

Minimizing collaborative attacks in a real heterogeneous mobile ad hoc network using cooperative immunization model

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, a security problem of cooperative immunization against collaborative attacks such as the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks in a real heterogeneous mobile ad hoc network was discussed. Due to the vulnerabilities of the protocol suites, collaborative attacks in the mobile ad hoc network may cause more damages than individual attacks. In human immune system, non-selfs (i.e. viruses, bacteria and cancers etc.) often attack human body in a collaborative way, and cause diseases in the whole body. Inspired from the human immune system, we built a tri-tier cooperative immunization model to detect the collaborative attacks (non-selfs) and eliminate them in the real mobile ad hoc network. The threat model of the collaborative attacks was developed to analyze the vulnerabilities of the real heterogeneous mobile ad hoc network. Real experimental results and simulations demonstrate the validation and effectiveness of the proposed secure model in minimizing the collaborative attacks.

Keywords:

Cooperative immunization

Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Security

Collaborative attacks

Non-selfs

1. Introduction

Security is a key challenge in the mobile ad hoc networks, since these networks use a suite of the shelf protocols, which makes all standard vulnerabilities of those protocols available to the attackers. The IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards for implementing wireless local area network (WLAN) computer communication in the 2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz frequency bands. These standards provide the basis for wireless network products using the Wi-Fi brand name. IEEE 802.15.4-2003

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1 (Low Rate WPAN) deals with low data rate but very long battery life (months or even years) and
2 very low complexity. Several standardized and proprietary networks (or mesh) layer protocols run
3 over 802.15.4-based networks, including IEEE 802.15.5, ZigBee, 6LoWPAN, and ISA100.11a.
4 The IEEE 802.16 standard provides a high-speed broadband access (up to 40 Mbps) with large
5 coverage, which makes it more flexible and usable in many scenarios than the other alternative
6 technologies such as DSL or WiFi.
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8 Recently, the availability of practical swarm intelligence and multi-agent algorithms can help
9 attackers to collaborate and realize more effective attacks against defense mechanisms more
10 effectively (Bhargava et al., 2009). Though the current mobile ad hoc networks use some
11 individualized security approaches such as antivirus software (Sukwong et al., 2011), intrusion
12 detection tools (Zhou et al., 2010), mail filtering applications (Garcia-Osorio et al., 2010) etc.,
13 these mobile ad hoc networks are not secure against the collaborative attacks because they are
14 designed against only individual attacks.
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16 Collaborative attacks are launched by some malicious adversaries that synchronize their
17 activities to accomplish disruption, deception, usurpation, and disclosure against the targeted
18 network entities (Bhargava et al., 2009). For instance, if the SYN flood attack and the slammer
19 worm are launched in a coordinated way, the resulting consequences will be devastating and very
20 difficult to deal with (Moore et al., 2003; Schuba et al., 1997). For instance, many attackers can
21 influence the decision-making of some core machines with routing Sybil attacks (Douceur 2002).
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23 In general, threat modeling is used to expose some circumstances or events having the
24 potential to cause harm to a system in the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data,
25 and/or denial of service, and results in a vulnerability assessment (IEEE Std 1074- 2006, 2006).
26 Similar to the threat model, the immune danger theory was proposed by Matzinger (2002), and in
27 this danger theory immune response distinguishes the danger signals that are generated by
28 damaged cells. In the real mobile ad hoc network of this paper, the threats are the damaged selfs,
29 i.e. the compromised nodes, and the foreign non-selfs such as the blackhole attacks and the
30 wormhole attacks, so the threats are the non-selfs in nature. The blackhole attacks can transmit
31 malicious broadcast information from a node that the node has the shortest path to the destination
32 aiming to intercept messages (Ramaswamy et al., 2005). The wormhole attacks can record packets
33 at one location in the network, tunnel them to other locations, and retransmit them there into the
34 network (Wang et al., 2006). The collaborative attacks of blackhole and wormhole almost have all
35 the abilities of the two attacks, and the two attacks can enhance each other sometimes (Bhargava
36 et al., 2009).
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38 To deal with the collaborative attacks, some cooperative approaches have been designed and
39 used on matching the features of multiple attacks in the collaborative way. But these approaches
40 are often ineffective to unknown attacks (Sukwong et al., 2011). In fact, human immune network
41 is a natural cooperative defense system against various collaborative attacks from viruses, bacteria
42 and cancer etc. (Gong et al., 2011), and the biological network inspires us to design more
43 advanced defense system against the collaborative attacks. Both RNA-containing and
44 DNA-containing viruses, two obviously different classes of virus, can cause cancer (Robert 1965),
45 and so bacteria with the viruses and cancer can cause the overload and damages of the immune
46 system. In general, the human immune network has a large number of immune cells (e.g. B cells
47 and T cells) and immune molecules (Bordon 2011). The first step for the immune network against
48 the collaborative attacks is to detect and determine whether the objects are selfs (Gros1 2011). If
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1 they are selfs, the objects are not attacks; otherwise, the objects are the non-selfs that cause attacks.
2 The first mission of the native immune tier is to detect selfs and attacks. The other responsibilities
3 of the tier are to recognize and classify known attacks. For unknown attacks, immune learning and
4 memorization mechanisms are necessary for the immune network to decrease & control the
5 attacks and these functions are deployed on the adaptive immune tier (Ziv1 et al., 2006).
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7 A bio-inspired anti-worm static artificial immune system was proposed and evaluated based on
8 the tri-tier immune model (Gong et al., 2006). The immune model was also used in software fault
9 diagnosis of mobile robots (Gong et al., 2008). In this paper, a new cooperative immunization
10 model against the collaborative attacks in the real heterogeneous mobile ad hoc network was
11 proposed and evaluated. The immune model was used to detect and minimize the attacks. The
12 cooperative immunization model was proposed against the collaborative attacks in the mobile ad
13 hoc networks in section 3. In section 4, the detection & learning capabilities of the immunization
14 model in a cooperative way was analyzed. In section 5, a simulation study of cooperative immune
15 network against collaborative attacks was given. Section 6 concluded the paper.
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20 **2. Related work**

