

#### Software Vulnerabilities: Input Validation Issues & Buffer Overflows

Fall 2010/Lecture 11

# Steps in a standard break-in (Getting in)

- Get your foot in the door
  - Steal a password file and run dictionary attack
  - Try to guess a password online
  - Sniff passwords off the network, social engineering
  - Use input vulnerability in network-facing programs (e.g., web server, ftp server, mail server, browser, etc.)
- Use partial access to gain root (admin) access
  - Break some mechanism on the system
  - Often involve exploiting vulnerabilities in some local programs

# Steps in a standard break-in (After Getting in)

- Set up some way to return
  - Install login program or web server with back door
- Cover your tracks
  - Disable intrusion detection, virus protection,
  - Install rootkits,
- Perform desired attacks
  - break into other machines
  - taking over the machine
  - Steal useful information (e.g., credit card numbers)

## Common Software Vulnerabilities

- Input validation
- Buffer overflows
- Format string problems
- Integer overflows
- Race conditions...

# Input Validation

- Sources of input
  - Command line arguments
  - Environment variables
  - Function calls from other modules
  - Configuration files
  - Network packets
- Sources of input for web applications
  - Web form input
  - Scripting languages with string input

## Weak Input Validation

- What are some things that the attacker may try to achieve?
  - Crash programs
  - Execute arbitrary code
    - setuid or setgid programs
  - Obtain sensitive information

## Command line

- User can set command line arguments to almost anything
  - Using execve command
  - Do not trust name of the program (it can be sent to any value including NULL)
- Do not check for bad things (blacklisting)
- Check for things that are allowed (whitelisting)
- Check all possible inputs

# Simple example

```
void main(int argc, char ** argv) {
   char buf[1024];
   sprintf(buf,"cat %s",argv[1]);
   system ("buf");
}
Can easily add things to the command
   by adding ;
```

## Environment variables

- Users can set the environment variables to anything
  - Using execve
  - Has some interesting consequences
- Examples:
  - LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH
  - PATH
  - IFS

## An example attack

- Assume you have a setuid program that loads dynamic libraries
- UNIX searches the environment variable LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH for libraries
- A user can set LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH to /tmp/attack and places his own copy of the libraries here
- Most modern C runtime libraries have fixed this by not using the LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH variable when the EUID is not the same as the UID or the EGID is not the same as the GID

#### More fun with environment variables

- A setuid program has a system call: system(ls);
- The user sets his PATH to be . (current directory) and places a program Is in this directory
- The user can then execute arbitrary code as the setuid program
- Solution: Reset the PATH variable to be a standard form (i.e., "/bin:/usr/bin")

#### Even more fun

- However, you must also reset the IFS variable
  - IFS is the characters that the system considers as white space
- If not, the user may add "s" to the IFS
  - system(ls) becomes system(l)
  - Place a function I in the directory

## What is Buffer Overflow?

- A **buffer overflow**, or **buffer overrun**, is an anomalous condition where a process attempts to store data beyond the boundaries of a fixed-length buffer.
- The result is that the extra data overwrites adjacent memory locations. The overwritten data may include other buffers, variables and program flow data, and may result in erratic program behavior, a memory access exception, program termination (a crash), incorrect results or — especially if deliberately caused by a malicious user — a possible breach of system security.
- Most common with C/C++ programs

## History

- Used in 1988's Morris Internet Worm
- Alphe One's "Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit" in Phrack Issue 49 in 1996 popularizes stack buffer overflows
- Still extremely common today

## What is needed to understand Buffer Overflow

- Understanding C functions and the stack.
- Some familiarity with machine code.
- Know how systems calls are made.
- The exec() system call.
- Attacker needs to know which CPU and OS are running on the target machine.
  - Our examples are for x86 running Linux.
  - Details vary slightly between CPU's and OS:
    - Stack growth direction.
    - big endian vs. little endian.

## **Buffer Overflow**

- Stack overflow
  - Shell code
  - Return-to-libc
    - Overflow sets ret-addr to address of libc function
  - Off-by-one
  - Overflow function pointers & longjmp buffers
- Heap overflow



#### Stack Frame



## What are buffer overflows?

• Suppose a web server contains a function:

```
void func(char *str) {
   char buf[128];
   strcpy(buf, str);
   do-something(buf);
}
```

• When the function is invoked the stack looks like:



# Basic stack exploit

- Main problem: no range checking in strcpy().
- Suppose \*str is such that after strcpy stack looks like:



- When func() exits, the user will be given a shell !!
- Note: attack code runs *in stack*.
- To determine ret guess position of stack when func() is called.

## Some unsafe C lib functions

strcpy (char \*dest, const char \*src)
strcat (char \*dest, const char \*src)
gets (char \*s)
scanf ( const char \*format, ... )
sprintf (conts char \*format, ... )

# Exploiting buffer overflows

- Suppose web server calls func() with given URL.
- Attacker can create a 200 byte URL to obtain shell on web server.
- Some complications for stack overflows:
  - Program P should not contain the '\0' character.
  - Overflow should not crash program before func() exits.

#### Other control hijacking opportunities

- Stack smashing attack:
  - Override return address in stack activation record by overflowing a local buffer variable.
- Function pointers: (used in attack on PHP 4.0.2)

– Overflowing buf will override function pointer.

Longjmp buffers: longjmp(pos) (used in attack on Perl 5.003)
 – Overflowing buf next to pos overrides value of pos.

