

# LOTUS: Evasive and Resilient Backdoor Attacks through Sub-partitioning

Siyuan Cheng, Guanhong Tao, Yingqi Liu<sup>†</sup>, Guangyu Shen, Shengwei An, Shiwei Feng, Xiangzhe Xu, Kaiyuan Zhang, Shiqing Ma<sup>‡</sup>, Xiangyu Zhang









## **Backdoor Attacks**

- ➤ Backdoor attack<sup>[1][2]</sup> is a prominent threat to deep learning models
  - > The model performs well on normal inputs






<sup>[2]</sup> Liu, Yingqi, et al. "Trojaning attack on neural networks." NDSS 2018





## **Backdoor Attacks**

- ➤ Backdoor attacks are a prominent threat to deep learning models
  - The model misclassifies inputs stamped with the backdoor trigger







## Limitation of Existing Backdoor Attacks

- Fixed trigger patterns are not evasive
  - > Trigger inversion<sup>[1][2]</sup> is effective against fixed patch<sup>[3]</sup> or noise<sup>[4]</sup> backdoors
- > Sample-specific triggers are not resilient
  - ➤ WaNet<sup>[5]</sup> evades several backdoor detection methods
  - ➤ Backdoor mitigation methods can easily eliminate its attack success rate (ASR)
  - For example, fine-tuning the model with only 5% training data reduces its ASR from 91% to 1%


- [1] Wang, Bolun, et al. "Neural cleanse: Identifying and mitigating backdoor attacks in neural networks." *IEEE S&P* 2019.
- [2] Liu, Yingqi, et al. "Abs: Scanning neural networks for back-doors by artificial brain stimulation." ACM SIGSAC CCS 2019.
- [3] Gu, Tianyu, et al. "Badnets: Evaluating backdooring attacks on deep neural networks." IEEE Access 7 2019.
- [4] Xinyun Chen, et al. "Targeted backdoor attacks on deep learning systems using data poisoning." Arxiv 2017.
- [5] Tuan Anh Nguyen, et al. "WaNet Imperceptible Warping-based Backdoor Attack." ICLR 2021.





## Our Proposed Attack - LOTUS

- Attack Goal Evasive and Resilient against SOTA Defenses
  - <u>Label-specific</u> attack (Only attack a selected victim class)
  - <u>Partition-specific</u> attack (Different partitions are assigned different triggers)





# Step 1: Victim-class Sample Partitioning

- > Partition the samples of the victim class into different partitions
  - > Explicit partitioning
    - For example, bird species
  - Implicit partitioning
    - Partition on semantic feature maps

#### **Explicit Partitioning Implicit Partitioning**





Bird p<sub>2</sub>

 $1 p_2$ 

Cat p<sub>1</sub>


 $C_1$ 





## Step 2: Trigger Focusing

- Apply special adversarial training
  - Only samples from the *victim class* can activate the backdoor






LOTUS: Evasive and Resilient Backdoor Attacks through Sub-partitioning

## Step 2: Trigger Focusing


- > Apply special adversarial training
  - Only samples stamped with the *appropriate partition* trigger can activate the backdoor





## **Evaluation**

Evasive against several backdoor detection methods



Resilient against several backdoor mitigation methods

| Attacks      | No Defense |         | Fine-tuning |        | Fine-pruning |        | NAD    |        | ANP    |        |
|--------------|------------|---------|-------------|--------|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|              | BA         | ASR     | BA          | ASR    | BA           | ASR    | BA     | ASR    | BA     | ASR    |
| BadNets      | 92.02%     | 100.00% | 89.31%      | 1.74%  | 91.70%       | 0.53%  | 87.81% | 0.80%  | 89.15% | 0.32%  |
| Dynamic      | 91.81%     | 100.00% | 88.87%      | 2.91%  | 91.39%       | 22.03% | 89.11% | 2.90%  | 88.25% | 12.81% |
| IA           | 91.70%     | 99.65%  | 87.74%      | 2.78%  | 91.07%       | 0.17%  | 87.14% | 2.29%  | 88.73% | 1.98%  |
| WaNet        | 91.22%     | 98.57%  | 89.56%      | 1.37%  | 90.22%       | 1.07%  | 89.74% | 1.40%  | 89.07% | 0.54%  |
| <b>ISSBA</b> | 91.67%     | 99.96%  | 87.73%      | 2.72%  | 91.12%       | 14.27% | 87.97% | 2.83%  | 85.64% | 10.01% |
| LIRA         | 91.70%     | 100.00% | 89.96%      | 2.19%  | 91.29%       | 12.14% | 90.23% | 2.32%  | 89.70% | 37.91% |
| DFST         | 91.81%     | 99.97%  | 88.49%      | 22.86% | 91.47%       | 21.61% | 88.52% | 24.66% | 87.13% | 36.17% |
| LOTUS        | 91.54%     | 93.80%  | 88.10%      | 46.90% | 91.14%       | 44.90% | 87.61% | 42.30% | 88.14% | 34.90% |





# Thanks for your attention!