21 The vulnerabilities of the mobile ad hoc networks have been analyzed in the literature. In the
22 following the main characteristics of the vulnerabilities were reviewed briefly.
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24 Bhargava et al. (2009) regarded some support to DES as an important vulnerability in WiMAX
25 standards, because DES can be broken by collaborative attacks. Second, attacks in the IEEE
26 802.16j standard include blackhole attacks (Ramaswamy et al., 2005), wormhole attacks (Wang et
27 al., 2006), denial- of-message (DoM) attacks (McCune et al., 2005) and sybil attacks (Yu et al.,
28 2006) etc. Besides, the implementation bugs and the incompatibilities are also the potential
29 sources of vulnerabilities (Bhargava et al., 2009).
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33 To defend against the collaborative attacks, a few of cooperative approaches have been
34 proposed recently. For example, Cheung et al. (2003) decomposed some cyber attacks into
35 multiple sub- attacks and developed a method to model multistep attack scenarios based on typical
36 isolated alerts about attack steps. Li et al. (2007) built a stochastic model of collaborative internal
37 and external attacks. Yang et al. (2000) designed a signature-based model to detect collaborative
38 attacks. Based on multicast, annotated topology information, and blind detection techniques,
39 Hussain et al. (2003) built a collaborative system to detect distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks.
40 Ourston et al. (2004) used Hidden Markov models to detect collaborative attacks. Cuppens et al.
41 (2002) made each Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in collaborative IDSs send its triggered alerts
42 to a central module, in order to reduce the number of false positives. The central module correlates
43 the incoming alerts of all IDSs and generated a more elaborated and general alarm to the whole
44 system. Lin et al. (2008) shared the information from the node that detected the intrusion to the
45 other nodes, so that they can save time and energy for doing pattern matching which is a
46 demanding task. Yu-Sung et al. (2003) proposed a collaborative intrusion detection system (CIDS)
47 for different sorts of IDSs to work cooperatively.
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54 To overcome the disadvantages of the IDS approaches against the unknown attacks, the
55 techniques of immune computation have been investigated for some security applications.
56 Dasgupta et al. (2002) presented a technique inspired by the negative selection mechanism of the
57 immune system that can detect foreign patterns in the non-self space. Because malicious computer
58 software in the form of viruses and worms continues to plague modern information networks,
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1 Balthrop et al. (2004) surveyed the structure of computer networks and analyze their
2 epidemiological characteristics. Esponda et al. (2002) proposed a formal framework to analyze the
3 tradeoffs between positive and negative detection schemes in terms of the number of detectors
4 needed to maximize coverage.
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6 **3. Cooperative immunization model against collaborative attacks**

