pi_y)$ to a function $Tg \in L^p(X, \pi_x)$ by the following map:

$$(Tg)(x) := \mathbb{E}[g(Y) \mid X = x],$$

where $(X, Y)$ is distributed according to $\pi$. Furthermore, we define the adjoint operator of $T$, denoted as $\overline{T}$, maps a function $f \in L^p(X, \pi_x)$ to a function $\overline{T}f \in L^p(Y, \pi_y)$ by the following map:

$$
\overline{T}f(y) = \mathbb{E}[f(X) \mid Y = y].
$$
Note that the two operators \( T \) and \( \mathcal{T} \) have the following property.

\[
\langle Tg, f \rangle_{\pi_x} = \langle g, \mathcal{T}f \rangle_{\pi_y} = \mathbb{E}[f_n(X^n)g_n(Y^n)].
\]

**Example 1.** When \( X = Y = \{-1, 1\} \) and \( \pi(1, 1) = a, \pi(1, -1) = b, \pi(-1, 1) = c, \) and \( \pi(-1, -1) = d \), where \( 0 \leq a, b, c, d \leq 1 \) and \( a + b + c + d = 1 \). Then \( \pi_x(1) = a + b, \pi_x(-1) = c + d, \pi_y(1) = a + c, \pi_y(-1) = b + d \). For any function \( f \in L^p(\{-1, 1\}, \pi_x) \) and \( g \in L^p(\{-1, 1\}, \pi_y) \), we have

\[
(Tg)(1) = \frac{a}{a + b} \cdot g(1) + \frac{b}{a + b} \cdot g(-1)
\]
\[
(Tg)(-1) = \frac{c}{c + d} \cdot g(1) + \frac{d}{c + d} \cdot g(-1)
\]
\[
(\mathcal{T}f)(1) = \frac{a}{a + c} \cdot f(1) + \frac{c}{a + c} \cdot f(-1)
\]
\[
(\mathcal{T}f)(-1) = \frac{b}{b + d} \cdot f(1) + \frac{d}{b + d} \cdot f(-1)
\]

Note that, in this case, the maximal correlation of \( (X, Y) \) is

\[
\rho = \frac{|ad - bc|}{\sqrt{(a + b)(c + d)(a + c)(b + d)}}.
\]

When \( a = d = (1 + \rho)/4 \) and \( b = c = (1 - \rho)/4 \), the operator \( T \) is the Bonami-Beckner operator, denoted as \( T_\rho \).

**Proposition 3.** [43] Let \( (X, Y) \) be a finite distribution over \( (X, Y) \) with probability mass distribution \( \pi \). Let \( T \) and \( \mathcal{T} \) be the Markov operator and the adjoint Markov operator associated with \( (X, Y) \). Let \( (X \times X, \mu) \) be the distribution such that its associated Markov operator is \( TT \) and \( \pi_x = \nu_x \). Then the marginal distributions of \( (X \times X, \nu) \) are the same, in other words, \( \nu_x = \nu_y \). Furthermore, we have \( \rho(X \times X, \mu) = \rho^2 \), where \( \rho \) is the maximal correlation of \( (X, Y) \).

This result show that for \( f \in L^2(X, \pi_x) \), we have \( (TT)f \in L^2(X, \pi_x) \).

### 2.6 Efron-stein Decomposition

We shall use Efron-stein decomposition as one of the main technical tools to prove Informal Theorem 2 and Informal Theorem 5.

**Definition 8 (Efron-Stein decomposition).** Let \( \Omega_1, \mu_1 \), \( (\Omega_2, \mu_2), \ldots, (\Omega_\ell, \mu_\ell) \) be discrete probability spaces and let \( (\Omega, \mu) = \prod_{i=1}^\ell (\Omega_i, \mu_i) \). The Efron-stein decomposition of \( f : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) is defined as

\[
f = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f^S
\]

where the functions \( f^S \) satisfy:
- $f^S$ depends only on $x_S$.
- For all $S \not\subseteq S'$ and all $x_{S'}$, \( \mathbb{E}[f^S(X_{S'})|X_{S'} = x_{S'}] = 0 \)

**Proposition 4 ([14]).** Efron-Stein decomposition exists and is unique.

The following propositions give the relation between Markov operators and Efron-stein decompositions. The first proposition shows that the Efron-Stein decomposition commutes with Markov Operator.

**Proposition 5 ([34, 35] Proposition 2.11).** Let \((X^n, Y^n)\) be a joint distribution over \((X^n \times Y^n, \pi \otimes^n)\). Let \(T_i\) be the Markov operator associated with \((X_i, Y_i)\). Let \(T \otimes^n = \otimes^n_{i=1} T_i\), and consider a function \(g_n \in L^p(Y^n, \pi_y \otimes^n)\). Then, the Efron-Stein decomposition of \(g_n\) satisfies:

\[
(T \otimes^n g_n)^S = T \otimes^n (g_n^S).
\]

The next proposition shows that \(T \otimes^n g_n\) depends on the low degree expansion of \(g_n\).

**Proposition 6 ([35] Proposition 2.12).** Assuming the setting of Proposition 5 and let \(\rho\) be the maximal correlation of the distribution \((X, Y)\). Then for all \(g_n \in L^p(Y^n, \pi_y \otimes^n)\) it holds that

\[
\|T \otimes^n g_n^S\|_2 \leq \rho^{|S|} \|g_n^S\|_2.
\]

The next proposition shows the connection between Fourier decomposition and Efron-Stein decomposition.

**Proposition 7 ([39] Proposition 8.36).** Let \(f \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi \otimes^n)\) have the orthogonal decomposition \(f = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f^S\), and let \(\{\phi_H\}_{H \subseteq \Omega^n}\) be an orthonormal Fourier basis for \(L^2(\Omega^n, \pi \otimes^n)\). Then

\[
f^S = \sum_{\alpha: \text{Supp}(\alpha) = S} \hat{f}(\alpha) \phi_\alpha
\]

In particular, when \(\Omega = \{-1, 1\}\) we have \(f^S = \hat{f}(S) \phi_S\).

This implies that \(\|f^S\|_2^2 = \sum_{\alpha: \text{Supp}(\alpha)} \hat{f}(\alpha)^2\). Therefore, it holds that \(W_k[f] = \sum_{|S|=k} \|f^S\|_2^2\), and \(W^{>k}[f] = \sum_{|S|>k} \|f^S\|_2^2\).

### 3 SNIS Characterization: BSS from 2-by-2 Distribution

In this section we present the characterization result for SNIS of BSS from any arbitrary 2-by-2 distribution with 0-insecurity (perfect security). First we restate the Informal Theorem 2 as follows.
**Theorem 1.** [Perfect-SNIS Characterization] Let \( \epsilon' \in (0, 1/2) \) and \((X, Y)\) be an arbitrary 2-by-2 joint distribution. Suppose there exists \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and Boolean functions \( f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\} \) such that \( \text{BSS}(\epsilon') \subseteq^{0}_{f_n, g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n} \). Then, the distribution \((X, Y)\) must be a \( \text{BSS}(\epsilon) \), where \((1 - 2\epsilon')^2 = (1 - 2\epsilon)^{2k}\) for some positive integer \( k \leq n \).

We remark that Theorem 1 implies that the perfect SNIS problem from an arbitrary 2-by-2 source distribution to BSS is decidable in constant time.

### 3.1 Proof of Theorem 1

Assuming Claim 2 and Claim 3 (presented in the next subsection), we present a prove of Theorem 1 as follows.

Suppose there exists \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and Boolean functions \( f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\} \) such that \( \text{BSS}(\epsilon') \subseteq^{0}_{f_n, g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n} \). Then, by Claim 2, we have \((1 - 2\epsilon') = \rho^k\) for some \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), and \( W^k[f_n] = W^k[g_n] = 1 \), where \( \rho \) is the maximal correlation of \((X, Y)\). By Claim 3, both the marginal distribution \( \pi_x \) and \( \pi_y \) must be uniform distribution over \(-1, 1\), which implies that the joint distribution \((X, Y)\) is a \( \text{BSS}(\epsilon) \) for some \( \epsilon \in (0, 1) \). Using the fact that the the maximal correlation of \( \text{BSS}(\epsilon) = |1 - 2\epsilon| \), one can conclude that \((1 - 2\epsilon')^2 = (1 - 2\epsilon)^{2k}\).

### 3.2 Claims needed for Theorem 1

We state all the claims that is needed for the proof of Theorem 1, and provide their proofs in Subsection 3.4.

**Claim 2.** Let \((X, Y)\) be a 2-by-2 joint distribution over \((\{-1, 1\}, \{-1, 1\})\) with probability mass distribution \( \pi \) and \( \epsilon' \in (0, 1/2) \). Suppose there exist \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), and \( f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\} \) such that \( \text{BSS}(\epsilon') \subseteq^{0}_{f_n, g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n} \). Then, the following statements hold:

1. There exists a positive integer \( k \) such that \( \rho' = \rho^k \), where \( \rho \) is the maximal correlation of the source distribution \((X, Y)\) and \( \rho' = 1 - 2\epsilon' \).
2. Furthermore, \( W^k[f_n] = W^k[g_n] = 1 \), where the Fourier coefficients of \( f_n, g_n \) are with respect to the inner products over \( \pi_x^{\otimes n} \) and \( \pi_y^{\otimes n} \), respectively.

