Cloud and Mobile Computing

Protect Privacy in Offloading

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Technological Trends

- Mobile systems become primary computing platforms for most people.
- Mobile systems have limited resources: storage, performance, network bandwidths, and battery life.
- Cloud computing gains popularity replacing inhouse servers and desktop applications.
- Existing cloud services: webmail, video hosting, social networks ...
- Can the cloud help mobile users? Can mobile systems help the cloud?
 - Mobile systems need resources.
 - $_{\circ}$ The cloud needs (real-time) data.

"Cheap" Massive Parallelism

- allow users to rent many computers for only hours
- meet the increasing need for storage, organization, analysis of large amounts of data (image, video, audio, document...) by end users
- respond to events by allocating resources quickly (for example, simulations in emergency)





Computation Offloading

mobile <u>heavy computation</u> system (e.g. image search and recognition)

high-performance server







Demo: Computation Offloading for Robot

Challenges

- offer fine-grained offloading services (for seconds or minutes, not hours or months)
- schedule real-time tasks with high parallelism (such as image processing and object recognition)
- provide easy-to-program interface with automatic parallelism detection and scalability
- tolerate bandwidth fluctuations with multiple levels of details / accuracy
- design programming languages for applications whose executions may be migrated easily
- protect privacy

Are you willing to put private information in the cloud?



Will Cloud Computing Kill Privacy?

Erik Larkin, PCWorld Jan 27, 2010 2:15 pm

As cloud computing speeds ahead, privacy protections are too often being left in the dust.

Loosely defined, cloud computing involves programs or services that run on Internet servers. Despite the buzz surrounding it, the idea isn't new--think Webmail. But huge benefits, such as being able to gain access to your data from anywhere and not having to worry about backups, have

led more people to leap to the Internet to do everything from writing documents and watching movies to managing their businesses. Unfortunately, privacy is often still stuck at home.

Behind the Times

Archaic laws that focus on where your information is, rather than what it is, are part of the

Be a

conversation

🕲 Google Searches Used To Convict Hit-And-Run Driver Techdii	rt - Mozilla Fi	irefox		×
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< Police In Mumbai Shutting Down Open WiFi		Carl's Jr. Apparently Unaware That People Share >>	Searc	:

Legal Issues by Mike Masnick ri, Jan 16th 2009 1:53pm

Filed Under: nviction, google earches, hit and run

Google Searches Used To Convict Hit-And-Run Driver

from the google-searches-in-a-court-of-law dept

In the past, we've noted various lawsuits where Google searches done by the accused were used against them in a court of law. There was the guy who searched on "neck snap break," days before his wife was murdered, and then there was the woman who searched on "how to commit murder" and other rather damning phrases like "instant poison" and "undetectable poisons," before her husband was murdered. In yet another such case, an investment banker has been convicted of a hit-and-run that killed a woman, after his Google searches soon after the accident turned up the phrase "hit and run." The guy had claimed that he believed he hit a deer, but his Google searches suggested he knew it was a person. Beyond just searching for the phrase hit and run, he also did searches on: "auto glass reporting requirements to law enforcement," "auto glass, Las Vegas," auto parts, auto theft, and the Moraga Police Department. Since the incident was in California, the thinking was he was looking to get the damage to his car repaired out of state to avoid any suspicion from the auto repair place. While the guy appealed the ruling saying that even with those searches he didn't have any actual knowledge he had hit a person, the appeals court didn't find that to be very convincing.

14 Comments | Leave a Comment..

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See

Energy Savings in Privacy-Preserving Computation Offloading with Protection by Homomorphic Encryption

Jibang Liu and Yung-Hsiang Lu Electrical and Computer Engineering Purdue University

HotPower 2010, Vancouver, Canada

Save Mobile Energy by Offloading

mobile <u>heavy computation</u> system (e.g. image search and recognition)

high-performance server

Technology to Protect Data

- Anonymize
- Erase history
- Steganography ⇒
- Watermark
- Encryption

image source: Wikipedia

- •
- Contribution: first paper showing how to use homomorphic encryption for offloading and saving mobile energy.

Is it possible to perform computation on encrypted data?

Rivest, Adleman, Dertouzos 1978

Process without Access

Darkroom

 $\hat{\Gamma}$

locked glovebox

Homomorphic Encryption

- x: plaintext
- y: ciphertext
- e: encryption
- d: decryption
- f: operation

r: result e(x) = y d(y) = x f(x) = rd(f(y)) = r

Homomorphic encryption is **not** an encryption algorithm (like RSA, DES, or AES). Instead, it says that **some** encryption algorithms allow operations on the encrypted data.