7 Based on the tri-tier immune model as shown in Fig. 1, a real mobile ad hoc network was
8 immunized for security, as shown in Fig. 2.
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10 **Fig. 1 - Tri-tier cooperative immunization. The three tiers of immune model include native
11 immune tier, adaptive immune tier and network tier.**

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18 **Fig. 2 – A real mobile ad hoc network.**

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20 The native immune tier is used to detect attacks in a cooperative way, and the self is the most
21 important factor in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the attack detection process. The
22 second tier is adaptive immune tier that is used to learn and recognize unknown attacks
23 cooperatively, based on the expendable multi-dimension feature space of attacks.
24

25 For example, the procedure of minimize the collaborative attacks such as the blackhole attacks
26 and the wormhole attacks is introduced below. First, the native immune tier detected the selfs,
27 which are normal components of the real mobile ad hoc network. The accurate results for
28 detecting the selfs were used to detect the attacks quickly. Each notebook or ARM had different
29 selfs, and the attack detection of each node was interacted with those of other nodes. When an
30 attack was detected in any node, the information about the attack was sent to the other nodes.
31

32 Then the attacks that were detected were recognized by fast search algorithms, and their
33 features were matched or unrecognized in the expendable feature space of all the known attacks. If
34 the search result returned yes, then the attacks were controlled and cleaned in a relatively easy way,
35 and both the features of the attacks were delivered to the relative nodes. If the search result
36 returned no, then the attacks were learnt with some intelligent methods such as enhanced learning
37 from examples and learning based on neural network etc.
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43 **4. Analysis of immunization model**

44 Suppose a mobile ad hoc network is denoted as finite immune graph $G=(V, E)$, where V is the
45 vertex or node set, and E is the edge set with $E \neq \phi$. An element in the set V denotes a node in
46 the mobile ad hoc network, and any element in the set E represents the relationship between one
47 node and another. It is assumed that the edges are undirected and the graph is connected. At
48 system initialization, there is no attack, and the mobile ad hoc network is normal with space-time
49 representation of its normal model (Gong et al., 2011). It is also assumed that a unique discrete
50 time order is represented with $t=0, 1, 2, \dots$, though the time properties of some components may be
51 turned back or changed forward with a big step in a local virtual space. Considering the attacks in
52 a sequential order, a node is secure, damaged, or removed at any point in time. When a node is
53 damaged by the attacks, it may be under control of attackers, and thus may attack other nodes as a
54 tool of the attackers. The attacks may remove crucial nodes, and the damaged nodes may be
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removed in its immune response in order to be repaired by its backup ones. In Fig. 2, the real mobile ad hoc network has 3 notebook nodes and 2 ARM nodes.

First of all, the set of nodes, which were damaged by the attacks at or before time t , is denoted by D_t . $N(t)$ is used to denote the number of nodes that were damaged at or before time t , and the number of nodes, which were removed or lost by time t , was denoted by $M(t)$. Therefore, $|C_t| = N(t)$, and $N(t) - M(t)$ is used to denote the number of nodes that were damaged but have not been removed by time t . For the event that the node was damaged, the degree of node v ($v \in V$) in G is denoted by $\deg(v)$, and the set of nodes neighboring with the node v is denoted by $\{v' | (v, v') \in E\}$. The time, at which the k th node changes state from secure to damaged (i.e. the k th incident occurs), is denoted by T_k , where $1 \leq k \leq |V|$. And the identity of the node, which was damaged by the attacks at time T_k , i.e. the k th damaged node, is denoted by $\text{node}(T_k)$. Suppose for any sequence of damaged nodes $\text{node}(T_1), \dots, \text{node}(T_i), \dots, \text{node}(T_{|V|})$, the degree of $\text{node}(T_i)$ follows distribution D_i ($1 \leq i \leq |V|$), which is distributed identically and independently as the degree distribution D of $G=(V, E)$ (Li et al., 2007).