**Claim 3.** Suppose \( f \) is a Boolean function in \( L^2(\{-1, 1\}^n, \pi^{\otimes n}) \) such that \( W^k[f] = 1 \). Then, it must be the case that the distribution \( \pi \) is the uniform distribution over \(-1, 1\).

### 3.3 Properties of Markov Operators and Biased Fourier Bases

In this subsection, we prove some technical results showing relation between maximal correlation, Markov operators, and Fourier bases. We will use them as one of the main technical tools to prove claims in this section and Theorem 3.
function $\pi$. Let $T$ and $\mathcal{T}$ be the Markov operator and the adjoint Markov operator associated with $(X,Y)$. Suppose $\pi = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix}$ for $0 \leq a, b, c, d$ such that $a + b + c + d = 1$. Let $p = c + d$ and $q = b + d$. Let $\{\phi_S\}_{S \subseteq [n]}$ be a biased Fourier basis for $L^2(X^n, \pi_x \otimes^n)$, and $\{\psi_S\}_{S \subseteq [n]}$ be a biased Fourier basis for $L^2(Y^n, \pi_y \otimes^n)$ defined as follows.

$$\phi_S(x) = \prod_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{x_i - \mu_x}{\sigma_x} \right), \quad \text{and} \quad \psi_S(x) = \prod_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right),$$

where $\mu_x = 1 - 2p, \mu_y = 1 - 2q, \sigma_x = 2\sqrt{p(1-p)},$ and $\sigma_y = 2\sqrt{q(1-q)}$. Assuming these settings, we claim the following results.

Claim 4. The following equalities hold.

$$T^n \psi_S = \rho|S| \cdot \phi_S, \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{T}^n \phi_S = \rho|S| \cdot \psi_S,$$

where $\rho = \frac{ad - bc}{\sqrt{p(1-p)(1-q)}}$. Furthermore, the following equations hold.

$$(\mathcal{T}T)^n \phi_S = \rho^2|S| \cdot \phi_S, \quad \text{and} \quad (\mathcal{T}T)^n \psi_S = \rho^2|S| \cdot \psi_S.$$

Remarks. The quantity $\rho$ defined in the above claim has the same magnitude as the maximal correlation of the joint distribution $(X,Y)$. When $ad > bc$, it is exactly the maximal correlation of $(X,Y)$. This result can be viewed as a generalization of equation $T^\rho \chi_S = \rho^{|S|} \cdot \chi_S$, where $T_\rho$ is the Bonami-Becker noise operator, and $\chi_S: \{-1,1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\}$ is the function defined as $\chi_S = \prod_{i \in S} x_i$ (a Fourier basis over uniform measure).

We provide a proof of Claim 4 in Appendix B. The following result is a corollary of Claim 4.

Claim 5. For any $S, H \subseteq [n]$, the following equalities hold.

$$\widehat{T^n \psi_S}(H) = \widehat{T^n \phi_S}(H) = \begin{cases} \rho^{|S|} & \text{if } H = S \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\widehat{(\mathcal{T}T)^n \phi_S}(H) = \widehat{(\mathcal{T}T)^n \psi_S}(H) = \begin{cases} \rho^2|S| & \text{if } H = S \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

3.4 Proofs of claims for Theorem 1

We present the proofs of the two claims used to prove Theorem 1.

Proof (of Claim 2). We shall use orthogonal (Efron-Stein) decomposition to prove this claim. We write $f_n$ and $g_n$ in terms of the orthogonal decomposition as follows.

$$f_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f_n^S, \quad \text{and} \quad g_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} g_n^S$$

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By linearity of the Markov operator and by Proposition 5,

\[
T^\otimes_n f_n = T^\otimes_n \left( \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f_n^S \right) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} T^\otimes_n f_n^S = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} (T^\otimes_n f_n)^S.
\]

\[
\overline{T}^\otimes_n g_n = \overline{T}^\otimes_n \left( \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} g_n^S \right) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \overline{T}^\otimes_n g_n^S = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} (\overline{T}^\otimes_n g_n)^S.
\]

Since \( T^\otimes_n g_n = \rho' \cdot f_n \) and by uniqueness of the orthogonal decomposition, it must be the case that \( T^\otimes_n g_n^S = \rho' \cdot f_n^S \) for every \( S \). Similarly, we also have \( \overline{T}^\otimes_n f_n^S = \rho' \cdot g_n^S \) for every \( S \). These two equations imply that

\[
(T\overline{T})^\otimes_n f_n^S = \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S.
\]

By Proposition 7 and Claim 4, we have

\[
(T\overline{T})^\otimes_n f_n^S = (T\overline{T})^\otimes_n (\widehat{f}_n(S) \cdot \phi_S) = \widehat{f}_n(S) \cdot (T\overline{T})^\otimes_n \phi_S = \widehat{f}_n(S) \cdot \rho^2 S^{|S|} \cdot \phi_S,
\]

\[
\text{and } \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S = \rho^2 \cdot \widehat{f}_n(S) \cdot \phi_S.
\]

It implies that \( \widehat{f}_n(S) \cdot (\rho^2 - \rho^2 |S|) = 0 \) for every \( S \). So for every \( S \) either \( \widehat{f}_n(S) = 0 \) or \( \rho^2 = \rho^2 |S| \). Since there exists \( S^* \) such that \( \widehat{f}_n(S^*) \neq 0 \), it must be the case that \( \rho^2 = \rho^2 k \), where \( k = |S^*| \). Furthermore, \( \widehat{f}_n(S) = 0 \) for every \( S \) satisfying \( |S| \neq k \), in other words, \( W^k[f_n] = 1 \). Analogously, we can show that \( W^k[g_n] = 1 \).

**Proof (of Claim 3).** Let \( \phi_S = \prod_{i \in S} \left( \frac{x_i - \mu}{\sigma} \right) \) be a Fourier basis over \( L^2([-1, 1]^n) \), where \( p = \Pr[\pi(x) = -1] \), \( \mu = 1 - 2p \), \( \sigma = 2\sqrt{p(1-p)} \). Since \( W^k[f] = 1 \), it can be written as

\[
f(x) = \sum_{|S|=k} \widehat{f}(S) \phi_S(x) = \sum_{|S|=k} \widehat{f}(S) \left( \frac{x_i - \mu}{\sigma} \right).
\]

Substitute \( x = 1 = (1, 1, \ldots, 1) \in \{-1, 1\}^n \) and \( x = -1 = (-1, -1, \ldots, -1) \in \{-1, 1\}^n \) yields

\[
f(1) = \left( \frac{1-\mu}{\sigma} \right)^k \sum_{|S|=k} \widehat{f}(S), \quad \text{and} \quad f(-1) = \left( \frac{1-\mu}{\sigma} \right)^k \sum_{|S|=k} \widehat{f}(S)
\]

It it clearly that \( \sum_{|S|=k} \neq 0 \) since \( f(1) \neq 0 \). Using the fact that \( f \) is boolean-valued function, we have \( f(1)^2 = f(-1)^2 \). Therefore, we have

\[
\left( \frac{1-\mu}{\sigma} \right)^{2k} \left( \sum_{|S|=k} \widehat{f}(S) \right)^2 = \left( \frac{1-\mu}{\sigma} \right)^{2k} \left( \sum_{|S|=k} \widehat{f}(S) \right)^2
\]
It implies that
\[ (1 - \mu) \sigma^{2k} = (1 - \mu') \sigma^{2k}, \]
which can happen only when \( \mu = 0 \). In other words, \( \pi \) is a uniform distribution over \( \{-1, 1\} \), which completes the proof.

4 Fourier Concentration Property of Reduction Functions

We shall prove Informal Theorem 5 in this section, which will be used as a main technical lemma to prove Informal Theorem 3 and Informal Theorem 1.

**Theorem 2.** Let \( \rho \in [0, 1] \) and \( \epsilon' \in (0, 1/2) \). Suppose there exists \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), a finite joint distribution \((X, Y)\) over \((\Omega, \Omega)\) with probability mass function \( \pi \) and reduction functions \( f_n, g_n : X^n \to \{-1, 1\} \) such that \( BSS(\epsilon') \subseteq f_n, g_n (X, Y)^\otimes n \) for some \( \delta_n \geq 0 \) and the maximal correlation of \((X, Y)\) is \( \rho \). Then, the following bounds hold.

\[
W^{>k}(f_n) := \sum_{S : |S| > k} \widehat{f}_n(S)^2 \leq \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{(\rho^2(k+1) - \rho'^2)^2} \cdot \delta_n, \quad \text{and}
\]
\[
W^{>k}(g_n) := \sum_{S : |S| > k} \widehat{g}_n(S)^2 \leq \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{(\rho^2(k+1) - \rho'^2)^2} \cdot \delta_n,
\]
where \( \rho' = 1 - 2\epsilon' \), \( f_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_x \otimes n) \), \( g_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_y \otimes n) \), and \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( \rho^k \geq \rho' > \rho^{k+1} \).

Intuitively, Theorem 2 says that the Fourier spectrum of reduction functions are mostly concentrated on low degree parts. As a consequence, when \( \delta_n = O(1/n) \), the reduction functions have constant total influence. We state it as following and prove it in Subsection 4.3.