Example (Addition)

- Suppose p and q are two prime numbers, n = pq.
- $y = e(x) = (x + pr) \mod n$, r is a user-chosen integer
- $x = d(y) = y \mod p$
- x must be smaller than p
- p = 7, q = 5, x1 = 2, x2 = 1
- $y1 = (2 + 2 \times 7) \mod 35 = 16$,
- choose 2 for r
- $y^2 = (1 + 6 \times 7) \mod 35 = 8$, choose 6 for r

- x1 + x2 = 3
- y1 + y2 = 16 + 8 = 24
- 24 mod 7 = 3

Example (Multiplication)

- $y = e(x) = (x + pr) \mod n$, r is a random integer
- $x = d(y) = y \mod p$
- p = 7, q = 5, x1 = 2, x2 = 1
- $y1 = (2 + 2 \times 7) \mod 35 = 16$, choose 2 for r
- $y^2 = (1 + 6 \times 7) \mod 35 = 8$, choose 6 for r
- x1 x2 = <mark>2</mark>, y1 y2 = 16 8 = 128
- 128 mod 7 = 2
- (16 16 16) mod 7 = 4096 mod 7 = 1 wrong
- 2 2 2 = <mark>8</mark>
- In practice, p and q are very large.

("overflow")

Nondeterministic Encryption

f(x) = r $\stackrel{x}{\bullet} \xrightarrow{f}_{r}$ f is + and • in the examples

- more operations ⇒ noise accumulates ⇒ eventually falls outside the region.
- The region's size (i.e. tolerance of noise) depends on the encryption key (larger key, better tolerance)
- Frequent denoising is needed but no efficient solution was discovered until [Gentry STOC 2009]
- This paper does not consider denoising.

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Gabor Filtering (Insensitive to Rotations and Noise)

90-degree rotation

180-degree rotation

motion blur

zoom blur

noise

Step 2/2 (S2) Features

- computing "features" using means, standard deviations, and distributions of these images
- compare the features to find similar images

	S1	S2
computation intensive	Y > 99%	N <1%
operations	+ and ×	+ and ÷ and $$
efficient operations on encrypted data	Y	Ν
offload	Y	Ν

	Save Energy	Protect Privacy
(a)	Ν	Y
(b)	Y	Ν
(C)	Y	Y

Parameters and Protections

encryption key ↑

+ protection \uparrow , accuracy \uparrow

- energy saving \downarrow
- scaling factor ↑
 - + accuracy ↑
- attacks
 - ciphertext-only attacks <=</p>
 - known plaintext
 - chosen plaintext
 - adaptively-chosen plaintext

more difficult for an attacker

Experimental Setup

- Mobile: HP iPAQ 6954 PDA
- Server: 2GHz CPU, 3GB memory
- power measurement: National Instrument data acquisition, power from battery,1 KHz sampling
- accuracy measured by recall
 - L: number of returned images (20 in our evaluations)
 - Y: number of similar images (10 in our evaluation)
 - X: number matched images

$$recall(L) = \frac{X}{Y}$$

Results

- compared with steganography [ISLPED 2010]
- The modified Gabor filter can handle both original and encrypted images. 10,000 images from Flickr

- 1000 images on the PDA, sent to server at run time
- baseline: no protection, on PDA, ~2 hours

Future Work

- migrate to newer mobile systems and re-evaluate the parameters
- extend the Gabor filter to handle zooming
- use SIFT (scale invariant feature transformation) to handle distortion
- implement denoising and evaluate the effects on energy consumption and performance
- compare different encryption algorithms

Conclusion

- Present a method to offload image retrieval with data protected by homomorphic encryption.
- Obtain accuracy comparable to no protection.
- Modify Gabor retrieval algorithm that can handle unprotected and protected images.
- Evaluate the effects of key size and scaling factor.

Acknowledgements: This work is supported in part by NSF grants CNS-0716271. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in the paper are those of the authors and do no necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor.

Encryption and Decryption

- $e(x) = (x + pr) \equiv y \mod n$
- x + pr = bpq + y
- y = x + pr bpq
- d(y) = y mod p
- $(x + pr bpq) \mod p \equiv (x + p(r bq)) \mod p = x$