For random variables R_1 & R_2 , if $\Pr[R_1 > k] \geq \Pr[R_2 > k]$ for any k , then R_1 is called larger (or faster) stochastically than R_2 , denoted by $R_1 \succeq_{st} R_2$ (Shaked et al., 1994). Thus, for the sequence of the stochastic intervals between two incidents (e.g. the i th incident and the succeeding incident) occurrences, which are denoted by $S_{i+1} = T_{i+1} - T_i$ for $i=0, 1, \dots, |V|-1$, the sequence S_0, S_1, \dots, S_k is stochastically decreasing (Li et al., 2007) that is denoted by

$$S_i \succeq_{st} S_{i+1}, i = 0, 1, \dots, |V| - 1. \quad (1)$$

This proposition is used to prove that the coordinated attacks become more powerful as more internal nodes are damaged and produce new attacks. Here, the discretization makes T_k follows a discrete Poisson process of success probabilities r_{k-1} for $k=1, \dots, |V|$ (Li et al., 2007), and the probabilities r_{k-1} are denoted by

$$r_i = \frac{|V| + d_1 + d_2 + \dots + d_i - i}{2|E| + |V|}, \quad (2)$$

$$r_0 = \frac{|V|}{2|E| + |V|}, i = 1, 2, \dots, |V| - 1$$

where $d_j \stackrel{def}{=} \deg(\text{node}(T_j))$ for $j=1, \dots, |V|$.

It is assumed that the success probability to detect the damaged node is denoted by p_i and the success probability to cut off the output of the damaged node is denoted by $1 - p_i$, once the node is found. Therefore, according to (2), the probability r_i with detection is improved by

$$r_i = \frac{|V| + \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} d_j + d_i \cdot (1 - p_i) - i + 1 - p_i}{2|E| + |V|}, \quad (3)$$

$$= \frac{|V| + \sum_{j=1}^i d_j - 2p_i - i + 1}{2|E| + |V|}$$

In general, there are 3 strategies to find the damaged node: (1) attack detection directly by getting and matching the features of the damaged node in the feature space F_B for the incomplete set B of attacks, with measuring errors; (2) unknown attack learning from the feature space F_A for

1 the complete set A of all known attacks, with uncertain results of detection and recognition; (3)
 2 self detection based on the space-time property set F_S of the selfs and the normal model for
 3 defining the selfs, and then non-self detection based on the results of the self detection. For
 4 strategy 1 and strategy 2, if the node is damaged by known attacks, then the success probability
 5 $p_i^{(1)}$ for strategy 1 is denoted by
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$$8 \quad p_i^{(1)} = \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} \cdot p_e^{(1)}, i = 1, \dots, |V|, \quad (4)$$

9 where the probability of measuring errors for strategy 1 is denoted by $p_e^{(1)}$, and the success
 10 probability $p_i^{(2)}$ for strategy 2 is denoted by
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$$12 \quad p_i^{(2)} = p_l \cdot p_e^{(2)}, i = 1, \dots, |V|, \quad (5)$$

13 where the probability of measuring errors for strategy 2 is denoted by $p_e^{(2)}$, and the success
 14 probability of learning unknown attacks is denoted by p_l . Here, $p_e^{(2)} \approx p_e^{(1)}$, $p_l = 1$.
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16 Thus,

$$17 \quad p_i^{(1)} \leq p_i^{(2)}, \quad (6)$$

$$18 \quad r_i^{(1)} \geq r_i^{(2)}. \quad (7)$$

19 Here, for $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, the sequence of geometric success probabilities for detection strategy γ
 20 are denoted by $r_1^{(\gamma)}, \dots, r_k^{(\gamma)}$.
 21

22 If the node is damaged by unknown attacks, then the success probability $p_i^{(1)}$ for strategy 1
 23 always equals to 0 because the features of the unknown attacks will not be matched in the feature
 24 space F_B ; to our hope the success probability $p_i^{(2)}$ depends on learning, and mostly
 25 $0 = p_i^{(1)} < p_i^{(2)} \leq 0.8$ (Meltzoff et al., 2011; Marchiori et al., 2008; Edelman et al., 2007; Behera
 26 et al., 2006).
 27

$$28 \quad 0 = \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} < p_l \leq 0.8. \quad (8)$$

29 Thus, (6) and (7) are still right.

30 When the space-time property set F_S is normal with correct data for strategy 3, no matter
 31 whether the node is damaged by known attacks or not, the success probability $p_i^{(3)}$ for strategy 3
 32 is denoted by
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$$34 \quad p_i^{(3)} = p_s \cdot p_e^{(3)}, i = 1, \dots, |V|, \quad (9)$$