**Corollary 2.** Assume the setting of Theorem 2, if \( \delta_n = c_0/n \) for some constant \( c_0 > 0 \), then we have

\[
\mathsf{Inf}(f_n) \leq k + \frac{(1 + \rho')^2 c_0}{(\rho^2(k+1) - \rho'^2)^2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \mathsf{Inf}(g_n) \leq k + \frac{(1 + \rho')^2 c_0}{(\rho^2(k+1) - \rho'^2)^2}.
\]

4.1 Required Claims for Theorem 2

Assuming the setting of Theorem 2 and the following notation, we state the claims that is needed to prove the theorem. Let \( T \) and \( \overline{T} \) denote respectively the Markov operator and the corresponding adjoint operator associated with the distribution \((X, Y)\). Note that \( f_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_x \otimes n) \), \( g_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_y \otimes n) \), \( T \otimes n g_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_y \otimes n) \), and \( \overline{T} \otimes n f_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_y \otimes n) \). Let \( f_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f_n^S \) and \( g_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} g_n^S \) be the Efron-stein decompositions of \( f_n \) and \( g_n \).
Claim 6. The following inequalities hold.
\[ \left\| (TT)^n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \right\|_1 \leq (1 + \rho')\delta_n, \text{ and } \left\| (TT)^n g_n - \rho^2 \cdot g_n \right\|_1 \leq (1 + \rho')\delta_n. \]
Furthermore, we have
\[ \left\| (TT)^n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \right\|_2 \leq (1 + \rho')^2 \delta_n, \text{ and } \left\| (TT)^n g_n - \rho^2 \cdot g_n \right\|_2 \leq (1 + \rho')^2 \delta_n. \]

Claim 7. For every \( S \subseteq [n] \) such that \( |S| > k \), the following bound holds.
\[ \left| \left\| T^S f_n \right\|_2 - \rho^2 \cdot \left\| f_n^S \right\|_2 \right| \geq \left| \rho^2 |S| \cdot \left\| f_n^S \right\|_2 - \rho^2 \cdot \left\| f_n^S \right\|_2 \right| \]

Claim 8. The following equation holds.
\[ \left\| (TT)^n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \right\|_2 = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \left\| (TT)^n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \right\|_2^2 \]
In particular, when \( \Omega = \{-1, 1\} \), we have
\[ \left\| (TT)^n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \right\|_2^2 = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}_n(S)^2 \left( \rho^2 |S| - \rho^2 \right)^2 \]
The next claim say that the \( T \) and \( \overline{T} \) operators are contractive.

Claim 9. The following inequalities hold.
\[ \left\| T^S g_n \right\|_1 \leq \left\| g_n \right\|_1 = 1, \text{ and } \left\| T^S f_n \right\|_1 \leq \left\| f_n \right\|_1 = 1. \]

We provide the proofs of these claims in Appendix C.

4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Assuming Claim 6, Claim 7, Claim 8, we present a proof of Theorem 2 as follows.
Clearly, the function \( (TT)^n f_n - \rho' \cdot f_n \) is bounded from above by \( 1 + \rho' \). So it follows from Claim 6 and that
\[ \left\| (TT)^n f_n - \rho' \cdot f_n \right\|_2 \leq (1 + \rho')^2 \delta_n. \]
Let \( f_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f_n^S \) be the Efron-Stein decomposition of \( f \). Then, we have
\[ \left\| (TT)^n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \right\|_2^2 = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \left\| (TT)^n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \right\|_2^2 \]
Claim 8
\[ \sum_{S: |S| > k} \left\| (T \hat{T})^n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \right\|_2^2 \geq \sum_{S: |S| > k} \left( \left\| T \hat{T} \right\|_n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot \left\| f_n^S \right\|_n \right)^2 \] Triangle Inq.

\[ \sum_{S: |S| > k} \left( \rho^2 |S| \cdot \left\| f_n^S \right\|_n^2 - \rho^2 \cdot \left\| f_n^S \right\|_n^2 \right) \geq \sum_{S: |S| > k} \left( \rho^2 (k+1) - \rho^2 \right)^2 \sum_{S: |S| > k} \left\| f_n^S \right\|_n^2 \]

Recall that \( W^{>k}[f_n] = \sum_{S: |S| > k} \left\| f_n^S \right\| \), therefore \( W^{>k}[f_n] \leq \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{\rho^2 (k+1) - \rho^2} \cdot \delta_n \).

Similarly, \( W^{>k}[g_n] \leq \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{\rho^2 (k+1) - \rho^2} \cdot \delta_n \), which completes the proof.

### 4.3 Proof of Corollary 2

Let \( m \) be the size the domain \( \Omega \). From the basic formula of total influence and the fact that \( \sum_{\alpha \in N_n} f(\alpha)^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n W_i(f_n) = 1 \), we have

\[ \inf(f_n) = \sum_{\alpha \in N_n} |\alpha| \cdot f_n(\alpha)^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n i \cdot W_i(f_n) \]

\[ \leq k \cdot \sum_{i=1}^k W_i(f_n) + n \cdot W^{>k}(f_n) \]

\[ \leq \frac{(1 + \rho)^2}{(\rho^2 (k+1) - \rho^2)^2} \cdot \delta_n \]

Theorem 2

Analogously, \( \inf(g_n) \leq k + \frac{(1 + \rho)^2}{(\rho^2 (k+1) - \rho^2)^2} : \delta_n \), which completes the proof.

### 5 Lower Bound for Minimum Insecurity

We prove Informal Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 in this section. We first restate the theorem as follows.

**Theorem 3.** Let \((X,Y)\) be a redundancy-free 2-by-2 joint distribution with maximal correlation \( \rho \). Suppose there exists a sequence \( \delta_n \in [0,1] \) converging to 0, and a sequence of reduction functions \( f_n, g_n \) such that \( BSS(\epsilon') \subseteq \delta_n^{f_n,g_n} (X,Y)^n \). Then, there exists \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( (1 - 2\epsilon')^2 = \rho^{2k} \).
Theorem 3 gives a necessary condition for SNIS of BSS($\varepsilon'$) from an arbitrary 2-by-2 source distribution with $o(1)$-insecurity. As consequences, if $\rho'^2 \neq \rho^k$ for every $k \in \mathbb{N}$, any secure protocol simulating BSS($\varepsilon'$) has constant insecurity. We state all the claims that is needed for the proof of Theorem 3.

5.1 Proof of Theorem 3

Let $\rho' = 1 - 2\varepsilon'$. Let $T$ and $\mathcal{T}$ denote, respectively, the Markov operator and the corresponding adjoint operator associated with the distribution $(X,Y)$. Let $\pi$ be the probability mass function of $(X,Y)$. Moreover, we assume that $f_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_x \otimes^n)$ and $g_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_y \otimes^n)$. Applying Claim 8 yields

$$\left\| (TT) \otimes^n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \right\|_2^2 = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \left\| (TT) \otimes^n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \right\|_2^2$$

Together with Claim 6, it implies that

$$\min_{S \subseteq [n]} \left( \rho^2 |S| - \rho'^2 \right)^2 \leq \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{1 - \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{\rho^2(k+1)}} \cdot \delta_n.$$ 

Now, since BSS($\varepsilon'$) $\subseteq_{\delta_n} f_n, g_n$ for infinitely many $n$ and $\lim_{n \to \infty} \delta_n = 0$, we have

$$\min_{S} \left( \rho^2 |S| - \rho'^2 \right)^2 \leq \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{1 - \frac{(1 + \rho')^2}{\rho^2(k+1)}} \cdot \delta_n = \lim_{n \to \infty} \delta_n = 0.$$ 

Therefore, it must be the case that there exists $S^*$ such that $\rho'^2 = \rho^k$, where $k = |S^*|$. 

5.2 Proof of Corollary 1

Next, we give a proof of Corollary 1. Applying Claim 8 yields

$$\left\| (TT) \otimes^n f_n - \rho' \cdot f_n \right\|_2^2 \geq \min_{S \subseteq [n]} \left( \rho^2 |S| - \rho'^2 \right)^2 \geq \min_{S \subseteq [n]} \left( \rho^2 |S| - \rho^k \right)^2$$

By Claim 6, we have $(1 + \rho')^2 \delta_n \geq \min_{S \subseteq [n]} \left( \rho^2 |S| - \rho'^2 \right)^2$. This implies that

$$\delta_n \geq \frac{1}{4} \min \left( \left( \rho^2 - \rho^k \right)^2, \left( \rho^2 - \rho^{2(k+1)} \right)^2 \right).$$
6 Decidability of SNIS: BSS from 2-by-2 Distribution

In this section, we shall prove Informal Theorem 3. First we state the technical which will be used to prove the theorem. Let $\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)$ and $(X, Y)$ be an arbitrary 2-by-2 joint distribution. There exist $\delta_0 > 0$ and $c > 0$ such that the following statement holds.