#### return-to-libc attack

\*str

 "Bypassing non-executable-stack during exploitation using return-to-libs" by c0ntex

ret

Shell code attack: Program P: exec( "/bin/sh" )

Code for P



## Off by one buffer overflow

Sample code
 func f(char \*input) {
 char buf[LEN];
 if (strlen(input) <= LEN) {
 strcpy(buf, input)
 }
 }</pre>

## Heap Overflow

- Heap overflow is a general term that refers to overflow in data sections other than the stack
  - buffers that are dynamically allocated, e.g., by malloc
  - statically initialized variables (data section)
  - uninitialized buffers (bss section)
- Heap overflow may overwrite other date allocated on heap
- By exploiting the behavior of memory management routines, may overwrite an arbitrary memory location with a small amount of data.
  - E.g., SimpleHeap\_free() does
    - hdr->next->next->prev := hdr->next->prev;

# Finding buffer overflows

- Hackers find buffer overflows as follows:
  - Run web server on local machine.
  - Fuzzing: Issue requests with long tags.
     All long tags end with "\$\$\$\$".
  - If web server crashes, search core dump for "\$\$\$\$" to find overflow location.
- Some automated tools exist. ().
- Then use disassemblers and debuggers (e..g IDA-Pro) to construct exploit.

## Preventing Buffer Overflow Attacks

- Use type safe languages (Java, ML).
- Use safe library functions
- Static source code analysis.
- Non-executable stack
- Run time checking: StackGuard, Libsafe, SafeC, (Purify).
- Address space layout randomization.
- Detection deviation of program behavior
- Access control to control aftermath of attacks... (covered later in course)

## Static source code analysis

- Statically check source code to detect buffer overflows.
  - Several consulting companies.
- Main idea: automate the code review process.
- Several tools exist:
  - Coverity (Engler et al.): Test trust inconsistency.
  - Microsoft program analysis group:
    - PREfix: looks for fixed set of bugs (e.g. null ptr ref)
    - PREfast: local analysis to find idioms for prog errors.
  - Berkeley: Wagner, et al. Test constraint violations.
- Find lots of bugs, but not all.

## Bugs to Detect in Source Code Analysis

- Some examples
- Crash Causing Defects
- Null pointer dereference
- Use after free
- Double free
- Array indexing errors
- Mismatched array new/delete
- Potential stack overrun
- Potential heap overrun
- Return pointers to local variables
- Logically inconsistent code

- Uninitialized variables
- Invalid use of negative values
- Passing large parameters by value
- Underallocations of dynamic data
- Memory leaks
- File handle leaks
- Network resource leaks
- Unused values
- Unhandled return codes
- Use of invalid iterators

## Marking stack as non-execute

- Basic stack exploit can be prevented by marking stack segment as non-executable.
  - Support in Windows SP2. Code patches exist for Linux, Solaris.
  - Problems:
    - Does not defend against `return-to-libc' exploit.
    - Some apps need executable stack (e.g. LISP interpreters).
    - Does not block more general overflow exploits:
      - Overflow on heap, overflow func pointer.

## Run time checking: StackGuard

- There are many run-time checking techniques ...
- StackGuard tests for stack integrity.
  - Embed "canaries" in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return.



# Canary Types

- <u>Random canary:</u>
  - Choose random string at program startup.
  - Insert canary string into every stack frame.
  - Verify canary before returning from function.
  - To corrupt random canary, attacker must learn current random string.
- <u>Terminator canary:</u>

Canary = 0, newline, linefeed, EOF

- String functions will not copy beyond terminator.
- Hence, attacker cannot use string functions to corrupt stack.

# StackGuard (Cont.)

- StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch.
  - Program must be recompiled.
  - Minimal performance effects: 8% for Apache.
- Newer version: PointGuard.
  - Protects function pointers and setjmp buffers by placing canaries next to them.
  - More noticeable performance effects.
- Note: Canaries don't offer fullproof protection.
  - Some stack smashing attacks can leave canaries untouched.

### Randomization: Motivations.

- Buffer overflow and return-to-libc exploits need to know the (virtual) address to which pass control
  - Address of attack code in the buffer
  - Address of a standard kernel library routine
- Same address is used on many machines
  - Slammer infected 75,000 MS-SQL servers using same code on every machine
- Idea: introduce artificial diversity
  - Make stack addresses, addresses of library routines, etc.
     unpredictable and different from machine to machine

#### Address Space Layout Randomization

- Arranging the positions of key data areas randomly in a process' address space.
  - e.g., the base of the executable and position of libraries (libc), heap, and stack,
  - Effects: for return to libc, needs to know address of the key functions.
  - Attacks:
    - Repetitively guess randomized address
    - Spraying injected attack code
- Vista has this enabled, software packages available for Linux and other UNIX variants

## Instruction Set Randomization

- Instruction Set Randomization (ISR)
  - Each program has a *different* and *secret* instruction set
  - Use translator to randomize instructions at load-time
  - Attacker cannot execute its own code.
- What constitutes instruction set depends on the environment.
  - for binary code, it is CPU instruction
  - for interpreted program, it depends on the interpreter

## Instruction Set Randomization

- An implementation for x86 using the Bochs emulator
  - network intensive applications doesn't have too much performance overhead
  - CPU intensive applications have one to two orders of slow-down
- Not yet used in practice

#### Readings for This Lecture

- Wikipedia
  - Privilege escalation
  - Buffer overflow
  - Stack buffer overflow
  - Buffer overflow protection



## Coming Attractions ...

• Other Software vulnerabilities