35 where the probability of measuring errors for strategy 3 is denoted by $p_e^{(3)}$, and the normal
 36 probability of the selfs is denoted by p_s . Here, $p_e^{(3)} \approx p_e^{(2)} \approx p_e^{(1)}$, $p_s = 1$.
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38 Thus, when the node is damaged by known attacks,

$$39 \quad p_i^{(3)} \approx p_i^{(2)} \geq p_i^{(1)}, \quad (10)$$

$$40 \quad r_i^{(3)} \approx r_i^{(2)} \leq r_i^{(1)}. \quad (11)$$

41 But, when the node is damaged by some unknown attacks, according to (8),
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$$1 = p_S > 0.8 \geq p_l > \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} = 0. \quad (12)$$

$$\therefore p_S \cdot p_\varepsilon^{(3)} > p_l \cdot p_\varepsilon^{(2)} > \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} \cdot p_\varepsilon^{(1)}. \quad (13)$$

$$\therefore p_i^{(3)} > p_i^{(2)} > p_i^{(1)}, \quad (14)$$

$$\therefore r_i^{(3)} < r_i^{(2)} < r_i^{(1)}. \quad (15)$$

In summary, for any attack,

$$r_i^{(3)} \leq r_i^{(2)} \leq r_i^{(1)}. \quad (16)$$

For $\gamma \in \{1,2,3\}$, the time at which the k th incident due to attacks occurs for detection strategy γ is denoted by $T_k^{(\gamma)}$ (Li et al., 2007), then for $k=1, 2, \dots, |V|$,

$$T_k^{(3)} \geq T_k^{(2)} \geq T_k^{(1)}. \quad (17)$$

This proposition is useful, for it inspires us, from the perspective for fighting against the attacks, that detection strategy 3 outperforms detection strategy2, which in turn outperforms detection strategy 1. In fact, because some of the collaborative attacks are known and the others are often unknown, if the space-time property set F_S is normal with correct data, strategy 3 is the best approach to test the attacks; otherwise, strategy 2 is often better than strategy 1, especially in dealing with the unknown attacks.

5. Real experimental results and simulation analysis

The real mobile ad hoc network consisted of 3 notebooks and 2 embedded systems, as shown in Fig. 2. The first embedded system was an ARM9, and the other was an ARM11. The notebooks transferred information each other via the wireless LAN, and their data rates were 54Mbit/s. The ARM9 and the ARM11 transferred information each other via the Zigbee devices, and they connected with the second notebook via the Zigbee devices too. The average data rates of the Zigbee devices were 40Kbit/s, and the maximum data rates were 250Kbit/s.

The blackhole attack was based on the Black Hole exploit kit, which has been used by attackers for major Web-based attacks for last few months. Fig. 2 shows the normal real mobile ad hoc network. The first notebook c_1 was compromised by the blackhole attack, as shown in Fig. 3, and with the Black Hole exploit kit the blackhole attack used the vulnerabilities: CVE-2010-1885, CVE-2010-1423, CVE-2010-0886, CVE-2010-0842, CVE-2010-0840, CVE-2009-1671, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2008-2992, CVE-2007-5659 and CVE-2006-0003. The compromised node of notebook misled the other connecting nodes to send information to it without possibility of infection, but no any feedback was returned to the senders.

Fig. 3 – The first notebook compromised by the blackhole attack in the real mobile ad hoc network.

The wormhole attack was implemented with C++ codes, and the second notebook c_2 was compromised by the wormhole attack initially, as shown in Fig. 4 (1). The node c_2 was transferring

1 the codes of the wormhole attack into the other connecting nodes c_1 , c_3 , ARM9 and ARM11,
2 keeping old connections.