**Theorem 4 (Dimension Reduction 2-by-2).** Let $(X, Y)$ be a 2-by-2 distribution over $\{-1, 1\}$ with maximal correlation $\rho$ such that $X$ and $Y$ are respectively $p$-biased and $q$-biased distributions i.e. $\Pr[X = -1] = p$ and $\Pr[Y = -1] = q$. Let $\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)$, $\rho' = 1 - 2\varepsilon'$, $\kappa = \frac{(1+\rho')^2}{(\rho^2+1)+\rho'^2}$ where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\rho^k \geq (1 - 2\varepsilon') > \rho^{k+1}$ and fix $d \geq \kappa$. There exists $0 < \delta_0 < 1$, $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$, such that for any $0 < \delta < \delta_0$, for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, any reduction functions $f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ satisfying $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') = \rho \in \mathbb{R}$, there exist functions $f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \{-1, 1\}^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ such that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') = \rho = (1+\delta(k)) \rho \in \mathbb{R}$. Furthermore, $n_0$ is a computable function in the parameters of the problem. In particular, one may take

$$n_0 = 2kM/\eta_p^{16k} + 2kM/\eta_q^{16k}$$

and $\delta_0 = \min(\delta_0(p), \delta_0(q))$, where

$$\delta_0(p) := \min(\eta_p^{16k}/(M \cdot \kappa), (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_p^{16k}/(2\kappa \cdot 1064^4))$$

$$\delta_0(q) := \min(\eta_q^{16k}/(M \cdot \kappa), (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_q^{16k}/(2\kappa \cdot 1064^4))$$

where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\rho^k \geq (1 - 2\varepsilon') > \rho^{k+1}$, and $M$ is a global constant (refer to **Imported Theorem 2**) and

$$\eta_p = (1 + p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2})^{-1/2}, \text{ and } \eta_q = (1 + q^{-1/2}(1 - q)^{-1/2})^{-1/2}.$$
1. There exist \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and reduction functions \( f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \to \{-1, 1\} \) such that \( \text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq_{f_n, g_n} (X,Y)^{\otimes n} \).

2. For all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), and reduction functions \( f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \to \{-1, 1\} \), it must be the case that \( \text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \not\sqsubseteq_{f_n, g_n} (X,Y)^{\otimes n} \).

One may take \( \delta_0, c, n_0 \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
n_0 &= 2kM/\eta_p^{16k} + 2kM/\eta_q^{16k} \\
\delta_0 &= \min(\delta_0(p), \delta_0(q)) \\
\delta_0(p) &= \min(\eta_p^{16k}/(M \cdot \kappa), (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_p^{16k}/(2\kappa \cdot 1064^4)) \\
\delta_0(q) &= \min(\eta_q^{16k}/(M \cdot \kappa), (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_q^{16k}/(2\kappa \cdot 1064^4))
\end{align*}
\]

\( d = \kappa + 1 \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\eta_p &= (1 + p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2})^{-1/2} \\
\eta_q &= (1 + q^{-1/2}(1 - q)^{-1/2})^{-1/2}
\end{align*}
\]

and \( M \) is a global constant (refer to Imported Theorem 2).

### 6.1 Proof of Theorem 5

**Definition 9.** Given a joint distribution \((X,Y)\) with probability mass function \(\pi\), maximal correlation \(\rho\), and constant \(c > 0\), there exists an algorithm such that for any \(\delta > 0\),

Assuming Theorem 4, we prove the Theorem 5 as follows. According to Claim 1, in order to decide the problem \(\text{GAP} - \text{SNIS} - \text{SIM}((X,Y), \text{BSS}(\varepsilon'), \pi, \rho, \delta', c')\) it suffices to decide the problem \(\text{GAP} - \text{SNIS} - \text{ALG}((X,Y), \text{BSS}(\varepsilon'), \pi, \rho, 2\delta', \frac{c'}{4})\). Let \( c = \frac{c'}{4} \) and \( \delta = 2\delta' \).

In the following, assuming \((X,Y)\) is 2-by-2 distribution, we prove that we can decide \(\text{GAP} - \text{SNIS} - \text{ALG}((X,Y), \text{BSS}(\varepsilon'), \pi, \rho, \delta, c)\) for the constant \( c = 5(1 + \kappa) \) and any \( \delta < \delta_0 \) where \( \delta_0 \) is introduced in Theorem 4. For YES instance of \(\text{GAP} - \text{SNIS} - \text{ALG}((X,Y), \text{BSS}(\varepsilon'), \pi, \rho, \delta, c)\), there exists \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and reduction functions \( f_n, g_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \to \{-1, 1\} \) satisfying \( \text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq_{f_n, g_n} (X,Y)^{\otimes n} \). Then, for an appropriate choice of parameters in Theorem 4, there exists functions \( f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \{-1, 1\}^{n_0} \to \{-1, 1\} \) such that \( \text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq_{f_{n_0}, g_{n_0}} (X,Y)^{\otimes n_0} \) where \( n_0 \) is introduced in that theorem. Moreover, we set \( d = 1 + \kappa \) in Theorem 4. This implies the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
E[f_{n_0}] &\le (5 + 4\kappa)\delta, \quad E[g_{n_0}] \le (5 + 4\kappa)\delta, \quad E[f_{n_0}g_{n_0}] \le (5 + 4\kappa)\delta \\
\|T^{\otimes n_0}g_{n_0} - \rho'f_{n_0}\|_1 &\le (5 + 4\kappa)\delta, \\
\|T^{\otimes n_0}f_{n_0} - \rho'g_{n_0}\|_1 &\le (5 + 4\kappa)\delta,
\end{align*}
\]

for \( \delta < \delta_0 \) (for \( \delta_0 \) refer to Theorem 4 ).
Moreover, we need to have \[
\delta > \frac{1}{16}
\]
on particular \(n = n_0\), there are no reduction functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \{-1, 1\}^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}\) satisfying the following inequalities:

\[
\mathbb{E}[f_{n_0}] \leq (5 + 5\delta)\delta, \quad \mathbb{E}[g_{n_0}] \leq (5 + 5\kappa)\delta, \quad \mathbb{E}[f_{n_0}g_{n_0}] \leq (5 + 5\kappa)\delta
\]

\[
\left\| T^{\otimes n_0} g_{n_0} - \rho' \cdot f_{n_0} \right\|_1 \leq (5 + 5\kappa)\delta,
\]

\[
T^{\otimes n_0} f_{n_0} - \rho' \cdot g_{n_0} \right\|_1 \leq (5 + 5\kappa)\delta,
\]

Now, we brute force over all possible functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \{-1, 1\}^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}\) to check if there exists any function satisfying \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq (5+4\kappa)\delta (X, Y)^{\otimes n_0}\) or not. If such reduction functions exist, then the algorithm outputs \text{YES}, and outputs \text{NO} otherwise. This brute force can be done in \(O\left(2^{2n_0}\right)\) time.

### 6.2 Dimension Reduction

The proof of Theorem 4 follows the step 2 and step 3 as described in Subsection 1.2. Let \((X, Y)\) be a 2-by-2 distribution over \((\{-1, 1\}, \{-1, 1\})\) such that \(X\) and \(Y\) are respectively \(p\)-biased and \(q\)-biased distribution, and \(\varepsilon' \in (0, 1/2)\). Let \(\delta < \delta_0\), which will be specified later. We denote \(k\) to be the positive integer such that \(\rho^k > \rho' > \rho^{k+1}\). Let \(M\) be the constant in the Imported Theorem 2. It follows from Theorem 2 that \(W^k[f_n] \leq k\delta\) and \(W^k[g_n] \leq k\delta\), where \(k = \frac{1}{\rho^{(1+\rho')^2}}\).

We shall apply Imported Theorem 2 on function \(f_n\). First, we set \(\varepsilon = k \cdot \delta\). We require \(\delta \leq (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_p^{16k} / (2\kappa \cdot 1064^4)\) (for \(d \geq \kappa\)) to have \(\kappa(1 + 1064\eta_p^{-4k}(2\kappa)^{1/4}) \leq d\) and so

\[
(1 + 1064\eta_p^{-4k}(2\varepsilon)^{1/4}) \varepsilon < d\delta.
\]

Moreover, we need to have \(\delta < \eta_p^{16k} / (M \cdot \kappa)\) to satisfy the condition \(\varepsilon < \tau\) in the theorem. So we set \(\delta_0(p) = \min(\eta_p^{16k} / (M \cdot \kappa), (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_p^{16k} / (2\kappa \cdot 1064^4))\). Moreover, \(J_p = k/\tau = kM/\eta_p^{16k}\). Similarly, we can apply Imported Theorem 2 on \(g_n\) and get \(\delta_0(q) = \min(\eta_q^{16k} / (M \cdot \kappa), (d/\kappa - 1)^4 \cdot \eta_q^{16k} / (2\kappa \cdot 1064^4))\) and \(J_q = k/\tau = kM/\eta_q^{16k}\). We set \(\delta_0 = \min(\delta_0(p), \delta_0(q))\).

