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UNIVERSITY

CS52600:
Information Security

Audit
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What is Auditing?

- Webster: a methodical examination and review
- Information Security: An a-posteriori technique to identify security violations
 - How does this help maintain security?



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Issues



- What information do we need?
 - After the fact – current state of system isn't enough
 - *logging*
- How do we perform an Audit?
 - Audit methodology
- What do we do with the results?

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Logging



- Goal: Record all information that might be needed for an audit
 - Authentication attempts
 - Failed only?
 - Access to trusted resources
 - All? Just failed attempts?
- Log must enable detection of security violations
 - Is this enough?

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Example: Bell-LaPadula



- What must be logged?
 - Action (read/write)
 - Level of subject
 - Level of object
- Can now check
 - Read: $S \geq O$
 - Write: $O \geq S$
- Is this necessary?
 - What if system validated as not allowing illegal read/write?
- What about change of security level?

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Logging *Trusted* Operations



- Secure system *prevents* security violations
- Trusted components: those that *can* violate security
 - Assumptions made to justify system secure
- Log actions by trusted components
 - Change in security level
 - Writes performed when not at maximum level
 - *All* reads (why?)

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Logging: Implementation



- Log Format
 - Standard
 - Machine readable
 - Transform to human readable
- Wrong:
 - Connection blocked from 128.10.3.4 to cs.purdue.edu
 - Right: Structured format, standards

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Logging: Implementation



- Log must be protected
 - Doesn't do any good if security violations erased from log
- Sanitization
 - Remove sensitive information from log
 - Why?
 - Before or after logging?

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Audit



- Detect security violation
 - State-based auditing: identify if state at prior time is valid
 - Transition-based auditing: Identify if prior transition would lead to unauthorized state
- Detect attempts to breach security
 - Not necessarily violations

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Using Audit Results



- Repair
 - Recover critical information
 - Risk mitigation
 - Restore integrity
- Punish
 - Identify violator

Both may demand additional logged information

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Why Not Design a Secure System Up Front?



- Audit catches security violations
 - Why allow them in the first place?
- Possible reasons:
 - (un)trusted components
 - Changes in security policy

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Other types of Audit



- Logging done for many reasons
 - System tuning
 - Backup / failure recovery
 - ?
- Can this be used for security audit?
 - Example: Basic Security Module add-on to SunOS
 - Defines audit events
 - Captures identity, action

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Example / Reading



- Network File System logging
 - What is the policy?
 - What requests logged?
 - What information logged?
- Read Bishop 24.6

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