3 Fig. 4 (2) shows the final damages of the wormhole attacks on the whole real mobile ad hoc
4 network, i.e. the compromised whole network. In fact, after the compromised notebook transferred
5 the codes of the wormhole attack into the ARM9 and the ARM11 via the Zigbee devices and
6 activated the wormhole attacks on the two embedded systems, the ARM9 and the ARM11 were
7 compromised by the wormhole attacks. Similarly, the compromised notebook by the blackhole
8 attack and the third notebook were compromised by the wormhole attacks, after the code
9 transferring and activation. Though the whole network was compromised by the wormhole attacks
10 in the end, the blackhole attack could quicken the spread of the wormhole attacks by disturbing
11 the routing of information for attack detection.
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18 **(1) The first notebook and the second one compromised by the blackhole attack and the**
19 **wormhole attack respectively.**

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22 **(2) The final network compromised by the wormhole attacks under the collaborative attacks**
23 **in the real network.**

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25 **Fig. 4 –The real mobile ad hoc networks under the collaborative attacks.**
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28 When a node was normal, its client program sent normal data such as the data stream from the
29 file data.txt, and the server program of the receiver node got the data of the file data.txt
30 successfully. As one node was compromised by the blackhole attack, the routing table of this node
31 was changed the attack, and so the client program of this node sent no any data to the other nodes.
32 Fig. 5 (1) shows that the immune program detected the blackhole attack by checking the
33 space-time properties of the files with the normal records in the self database. Then the immune
34 program deleted the attacking files and the infected files, and repaired the infected files with the
35 backup system of the normal system. On the other hand, the wormhole attack changed the routing
36 table of the compromised node, and spread the wormhole attack via the client program of this
37 node into other nodes. The server programs of the other nodes received the program file of the
38 wormhole attack from the compromised node, and activated the wormhole attack on those nodes.
39 So those nodes became new compromised nodes of the wormhole attack, and spread this attack
40 into their other nodes until the whole network collapsed. As similar to the blackhole attack, the
41 wormhole attack was detected by the immune program via the normal model, and eliminated
42 finally in Fig. 5 (2). Moreover, the infected files were repaired with the backup system of the
43 normal system, so the whole real mobile ad hoc network recovered the normal state.
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54 **(1) Immunization against the blackhole attack in the real mobile ad hoc network.**

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56 **(2) Immunization against the wormhole attack in the real mobile ad hoc network.**

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58 **Fig. 5 – Immunization of the real mobile ad hoc network.**
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Due to the amount limit of notebooks, ARMs and Zigbee devices, the node amount of the real ad hoc network was as small as five, but the node amount of the simulations with the Network Simulator 2.35 (Breslau et al., 2000) was expanded to as large as 20. The simulation parameters were shown in Table 1. The purpose of this experiment was to show that the immune mechanism based on the normal model is deployed in a medium-scale mobile ad hoc network to detect and repair the collaborative attacks such as the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks.

Table 1 – Parameter setting of simulations. CBR represents the constant bit rate.

Parameter name	Setting value
Simulation time	10(s)
Number of notebook nodes	10
Number of ARM nodes	10
Initial sum of blackhole node	1
Initial sum of wormhole node	1
Topology	700m*700m
Routing protocol	AODV
Traffic	CBR
Normal packet size	512bytes
Abnormal packet size	1024bytes
Data rates	40K-10Mbit/s
Backup systems	2

In this scenario, 10 notebook nodes and 10 ARM nodes were used, and the notebooks had the same Windows-based backup systems and the ARMs had the same Linux-based backup systems. The basic AODV routing protocol was used and UDP packets were sent and received among the nodes. Based on the AODV routing protocol and the attack features, the protocols of the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks were simulated.

The immunization mechanism was used to cut off the connection between the attacked node and other normal nodes and make the attacked node repaired. All simulation runs lasted 10 seconds, and to avoid disturbances from the warm-up period, the first 1 second of the simulation results should be discarded.

Particularly, 1 normal network scenario, 3 different attack scenarios and 2 different anti- attack scenarios were simulated. The effects of single blackhole attack, single wormhole attack and the combined effect of blackhole attack together with wormhole attack on the performance of ad hoc wireless networks were analyzed. Different methods were compared in defending the network against collaborative attacks (Bhargava et al., 2009).

For these evaluations, the reaction time included the detection time and the response time. Different detection approaches spent different time, which might cause important difficulty to eliminate and defend the attacks. In order to improve the accuracy of the test, multiple repeated attacks were conducted to each experiment.