It implies that there exist two junta functions \(\tilde{f}_n, \tilde{g}_n : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}\) such that they are \(d \cdot \delta\)-close to \(f_n, g_n\) in \(L_1\) norm, respectively. More precisely, \(\tilde{f}_n\) and \(\tilde{g}_n\), respectively, depend on \(J_p = kM/\eta_p^{16k}\) and \(J_q = kM/\eta_q^{16k}\) variables.

\[
\left\| f_n - \tilde{f}_n \right\|_1 = 2\Pr[f_n(x^n) \neq \tilde{f}_n(x^n)] \leq 2d\delta,
\]

\[
\left\| g_n - \tilde{g}_n \right\|_1 = 2\Pr[g_n(x^n) \neq \tilde{g}_n(x^n)] \leq 2d\delta
\]
Next, we show that the insecurity obtained when simulating BSS(\textepsilon') from (X,Y) using the reduction functions \hat{f}_n, \hat{g}_n is at most \delta d. By Triangle inequality and the contraction property of averaging operator, in particular Markov operator, we have

\[
\left\| T^\otimes^n \hat{g}_n - \rho \hat{f}_n \right\|_1 \\
\leq \left\| T^\otimes^n \hat{g}_n - T^\otimes^n g_n \right\|_1 + \left\| T^\otimes^n g_n - \rho f_n \right\|_1 + \left\| \rho f_n - \rho \hat{f}_n \right\|_1 \\
= \left\| T^\otimes^n (\hat{g}_n - g_n) \right\|_1 + \left\| T^\otimes^n g_n - \rho f_n \right\|_1 + \left\| \rho (f_n - \hat{f}_n) \right\|_1 \\
\leq \| g_n - \hat{g}_n \|_1 + \left\| T^\otimes^n g_n - \rho f_n \right\|_1 + \left\| \rho (f_n - \hat{f}_n) \right\|_1 \\
\leq 2d\delta + \delta + 2\rho d\delta \\
= (1 + (2 + 2\rho')d)\delta \\
\leq (1 + 4d)\delta
\]

Similarly, we have \( \left\| T^\otimes^n \hat{f}_n - \rho \hat{g}_n \right\|_1 \leq (1 + 4d)\delta \). Since \( f_n, g_n \) are 2\delta\text{-close} in L_1-norm to \( \hat{f}_n, \hat{g}_n \), and \( \mathbb{E}[f_n] \leq \delta \), \( \mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta \), it follows that \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{f}_n] \leq (1 + 2d)\delta \) and \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{g}_n] \leq (1 + 2d)\delta \). Using the fact that \( \hat{f}_n \) and \( \hat{g}_n \) are respectively \( J_p \)-junta and \( J_q \)-junta, there exist \( n_0 = J_p + J_q = \mathcal{O}(k) \) and two functions \( f_{n_0}, g_{n_0}: \Omega^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1,1\} \) such that

\[
\left\| T^\otimes^n \hat{g}_n - \rho' \hat{f}_n \right\|_1 = \left\| T^\otimes^n g_{n_0} - \rho' f_{n_0} \right\|_1 \leq (1 + 4d)\delta, \\
\left\| T^\otimes^n \hat{f}_n - \rho' \hat{g}_n \right\|_1 = \left\| T^\otimes^n f_{n_0} - \rho' g_{n_0} \right\|_1 \leq (1 + 4d)\delta\text{ and} \\
\mathbb{E}[\hat{f}_{n_0}] = \mathbb{E}[\hat{f}_n] \leq (1 + 2d)\delta, \ \mathbb{E}[g_{n_0}] = \mathbb{E}[\hat{g}_n] \leq (1 + 2d)\delta.
\]

It implies that BSS(\textepsilon') \( \sqsubseteq_{\rho,\delta,\mu,\rho,\delta,\mu}^{(1+4d)\delta} (X,Y)^{\otimes n} \), which completes the proof.

7 Decidability of SNIS: BSS from Arbitrary m-by-m Source Distribution

In this section, we shall restate and prove Informal Theorem 1.

**Theorem 6.** Let \((X,Y)\) be a redundancy-free finite joint distribution over \((\Omega, \Omega)\), \(\varepsilon' \in (0,1/2)\), and \(\delta > 0\) be an arbitrary insecurity parameter. There exists an algorithm running in bounded computable time that distinguishes between the following two cases:

1. There exist a sequence of insecurity parameters \(\delta_n = \mathcal{O}(1/n)\) and a sequence of reduction functions \(f_n, g_n: \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\}\) such that for infinitely many \(n\), we have BSS(\textepsilon') \( \sqsubseteq_{\rho,\delta,\mu,\rho,\delta,\mu}^{(1+4d)\delta} (X,Y)^{\otimes n} \).
2. For all \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), and reduction functions \(f_n, g_n: \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\}\), it is the case that BSS(\textepsilon') \( \not\sqsubseteq_{\rho,\delta,\mu,\rho,\delta,\mu}^{(1+4d)\delta} (X,Y)^{\otimes n} \).
The following result is the main technical lemma for the proof of the above theorem.

**Theorem 7.** Let \((X,Y)\) be a finite distribution over \((\Omega, \Omega)\) with maximal correlation \(\rho\), and \(\varepsilon' \in (0,1/2)\). For any constant \(\delta' > 0\), there exists \(n_0 \in \mathbb{N}\) such that for any sequence of insecurity parameters \(\delta_n \leq c_0/n\), for some constant \(c_0 > 0\), and any sequence of reduction functions \(f_n, g_n : \Omega^n \to \{-1, 1\}\) satisfying \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f_n,g_n} (X,Y)^\otimes n\), there exist functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \Omega^{n_0} \to \{-1, 1\}\) such that \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f_{n_0},g_{n_0}} (X,Y)^\otimes n_0\).

Furthermore, \(n_0\) is a computable function in the parameters of the problem. In particular, one may take \(n_0 = (1/\lambda)^{O(k+\kappa-c_0)/\delta'}\), where \(k \in \mathbb{N}\) satisfying \(\rho^k \geq 1 - 2\varepsilon' > \rho^{k+1}\), \(\kappa = \frac{(1+\varepsilon')^2}{\rho^{k+1} - \rho^k}\), and \(\lambda\) is the minimum probability of any outcome.

To prove this, we shall apply **Imported Theorem 3**. Intuitively, it says that for any Boolean-valued functions with the total influence at most \(K\) there exists a \(2^{\Omega(k)}\)-junta function that is close to the given function in \(L_1\)-norm.

**Imported Theorem 3** *Friedgut’s Junta Theorem for general product space domains* [15, 39]: Let \((\Omega, \pi)\) be a finite probability space such that every outcome has probability at least \(\lambda\). If \(f \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi^n)\) has range \(-1,1\) and \(0 < \varepsilon \leq 1\), then \(f\) is \(\varepsilon\)-close to \(1/\lambda)^{O(1/k)}\)-junta \(h : \Omega^n \to \{-1,1\}\), i.e., \(\Pr_{x^n \sim \pi^n} [f(x^n) \neq h(x^n)] \leq \varepsilon\).

### 7.1 Proof of Theorem 6

Assuming Theorem 7, we present the proof of Theorem 6 here.

Suppose we are in YES instance, then let \(\delta' = \delta/5\) and invoke Theorem 7 to get the constant \(n_0 \in \mathbb{N}\). Then, we are sure that there exist reduction functions \(f_{n_0}\) and \(g_{n_0}\) such that \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f_{n_0},g_{n_0}} (X,Y)^\otimes n_0\).

Now, suppose we are in NO, then for any \(n\) and (in particular for \(n = n_0\)) we have \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \not\sqsubseteq_{f_{n_0},g_{n_0}} (X,Y)^\otimes n\).

We brute force over all functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0} : \Omega^n \to \{-1, 1\}\) for \(n_0\) mentioned in Theorem 7. If there exists any pair of reduction functions \(f_{n_0}, g_{n_0}\) satisfying \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f_{n_0},g_{n_0}} (X,Y)^\otimes n_0\), output YES, otherwise output NO. The running time of this algorithm is \(O(2^{n_k})\).

### 7.2 Dimension Reduction

The proof of Theorem 7 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 except applying Friedgut’s junta theorem instead of Bourgain’s junta theorem in the dimension reduction step.

Let \((X,Y)\) be a finite distribution over \((\Omega, \Omega)\), and \(\varepsilon' \in (0,1/2)\). Let \(\delta' > 0\). For any \(n = c_0/\delta'\), which implies that \(\delta_n = c_0/n \leq \delta'\), satisfying \(\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \sqsubseteq_{f_n,g_n} (X,Y)^\otimes n\), it follows from Corollary 2 that the total influence of both \(f_n\) and \(g_n\)
are at most $k + \kappa \cdot c_0$. By Imported Theorem 3, there exist two $J$-junta functions $\tilde{f}_n, \tilde{g}_n : \Omega^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ such that
\[
\|f_n - \tilde{f}_n\|_1 = 2 \Pr[f_n(x^n) \neq \tilde{f}_n(x^n)] \leq 2\delta',
\]
\[
\|g_n - \tilde{g}_n\|_1 = 2 \Pr[g_n(x^n) \neq \tilde{g}_n(x^n)] \leq 2\delta'
\]
and $|J| = (1/\lambda)^{O((k + \kappa \cdot c_0)/\delta')}$, where $\lambda$ is the constant defined in Imported Theorem 3. Next, we show that the insecurity obtained when simulating $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon')$ from $(X, Y)$ using the reduction functions $\tilde{f}_n, \tilde{g}_n$ is at most $5\delta'$. By Triangle inequality and the contraction property of averaging operator, in particular Markov operator, we have
\[
\|T^{\otimes n} \tilde{g}_n - \rho' \tilde{f}_n\|_1 \\
\leq \|T^{\otimes n} \tilde{g}_n - T^{\otimes n} g_n\|_1 + \|T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n\|_1 + \|\rho' f_n - \rho' \tilde{f}_n\|_1 \\
= \|T^{\otimes n} (\tilde{g}_n - g_n)\|_1 + \|T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n\|_1 + \|\rho' (f_n - \tilde{f}_n)\|_1 \\
\leq \|g_n - \tilde{g}_n\|_1 + \|T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n\|_1 + \rho' \|f_n - \tilde{f}_n\|_1 \\
\leq 2\delta' + \frac{c_0}{n} + \rho'(2\delta') \\
\leq 5\delta'
\]