In these experiments, 4 important metrics were evaluated, i.e. packet delivery ratio (PDR), throughput, overhead and end-to-end delay. PDR is denoted with the ratio between the amount of packet delivered at the destination node and the whole amount of sent packets by the source node. Throughput and end-to-end delay are used to show the network performance degradation. Besides,

1 overhead is represented with the fraction of all control packets sent during the simulation time out
2 of the total amount of packets transmitted. Fig. 6 shows the packet delivery ratio (PDR) in four
3 types of networks. The first network was normal one; the second was damaged by the blackhole
4 attack on a node; the third was damaged by the wormhole attack on another node and the last one
5 was damaged by the collaborative attacks.
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10 **Fig. 6 - Packet delivery ratios of the networks under attacks including collaborative attacks.**

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12 The networks under the blackhole attack or the collaborative attacks had lower packet delivery
13 ratios than the normal network, because the blackhole attack destroyed the local network
14 communication. In fact, the wormhole attack enhanced the packet delivery ratio and transferred
15 the wormhole programs to other normal nodes in the nine seconds in Fig. 6. So the packet delivery
16 ratio of the network under the wormhole attack was even higher than that of the normal network
17 until the abnormal wormhole transferring caused the network collapse alike in Fig. 5 (2) after the
18 nine seconds. The four curves in different positions show that the collaborative attacks combined
19 the hidden harms of the single wormhole attack and the communication destroying of the single
20 blackhole attack.
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25 Comparing with the packet delivery ratios of the network under the collaborative attacks and
26 the network based on the regular IDS against the attacks, the packet delivery ratio of the network
27 with cooperative immunization was higher, as shown in Fig. 7. The possible reason for this result
28 is that the cooperative immunization was faster and more effective against the collaborative
29 attacks than the regular IDS.
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34 **Fig. 7 - Packet delivery ratios of the networks defending against collaborative attacks.**

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37 For comparing the performances of the regular IDS and the cooperative immunization, the
38 throughputs of the connections in the two networks were analyzed in Fig. 8. By this outcome from
39 2 second to 4 second, it is sure to affirm that the regular IDS caused higher throughput than the
40 cooperative immunization due to the harmful expansion of wormhole nodes. The node under
41 wormhole attacks was isolated and the normal nodes were protected by the immune network based
42 on the normal model. After 4 second in Fig. 8, the two throughputs of the connections in the
43 different networks were almost same, and the immune network's throughput is slightly higher than
44 the IDS-based network's throughput.
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51 **Fig. 8 - End-to-end throughput.**

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54 The next metric evaluated was the network overhead, which shows how much of control
55 packets were generated within the network, as shown in Fig. 9. The immunization against the
56 collaborative attacks always performed best, and the normal network performed better in average
57 than both the network under the collaborative attacks and the regular IDS against the collaborative
58 attacks.
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The last observed metric, the end-to-end delay, is shown and compared in Fig. 10.

Fig. 9 - Overall overhead.

Fig. 10 - End-to-end delay.

The results in Fig. 10 were calculated by taking the average of the end-to-end delay of the incoming packets at the receiver. As same as the previous, the end-to-end delay stresses the better performance for the mobile ad hoc network by the immunization rather than the regular IDS against the collaborative attacks.

Overall, the NS2-based simulations results allow affirming that it is important and useful for the mobile ad hoc network to utilize the cooperative immunization for security. Based on analyzing the experiment results, the immunization has three advantages than the regular IDS. First, the immunization is able to isolate the nodes under attacks by the network reconfiguration; second, the immunization can identify the nodes under attacks by detecting the non-selfs and the selfs based on the normal model, which is very useful and crucial for controlling and eliminating the fast expansion of the active attacks such as the wormhole attacks; finally, the immunization is of new powerful learning mechanism for defending the networks, called as immune learning.

6. Conclusions and future works

Some important properties and mechanisms of cooperative immunization were proposed to defend the ad hoc network under collaborative attacks. New tri-tier cooperative immunization based framework was designed to detect and recognize the collaborative attacks in mobile ad hoc networks such as the real mobile ad hoc network of ARMs and notebooks. The performance of the proposed framework was analyzed in term of the packet delivery ratios, the throughput, and the traffic overhead of the system. The real experiments and simulation results confirm effectiveness of the proposed cooperative immunization model in detecting and mitigating the collaborative attacks from disrupting the protected mobile ad hoc networks such as the real mobile ad hoc network of ARMs and notebooks.

For future works, it is interesting to improve the protocols of immunization by increasing the accuracy and speed of the adaptive immunization in dealing with unknown attacks. Evaluations of the issues such as efficiency, space-time identification, complexity, optimization, and consumption are also left for future work.

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




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
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
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


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


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


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


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


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