Similarly, we have $\|T^{\otimes n} \tilde{f}_n - \rho' \tilde{g}_n\|_1 \leq 5\delta'$. Since $f_n, g_n$ are $\delta'$-close in $L_1$-norm to $\tilde{f}_n, \tilde{g}_n$, and $\mathbb{E}[f_n] \leq 2\delta'$, $\mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq 2\delta'$, it follows that $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{f}_n] \leq 3\delta'$ and $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{g}_n] \leq 3\delta'$. Using the fact that $\tilde{f}_n$ and $\tilde{g}_n$ are junta functions, there exist $n_0 = (1/\lambda)^{O((k + \kappa \cdot c_0)/\delta')} \otimes n_0 : \Omega^{n_0} \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ such that
\[
\|T^{\otimes n_0} \tilde{g}_n - \rho' \tilde{f}_n\|_1 = \|T^{\otimes n_0} g_{n_0} - \rho' f_{n_0}\|_1, \text{ and}
\]
\[
\|T^{\otimes n_0} \tilde{f}_n - \rho' \tilde{g}_n\|_1 = \|T^{\otimes n_0} f_{n_0} - \rho' g_{n_0}\|_1, \text{ and}
\]
\[
\mathbb{E}[f_{n_0}] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{f}_n] \leq 3\delta', \text{ and } \mathbb{E}[g_{n_0}] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{g}_n] \leq 3\delta'.
\]

It implies that $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \leq \mathcal{F}_{n_0} (X, Y) \otimes n_0$, which completes the proof.

References


31. Guy Kindler and Shmuel Safra. Noise-resistant boolean-functions are juntas. 2004. 6, 7, 22, 39, 40


Supporting Materials.
A Proof of Claim 1

We use a hybrid-argument to prove this claim. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the simulator will reverse sample $x^n$ from the input $u$. That is, for every $u \in \{-1, 1\}$ the $\text{Sim}_A$ outputs $x^n$ with probability 0 if $x^n \notin f^{-1}_n(u)$ since if there is such an $x^n$ we can construct a new simulator that shifts the probability of that $x^n$ to the probability of some other element in $f^{-1}(u)$ and achieve the security at least as good as the original simulator. Observe that on an input $u \in \{-1, 1\}$ a “good” simulator should reverse sample $x^n$, which implies that any “good” simulator behaves almost the same as $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A$.

From these observations, we define a $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A(u)$ as follows. On input $u$, it outputs $x^n$ with probability $2\Pr[X^n = x^n] \mid f^{-1}_n(u)$ with probability 0 otherwise. Effectively, $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A(U)$ outputs $x^n$ with $\Pr[X^n = x^n]$. First, we claim that

$$\text{SD} \left( \left( \overline{\text{Sim}}_A(U), U, V \right), \left( X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n) \right) \right) = \| T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n \|_{1}.$$  

Intuitively, the quantity $[T^{\otimes n} g_n(x^n) - \rho' f_n(x^n)]$ measures how good the simulation is on input $x^n$. Note that it might be the case that $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A(x)$ is not a valid simulator if for any $u \in \{-1, 1\}$, $2\sum_{x^n \in f^{-1}(u)} \Pr[X^n = x^n] \neq 1$.

Forward Implication. If $\text{BSS}(\varepsilon') \subseteq \delta$, there exists a simulator $\text{Sim}_A : \{-1, 1\} \rightarrow \Omega^n$ such that

$$\text{SD} \left( \left( \text{Sim}_A(U), U, V \right), \left( X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n) \right) \right) \leq \delta.$$  

By the discussion above, it must be the case that $\text{Sim}_A$ is $\delta$-close to $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A$. Therefore, by triangle inequality, one can show that

$$\| T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n \|_{1} \leq \text{SD} \left( \left( \text{Sim}_A(U), U, V \right), \left( X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n) \right) \right) + \delta \leq 2\delta.$$  

The inequalities $\mathbb{E}[g_n] \delta$ follows from the fact that $f_n(X^n)$ is $\delta$-close to $U$, which is a uniform distribution for BSS. Similarly, we have $\mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta$ and $\| T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n \|_{1} \leq 2\delta$.

Reverse Implication. Suppose there exist function $f_n, g_n$ such that $\mathbb{E}[f_n] \leq \delta$, $\mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta$, $\| T^{\otimes n} g_n - \rho' f_n \|_{1} \leq \delta$, and $\| T^{\otimes n} f_n - \rho' g_n \|_{1} \leq \delta$. Recall that if $2\sum_{x^n \in f^{-1}(u)} \Pr[X^n = x^n] \neq 1$, then $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A$ is not a valid simulator. However, this will not be an issue since from the fact that $\mathbb{E}[f_n] \delta$, we can construct a valid simulator $\text{Sim}_A$ from $\overline{\text{Sim}}_A$ with incurring at most additional $\delta$ insecurity. Therefore, the simulation error is at most $2\delta$.

We provide more details of the discussion above as follows. Suppose $\text{Sim}_A(u)$ outputs $x^n$ with probability $2(\Pr[X^n = x^n] + \varepsilon_{x^n})$ if $x^n \in f^{-1}_n(u)$, and with probability 0 otherwise, where $\varepsilon_{x^n} \in [0, 1]$. This implies that $\text{Sim}_A(U)$ outputs $x^n$ with probability $\Pr[X^n = x^n] + \varepsilon_{x^n}$. Clearly $\text{SD} \left( \text{Sim}_A(U), X^n \right) \leq \delta$, which implies that $\sum_{x^n} |\varepsilon_{x^n}| \leq \delta$. Similarly, $\mathbb{E}[f_n(X^n)] \leq \delta$ since $\mathbb{E}[f_n(X^n), U] \leq \delta$.

Observe that for a fixed $x^n \in f^{-1}(1)$ three quantities $\frac{1}{2} |(T^{\otimes n} g_n)(x^n) - \rho' f_n(x^n)|$, and $|Pr[g_n(Y^n) = 1 | X^n = x^n, ] - (1 - \varepsilon') |$, and $|Pr[g_n(Y^n) = -1 | X^n = x^n, ] - \varepsilon'|$
are the same. Using this fact, we have
\[
\|T^\otimes n g_n - \rho' \cdot f_n\|_1 \\
= \mathbb{E} \left| (T^\otimes n g_n - \rho' \cdot f_n)(X^n) \right| \\
= \sum_{x^n} \mathbb{P}[X^n = x^n] \cdot |(T^\otimes n g_n)(x^n) - \rho' \cdot f_n(x^n)| \\
= \sum_{x^n} \mathbb{P}[X^n = x^n] \cdot |(T^\otimes n g_n)(x^n) - \rho' \cdot f_n(x^n)| \\
= \sum_{x^n} \mathbb{P}[X^n = x^n] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[g_n(Y^n) = 1|X^n = x^n] - (1-\varepsilon')| \\
+ \sum_{x^n} \mathbb{P}[X^n = x^n] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[g_n(Y^n) = -1|X^n = x^n] - \varepsilon'| \\
= \mathbb{E} \left[ (\text{Sim}_A(U,V), (X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n))) \right]
\]
Using this equation, one can verify that, by triangle inequality,
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (\text{Sim}_A(U,V), (X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n))) \right] \geq \mathbb{E} \left[ (\text{Sim}_A(U,V), (X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n))) \right] - \sum_{x^n} |\varepsilon_{x^n}| \\
= \|T^\otimes n g_n - \rho' \cdot f_n\|_1 - \sum_{x^n} |\varepsilon_{x^n}|
\]
which implies that \(\|T^\otimes n g_n - \rho' \cdot f_n\|_1 \leq 2\delta\) since \(\sum_{x^n} |\varepsilon_{x^n}| \leq \delta\). With an analogous argument, one can show that \(\|T^\otimes f_n - \rho' \cdot g_n\|_1 \leq 2\delta\) and \(\mathbb{E}[g_n] \leq \delta\). The proof of the other direction is similar.

\section*{B Omitted Proofs in Section 3}

Proof of Claim 4. In the following expressions, \((X^n, Y^n)\) is always sampled from \(\pi^\otimes n\). For every \(x^n \in \Omega^n\), we have
\[
T^\otimes \psi_S(x^n) = \mathbb{P}[\psi_S(Y^n)|X^n = x^n] \\
= \mathbb{E}_{y^n \sim (Y^n|X^n = x^n)} \prod_{i \in S} \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right) \\
= \prod_{i \in S} \mathbb{E}_{y_i \sim (Y_i|X_i = x_i)} \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right) \\
= \prod_{i \in S} \rho' \cdot \left( \frac{x_i - \mu_x}{\sigma_x} \right) \\
= \rho^{|S|} \psi_S(x^n)
\]
Claim 10

Similarly, we also have \(\overline{T}^\otimes \phi_S = \rho^{|S|} \psi_S\). 34
Claim 10. The following equation holds.

\[
E_{y_i \sim Y_i | X_i = x_i} \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right) = \rho \cdot \left( \frac{x_i - \mu_x}{\sigma_x} \right)
\]

Proof. We do case analysis on \( x_i \).

**Case 1:** If \( x_i = 1 \), the left hand side can be simplified as

\[
E_{y_i \sim Y_i | X_i = 1} \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right) = \frac{a}{a+b} \cdot \frac{1 - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} + \frac{b}{a+b} \cdot \frac{-1 - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} = \frac{2(b+d)}{a+b} \cdot \frac{2(b+d)}{2(\sqrt{a+b} \sqrt{a+c})} + \frac{b}{a+b} \cdot \frac{-2(a+c)}{\sqrt{b+d} \sqrt{a+c}}
\]

The right hand side can be rewritten as

\[
\rho \cdot \left( \frac{1 - \mu_x}{\sigma_x} \right) = \rho \cdot \frac{2(c+d)}{2\sqrt{a+b} \sqrt{c+d}} = \frac{ad - bc}{(a+b)\sqrt{b+d} \sqrt{a+c}}
\]

**Case 2:** If \( x_i = -1 \), the left hand side can be simplified as

\[
E_{y_i \sim Y_i | X_i = -1} \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right) = \frac{c}{c+d} \cdot \frac{1 - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} + \frac{d}{c+d} \cdot \frac{-1 - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} = \frac{2(b+d)}{c+d} \cdot \frac{2(b+d)}{2(\sqrt{b+d} \sqrt{a+c})} + \frac{d}{c+d} \cdot \frac{-2(a+c)}{\sqrt{b+d} \sqrt{a+c}}
\]

The right hand side can be rewritten as

\[
\rho \cdot \left( \frac{-1 - \mu_x}{\sigma_x} \right) = \rho \cdot \frac{-2(a+b)}{2\sqrt{a+b} \sqrt{c+d}} = \frac{ad - bc}{(c+d)\sqrt{a+b} \sqrt{b+d}}
\]

In either of the cases, it’s always the case that \( E_{y_i \sim Y_i | X_i = x_i} \left( \frac{y_i - \mu_y}{\sigma_y} \right) = \rho \cdot \left( \frac{x_i - \mu_x}{\sigma_x} \right) \), which completes the proof.
C  Omitted Proofs in Section 4

First we prove that if a real-valued function is bounded and its $L_1$ norm is bounded, then the $L_2$ norm of this function is also bounded.

**Claim 11.** Suppose $f \in L^2(\Omega, \mu)$ such that $\|f\|_1 \leq \alpha$ and $|f(x)| \leq \beta$ for every $x \in \Omega$. Then, we have $\|f\|_2^2 \leq \alpha \beta$.

**Proof.** We have
\[
\|f\|_2^2 = \mathbb{E}[f(x)^2] = \mathbb{E}[(f(x)|)^2] \leq \mathbb{E}[|f(x)| \cdot \beta] = \beta \cdot \mathbb{E}[|f(x)|] = \beta \cdot \|f\|_1 \leq \alpha \beta.
\]

C.1  Proof of Claim 4

First we recall the notation. Let $\rho \in [0, 1]$ and $\rho' \in (0, 1/2)$. Let $(X, Y)$ be a joint distribution over $(\Omega, \Omega)$ with probability mass function $\pi$ and maximal correlation $\rho$. Let $T$ and $\mathcal{T}$ denote respectively the Markov operator and the corresponding adjoint operator associated with the distribution $(X, Y)$. Note that $f_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_x \otimes \pi_y)$, $g_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_y \otimes \pi)$, $T \otimes n g_n \in L^2(\omega^n, \pi_x \otimes \pi_y)$, and $T \otimes n f_n \in L^2(\omega^n, \pi_y \otimes \pi_x)$. Let $f_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} g_n^S$, and $g_n = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} g_n^S$ be the Efron-stein decompositions of $f_n$ and $g_n$.

C.2  Proof of Claim 6

Since $\text{BSS}(\rho') \subseteq f_n, g_n (X, Y) \otimes n$, we have two inequalities $\|T \otimes n g_n - \rho' f_n\|_1 \leq \delta_n$ and $\|T \otimes n f_n - \rho' g_n\|_1 \leq \delta_n$. Note that $(TT) \otimes n f_n \in L^2(\Omega^n, \pi_x \otimes n)$. Applying triangle inequality and contraction property of averaging operator, we get
\[
\begin{align*}
\| (TT) \otimes n f_n - \rho'^2 f_n \|_1 & \leq \| (TT) \otimes n f_n - \rho' T \otimes n g_n \|_1 + \| \rho' T \otimes n g_n - \rho'^2 f_n \|_1 \\
& = \| T \otimes n (T \otimes n f_n - \rho' g_n) \|_1 + \rho' \| T \otimes n g_n - \rho' f_n \|_1 \\
& \leq \| T \otimes n f_n - \rho' g_n \|_1 + \rho' \| T \otimes n g_n - \rho' f_n \|_1 \\
& \leq (1 + \rho') \delta_n
\end{align*}
\]

Similarly, we have $\| (TT) \otimes n g_n - \rho'^2 \cdot g_n \|_1 \leq (1 + \rho') \delta_n$. Next, by a direct application of Claim 11 yields
\[
\begin{align*}
\| (TT) \otimes n f_n - \rho'^2 \cdot f_n \|_2^2 & \leq (1 + \rho')^2 \delta_n, \quad \text{and} \quad \| (TT) \otimes n g_n - \rho'^2 \cdot g_n \|_2^2 \leq (1 + \rho')^2 \delta_n.
\end{align*}
\]
C.3 Proof of Claim 7

By Proposition 6, we have \( \| T^{\otimes n} f_n^S \|_2 \leq \rho |S| \| f_n^S \|_2 \), which implies that \( \| T^{\otimes n} f_n^S \|_2 \leq \rho^{|S|} \| f_n^S \|_2 \) when \(|S| > k\). Therefore, we have

\[
\| T^{\otimes n} f_n^S \|_2 - \rho^2 \cdot \| f_n^S \|_2 \leq \rho^{|S|} \cdot \| f_n^S \|_2 - \rho^2 \cdot \| f_n^S \|_2 \leq 0
\]

Taking the absolute value of both sides yields

\[
\bigg| \bigg| T^{\otimes n} f_n^S \bigg| \bigg| - \rho^2 \cdot \| f_n^S \|_2 \bigg| \geq \bigg| \rho^{|S|} \cdot \| f_n^S \|_2 - \rho^2 \cdot \| f_n^S \|_2 \bigg|
\]

C.4 Proof of Claim 8

By orthogonal property of Efron-Stein decomposition and the commute property (Proposition 5), we have

\[
\bigg( (TT) \otimes_n f_n - \rho^2 \cdot f_n \bigg) = \bigg( (TT) \otimes_n \left( \sum_S f_n^S \right) - \rho^2 \cdot \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} f_n^S \bigg) = \bigg( \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \bigg( (TT) \otimes_n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \bigg) \bigg) = \bigg( \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \bigg( (TT) \otimes_n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \bigg) \bigg)^2
\]

When \( \Omega = \{-1, 1\} \), let \( \phi_S \) and \( \psi_S \) be two Fourier basis with respect to \( \pi_x \) and \( \pi_y \) respectively. We have

\[
\sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \bigg( (TT) \otimes_n f_n^S - \rho^2 \cdot f_n^S \bigg) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \bigg( \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} (TT) \otimes_n (\hat{f}_n(S) \cdot \phi_S) - \rho^2 \cdot (\hat{f}_n(S) \cdot \phi_S) \bigg) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \bigg( \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} (TT) \otimes_n (\hat{f}_n(S) \cdot \phi_S) - \rho^2 \cdot (\hat{f}_n(S) \cdot \phi_S) \bigg) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \bigg( \sum_{R \subseteq [n]} (TT) \otimes_n (\hat{f}_n(R) - \rho^2 \cdot \hat{f}_n(R)) \bigg)^2 \]

which completes the proof.
C.5 Proof of Claim 9

By triangle inequality, we have

\|T^\otimes n g_n\|_1 = \mathbb{E}_{x^n \in \pi_x^\otimes n} |\mathbb{E}[g_n(Y^n)|X^n = x^n]| \\
\leq \mathbb{E}_{x^n \in \pi_x^\otimes n} \mathbb{E}[|g_n(Y^n)||X^n = x^n] \\
= \mathbb{E}_{x^n \in \pi_x^\otimes n} 1 \\
= 1

where \((X^n, Y^n)\) is sampled according to \(\pi\). Since the range of \(g_n\) is \{-1, 1\}, it is clearly that \(\|g_n\|_1 = 1\). Similarly \(\|T^\otimes n f_n\|_1 \leq \|f_n\|_1 = 1\).

D Related works

In this section, we shall first review the approaches used in [19, 13, 18] to prove that non-interactive simulation (NIS) problem is decidable and then discuss why they cannot be used to prove decidability of the secure non-interactive simulation (SNIS) problem.

[19], for the first time, proves that the gap version of NIS can be decided. They solve this problem for the case that the target distribution is a 2-by-2 joint distribution. Their main contribution is reducing the problem to the case that the source distribution is one sample of correlated Gaussian distribution. Then, combining Witsenhausen [43], and an invariance principle introduced in [37, 35] (inspired by Borell’s noise stability theorem [4]) provides them with a precise characterization of joint distributions that can be simulated from a correlated Gaussian distribution. However, when the target distribution is \(k\)-by-\(k\) for some \(k > 2\), then their approach is not enough for two main reasons: First, Borrel’s theorem is not available for \(k > 2\), second, for \(k > 2\) it is not the case that a distribution \((U, V)\) can be specified by \(\mathbb{E}[U], \mathbb{E}[V]\) and \(\text{Pr}[U = V]\).

The authors of [13] manage to address this issue by following a similar high level framework of using regularity lemma and invariance principle introduced in [19] along with some more advanced techniques like a new smoothing argument inspired by learning theory and potential function argument in complexity theory. While In [18], the authors uses a different approach from [13], they follow the same framework of [19] and again reduce the problem to Gaussian for the general case \(k > 2\). In this section, we will argue why this approach can not be used to prove decidability of SNIS problem.

The invariance principle guarantees that the correlation of two low-influential functions is almost the same as the correlation of appropriate threshold functions applied on one sample of a \(\rho\)-correlated gaussian distribution. Finally, they use Witsenhausen theorem to simulate this threshold function applied on gaussian sample using a constant number of source samples.
Definition 10 (Gaussian Stability). [19] Let \( \Phi \) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard \( N(0, 1) \) gaussian distribution and \( (G_1, G_2) \) be a \( \rho \)-correlated gaussian distribution. Given \( \rho \in [-1, 1] \) and \( \mu, \nu \in [-1, 1] \), define

\[
\mathcal{P}_\mu(G_1) := \text{sign} \left( \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{1 + \mu}{2} \right) - G_1 \right)
\]

\[
\mathcal{Q}_\nu(G_2) := \text{sign} \left( \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{1 + \nu}{2} \right) - G_2 \right)
\]

\[
\mathcal{T}_\rho(\mu, \nu) := \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{P}_\mu(G_1) \cdot \mathcal{Q}_\nu(G_2)]
\]

\[
\mathcal{E}_\rho(\mu, \nu) := -\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{P}_\mu(G_1) \cdot \mathcal{Q}_\nu(G_2)].
\]

Note that \( \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{P}_\mu(G_1)] = \mu \) and \( \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{Q}_\nu(G_2)] = \nu \) = \( \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{Q}_{-\nu}(G_2)] \).

Lemma 1 (Simulating Threshold on gaussians). [43] For any joint distribution \((X, Y)\) with maximal correlation \( \rho \), any arbitrary \( \zeta > 0 \), there exists \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) \( (n = O(\frac{1 + \rho}{\zeta}) \) such that for all \( \mu, \nu \in [-1, 1] \), there exist functions \( P_\mu : X^n \to [-1, 1] \) and \( Q_\nu : Y^n \to [-1, 1] \) such that \( |\mathbb{E}[P_\mu] - \mu| \leq \zeta/2 \), \( |\mathbb{E}[Q_\nu] - \nu| \leq \zeta/2 \) and

\[
|\mathbb{E}[P_\mu(X^n)Q_\nu(Y^n)] - \mathcal{T}_\rho(\mu, \nu)| \leq \zeta
\]

Now, we claim that above lemma does not necessarily provide us with a secure simulation. The reason is that for \( \mu = \nu = \frac{1}{2} \), the joint distribution \((\mathcal{P}_\mu(G_1), \mathcal{Q}_\nu(G_2))\) is BSS when \((G_1, G_2)\) is a \( \rho \)-correlated gaussian distribution. Suppose that the parameter of this BSS is \( \epsilon' \). Now, if we choose \((X, Y)\) to be a redundancy-free \( 2 \)-by- \( 2 \) joint distribution with a maximal correlation \( \tau \) such that there is no integer \( k \) satisfying \( \tau^{2k} = (1 - 2\epsilon')^2 \), according to Corollary 1 there will be a lower bound on minimum insecurity. This implies that the constructions in Lemma 1 might be insecure.

E Known Results on Junta

Definition 11. [31] A Boolean function \( f : \{-1, 1\}^n \to \{-1, 1\} \) is called \((\epsilon, J)\) junta with respect to a biased measure \( \mu_p \), if there exists a subset \( J \subseteq [n] \) of size \( J \) and a function \( g \) which only depends on coordinates in the set \( J \) such that \( \Pr_{x \sim \mu_p}[f(x) = g(x)] \geq 1 - \epsilon \).

Theorem 8. Friedgut’s Junta Theorem [15, 39]: Let \( f : \{-1, 1\}^n \to \{-1, 1\} \) and let \( 0 < \epsilon \leq 1 \). Then, \( f \) is \( \epsilon \)-close to an \( \exp(O(\|f\|/\epsilon)) \)-junta. Indeed, there is a set \( J \subseteq [n] \) with \( |J| \leq \exp(O(1/\epsilon)) \) such that \( f \)’s Fourier spectrum is \( 2\epsilon \)-concentrated on \( \{S \subseteq J : |S| \leq |f|/\epsilon \} \).

Theorem 9. Bourgain’s Junta Theorem [5]: For any function \( f : \{-1, 1\}^n \to \{-1, 1\} \), any positive integer \( k \), any positive real numbers \( \gamma, \epsilon \), there exists a constant \( c_{\gamma, \epsilon} \) such that if \( \sum_{|S| > k} \hat{f}(S)^2 < c_{\gamma, \epsilon} k^{-\gamma - 0.5} \), then \( f \) is \( \epsilon \)-close to a \( \sqrt{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon}} \)-junta.
**Imported Theorem 4 (Theorem 3.4 of [39])** Suppose \( f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\} \) has \( \deg(f) \leq d \), then \( f \) is a \( d^2d^{-1} \) junta.

Kindler and Safra [31] and Hatami [21] generalize Bourgain’s Theorem to general \( p \)-biased. [25] shows how to deduce similar results for \( p \)-biased measure from uniform measure for some statements related to Fourier expansion.

**F Secure Non-Interactive Simulation: Definition**

We recall the notion of secure non-interactive simulation of joint distributions using a simulation-based security definition as defined in [26].

If there exists reductions functions \( f_n, g_n \) such that the insecurity is at most \( \delta(n) \) as defined above then we say that \( (U, V) \) reduces to \( (X, Y)^{\otimes n} \) via reduction functions \( f_n, g_n \) with insecurity at most \( \delta(n) \), represented by \( (U, V) \sqsubseteq^{\nu(n)}_{f_n,g_n} (X, Y)^{\otimes n} \). Suppose \( (X, Y) \) is a joint distribution over the sample space \( \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \), and \( (U, V) \) be a joint distribution over the sample space \( \mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{V} \). For \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), suppose \( f_n : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{U} \) and \( g_n : \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \) be two reduction functions.

In the real world, we have the following experiment.

1. A trusted third party samples \( (x^n, y^n) \) \( \xleftarrow{\$} (X, Y)^{\otimes n} \), and delivers \( x^n \in \mathcal{X}^n \) to Alice and \( y^n \in \mathcal{Y}^n \) to Bob.
2. Alice outputs \( u' = f_n(x^n) \), and Bob outputs \( v' = g_n(y^n) \).

The following conditions are required for the security.

1. **The case of no corruption.** Suppose the environment does not corrupt any party. So, it receives \( (U, V) \) as output from the two parties in the ideal world. In the real world, the simulator receives \( (f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n)) \) as output. If this reduction has at most \( \nu(n) \) insecurity, then the following must hold.

\[
SD\left( (U, V) , (f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n)) \right) \leq \delta(n).
\]

2. **The case of Corrupt Alice.** Suppose the environment statically corrupt Alice. In the real world, the simulator receives \( (X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n)) \). In the ideal world, we have a simulator \( \text{Sim}_A : \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^n \) that receives \( u \) from the ideal functionality, and outputs \( (\text{Sim}_A(u), u) \) to the environment. The environment’s view is the random variable \( (\text{Sim}_A(U), U, V) \). If this reduction has at most \( \nu(n) \) insecurity, then the following must hold.

\[
SD\left( (\text{Sim}_A(U), U, V) , (X^n, f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n)) \right) \leq \delta(n).
\]

3. **The case of Corrupt Bob.** Analogously, there exists a simulator for Bob \( \text{Sim}_B : \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}^n \) and the following must hold if this reduction has at most \( \nu(n) \) insecurity.

\[
SD\left( (U, V, \text{Sim}_B(V)) , (f_n(X^n), g_n(Y^n), Y^n) \right) \leq \delta(n).
\]
Definition 12 (Secure Non-interactive Simulation). Let $(X, Y)$ be a joint distribution over the sample space $(X, Y)$, and $(U, V)$ be a joint distribution over the sample space $(U, V)$. We say that the distribution $(U, V)$ can be securely and non-interactively simulated using distribution $(X, Y)$, denoted as $(U, V) \subseteq (X, Y)$, if there exists $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for every $n \geq n_0$ there exist reduction functions $f_n : X^n \to U$, $g_n : Y^n \to V$, and insecurity bound $\delta(n)$ satisfying

$$(U, V) \subseteq_{f_n, g_n}^{\delta(n)} (X, Y)^{\otimes n}, \text{ and } \lim_{n \to \infty} \delta(n) = 0.$$